
1. Once again, there was a preconception. Once again, there was a failure of intelligence.
Preconception: Trump will come, and we’ll be able to fight with our hands untied. Let’s hold off until Trump comes, and then we’ll be able to decisively defeat Hamas (not to mention annexation, encouraging emigration, expanding settlements, collapsing the Palestinian Authority).
Intelligence failure: No one sounded the alarm that Trump was planning to do exactly the opposite. And if someone did, the warning went nowhere. A future inquiry committee would easily conclude that the warning signs were there. Trump kept saying what he wanted to happen. But that’s the nature of preconception: you only hear what aligns with your predetermined view.
And so, once again, Israel was caught off guard. The very president who was supposed to remove the shackles tightened them instead. Trump wanted a deal “before” entering the White House. He got it. Trump said: “This must end.” And apparently, this is what he meant.
Or maybe this is just another preconception.
2. In Israel’s history, there has never been such a sour reaction to a sight as heartbreaking and exhilarating as the return of three hostages from captivity.
3. The Israeli government keeps saying — and the Trump administration keeps saying — that Hamas will not rule Gaza.
What neither is saying is how we move from Point A (Hamas in power, as this week’s images showed) to Point B (Hamas out of power).
Does Hamas believe Israel is truly committed to ensuring it will soon cease to exist? If it did, it might have held on to its best bargaining chips — the hostages — instead of agreeing to a deal.
On the other hand, maybe it does believe this. Maybe that’s exactly why it agreed to have a gradual deal — to buy time, to rearm, to resupply, to boost morale. As for phase 2 of the deal? In phase 1 of the deal 33 hostages (including bodies) are supposed to be sent back to Israel. The deal stipulates that negotiations for a second phase are to begin 16 days after the beginning of the implementation of phase 1, with the goal being the release of all remaining hostages, a permanent ceasefire, and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza.
That may never happen. Because Hamas, too, will never go through with a deal designed to bring about its own destruction.
4. The Israeli government does not seem to intend to proceed to phase 2 of the deal. If that’s the decision, it’s a gut-wrenching one. Let’s hope it wasn’t made for political reasons (holding the coalition together) but because the ministers genuinely believe that proceeding to phase 2 would be a grave mistake.
Phase 2 is the one involving the risk of leaving Hamas in power.
When asked, the Israeli public refuses to accept such outcome. When asked “Would you support a deal that allows Hamas to remain in power?” a solid majority says no. So it seems that the public (the majority that supports the current deal) believes that the deal can be implemented without leaving Hamas in power.
But wait a minute. When asked “Do you believe Netanyahu’s promise that Hamas will not remain in power?” a 61% majority said they don’t believe the promise.
To summarize: the public supports the deal; the public opposes Hamas remaining in power; the public does not believe Hamas will be removed from power.
In other words: the public supports a deal whose likely outcome it opposes.
You shouldn’t mock Israelis for their confused feelings. The situation really is complicated.
5. The fact that Trump surprised everyone by putting pressure on Israel to accept the deal doesn’t mean he won’t surprise again.
He could surprise Netanyahu again by ramping up the pressure to complete phase 2 of the deal. He could also do the opposite — surprise the deal’s supporters by easing the pressure.
That’s the dizzying reality of having an unpredictable president.
If Trump agrees to halt before phase 2, Israel is likely to do likewise.
So the real question is: What if Trump keeps pushing to complete all stages of the deal? Can Israel be the obstacle to completing the deal, if Trump is fully committed to implementing it?
The short answer is yes: Israeli governments have withstood heavy American pressure before when they believed national interests required it.
The longer answer: It’s complicated. Because resisting Trump’s pressure isn’t the same as resisting Obama’s or Biden’s.
A right-wing Israeli government that stands up to an Obama or a Biden is seen as defiant, principled — and it can always reassure its supporters with a wink: “Hang in there, a friendlier president is on the way.” But a right-wing Israeli government that stands up to Trump? That’s a government telling the Israeli public: There is really no American leader we can work with.
Something I wrote in Hebrew
On Trump’s second term and the Middle East:
The Middle East Trump will encounter now is not the one he faced when he was first elected in 2016. What awaits him? New circumstances. An opportunity … Gaza is in ruins. Hamas is a diminished player. Turkey’s power has grown beyond recognition. Iran is under pressure. Hezbollah is struggling in Lebanon. Syria is no longer a functioning state. And Israel? Israel is not the same Israel. Socially and politically weaker. Perhaps economically too. Wounded, burdened with guilt and despair in the wake of the Oct. 7 trauma. Yet also projecting determination, resilience and the dynamic force of a country that was knocked down, got back up and landed painful blows on its enemies … Trump likes opportunities. And Trump likes Trump. That means the key is identifying the kind of opportunity that will appeal to him … Trump is not a philanthropist. He is not a president whose instinct is to champion noble ideals. He is a president of interests and deals. A president of profit and return.
A week’s numbers
Let’s see what they say when “phase 2” is on the table (see column above).
A reader’s response
Jennifer Altman writes: “Shmuel, did you change your views on Trump?” My response: The question isn’t specific enough (changed in what way?), but generally speaking, I keep changing my mind from day to day as new information comes in, and recommend that you do likewise.
Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.