
In the end, a deal will likely be placed on the table — maybe, by the time you read this, it has already happened. The government will accept it; in truth, it won’t have much of a choice. A hostage deal is crafted behind closed doors, with powerful players involved. If there’s a deal, it will be one that both the outgoing and incoming U.S. presidents desire. It will be a deal that key mediators want. By the time it comes to a cabinet vote, the ministers will be no more than spectators. Their influence lies in setting the political red lines during negotiations. Once the prime minister makes his decision, their power ends.
What are these red lines? The monthly survey by JPPI, released earlier this week, reveals some of them. It sheds light on what the public is willing to accept — and what it isn’t. And to begin understanding the Israeli psyche concerning a deal we must start with the not-so-obvious: There is no longer such thing as a “deal at all cost.” No significant group in Israel supports such an idea. Thus, the notion of a deal that allows Hamas to remain in power is overwhelmingly rejected by Israeli Jews — only 17% are willing to accept it.
Another thorny issue: the idea of releasing only some of the hostages in a partial deal. Most Israelis reject such terms. And here lies a potential clash between what Israelis want and what their government is prepared — or able — to deliver. Reports suggest that any deal currently on the table is likely to be partial, at least initially. This means that celebrations will be muted; hostages will still remain in Gaza, their heartbreaking stories haunting us. Hamas will continue to exploit them, reminding us of its presence and stirring debates: Who is to blame for the continued captivity of the remaining hostages? Were they left behind only because of Hamas’ impossible demands or also because of our government’s refusal to meet reasonable terms that might have secured their release?
At least we know what the public thinks about these reasonable terms. As we’ve seen, if faced with the agonizing choice between returning all hostages as the cost of legitimizing Hamas’ rule or insisting on Hamas’ removal as the price of leaving hostages behind, the majority seems inclined toward the latter. This sentiment isn’t new; a similar finding emerged in a survey nearly a year ago, sparking a certain unease of people who believe that such questions shouldn’t even be asked.
But can we not ask it? Can we avoid confronting what Israeli society is, and isn’t, willing to do for its hostages?
The answer to this question reflects a complex reality. It reflects a meaningful change. Israelis are willing to go far for the hostages – but not as far as they once were. A decade ago, Israel paid dearly for a single hostage. Today, the willingness to pay is notably diminished. The horrific events of Oct. 7, the sheer number of hostages, and the unimaginable cruelty they face have hardened Israeli hearts. Paradoxically, and tragically, the enormity of the calamity has made Israelis less willing to pay the price they once deemed acceptable.
Still, Israelis remain willing to pay significant price to secure the hostages’ release. They are ready to free hundreds of terrorists, even those with blood on their hands – though not everyone agrees for this. Among Likud Party supporters, about half oppose such a move. Among Religious Zionist Party supporters, the majority – 55% – oppose a release of many imprisoned terrorists. When segmented by religiosity, religious Israelis are more likely to oppose such exchanges. Yet, when looking at the broader Jewish population, and even more so at the Arab population, the majority holds: Israel is prepared to release prisoners, including those guilty of grave crimes, to bring the hostages home.
The most contentious issue is the withdrawal of IDF forces from the Gaza Strip. Such a decision, should it become part of a deal, will largely define the government’s ability to defend it politically. Jewish Israelis are nearly evenly split on this question. However, supporters of the governing coalition overwhelmingly oppose a full withdrawal of IDF forces.
Another potential price is a declaration of the war’s end. Will Israelis accept that? The answer is complicated. When asked if they would agree to “ending the war,” 54% of Jewish respondents said yes, while 38% said no. But when presented with the idea that agreements with Hamas are temporary — allowing for the resumption of hostilities later — 55% agreed. That’s almost the same share of the public. In other words, acceptance of the idea of ending the war may not be a genuine view, but rather a belief that the ceasefire is merely provisional.
A shift in public sentiment reveals a changed Israel. Some will say the nation has hardened, revealing a crueler side. Others will argue the country has sobered, and was forced to become tougher. Either way, this is Israel’s new psyche. The war changed our society, and even our ethos, in many ways.
Something I wrote in Hebrew
Minister of Justice Yariv Levin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Gideon Sa’ar are promoting a new plan for change in the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee. In their version, this is a “compromise” plan. Here’s what I wrote when it was released:
What was proposed has two components that are not necessarily compatible. The first is the desire for compromise — a sentiment that leads Israelis like journalist Akiva Novick to write, “I supported the compromise even before I knew what the compromise was.” This desire is understandable and shared by many Israelis who are tired of unnecessary quarrels … alongside this positive sentiment lies the second component that cannot be ignored: The details of the compromise. While the desire for compromise is broad and abstract, the details of the compromise are specific and concrete. One can want compromise without wanting this compromise. Conversely, one can support this compromise without being in favor of compromise as a general principle.
A week’s numbers
Numbers from the JPPI monthly survey in Israel.
A reader’s response
Illya M. asks: Shmuel, is your book on U.S. Jews available in English? My answer: No, and the truth is that it is already somewhat outdated. But since you asked about books… my newer book “The Jews: 7 Frequently Asked Questions” will soon be published in English. So, get ready.
Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.