Rethinking Israel’s Security

There two ways to think about the dramatic events that rocked the Middle East in the last year and a half. 

One – a tactical failure in Gaza, and an unexpected decision by Hamas, led to unprecedented upheaval. Had Israel been slightly readier for the confrontation, either by looking more carefully at the intelligence hinting at possible attack, or by having more forces on the border on the morning of the attack, the result would have been not much different from the results of previous violent rounds in Gaza.   

Two – a strategic miscalculation, whose roots go back several decades, cost Israel dearly and served as a wake-up call. Israel failed to understand the motivations of its enemies, failed to ready itself to likely occurrences, failed in preparation, division of resources, allocations of funds. Had Israel been slightly readier for the confrontation it would not much matter. The upheaval would still lead to catastrophic outcomes. 

If the failure was tactical, what Israel needs is adjustment. If the failure is strategic, what Israel needs is rethinking. And a few Israelis are already engaged in attempts to envision a change to Israel’s strategy that is more than tactical adjustments. The most ambitious of these attempts reimagine an overhaul of Israel’s security strategy. That is, to rethink the principles established by Israel’s founder, David Ben-Gurion. These principles, claims one such Israeli – Prof. Eviatar Matania – must be reconsidered. In fact, he writes in a paper for the Misgav Institute, even if thus far no one formally changed “the principles of Israel’s historical (“Ben-Gurionist”) security strategy … in practice there is a ‘behavioral’ change in Israel’s political-security actions.” 

What Matania proposes in his detailed work is more than tweaks to Israel’s strategy. True, he writes, two of the main assumptions on which Israel’s strategy was founded are still valid: That the “region” doesn’t want Israel to be there, and that “there is a catastrophic asymmetry between Israel and its enemies in population, territory and the number of countries those who oppose Israel.” But one dramatic change necessitates rethinking: “Israel today, unlike before, is a strong Western economy — even after the upheavals it experienced — and its GDP is greater than that of any of the countries in the region (except Saudi Arabia and Turkey).” Thus, he writes, “Israel can currently invest considerable budgets in security.”

What would a new strategy look like? It is not easy to explain the full meaning of Matania’s proposition in a short article, but I’ll try to capture its essence by giving examples. 

One important change he proposes concerns “Deterrence.” Deterrence is one of the original “three principles” of Israel’s strategy — deterrence, early warning and decisive defeat of the enemy. Matania believes that deterrence ought to be replaced with what he calls “Coercion,” an amalgamation of Deterrence and “Compellence.” “Deterrence and Compellence create Coercion, which tries to prevent war through the threat of levying a heavy price (deterrence) or restoring deterrence through implementation (enforcement) while constantly moving between the two.” And by enforcement he means “angry” – his term – and “disproportionate” enforcement, “meaning that Israel will change from being a threatening yet contained actor to a player who reacts harshly to any injury, large or small.”

By enforcement he means “angry” – his term – and “disproportionate” enforcement, “meaning that Israel will change from being a threatening yet contained actor to a player who reacts harshly to any injury, large or small.”

Why give up on the idea of proportional response? Matania explains: “The term ‘proportional’ was invented by those who do not understand the essence of Coercion.  Coercion is not relevant if the enemy knows that a response [to provocation] will be measured.” Only “real fear that any small realization of a threat will be met with a blow of no Proportionately could strengthen deterrence.”

Matania doesn’t just propose to add layers to Israel’s strategy, he also believes some of the current pillars ought to be eliminated. Chief among them: early warning. “Early warning failed in the supreme tests that it faced, in the Yom Kippur War and the Oct. 7 disaster, and it is likely to fail in the future as well. Early warning will fail not because it is sometimes impossible to warn about impending war, but because it is impossible to guarantee such warning – especially when surprise is the essence of the enemy’s planning.” Israel, he writes soberly, “must assume that there may be another surprise in the future … on land, in the air or at sea, and perhaps also in cyberspace … Respectively, the IDF must be built so that any enemy can be stopped even when it has the advantage of surprise.”

Easier said than done? Costlier done than said? No doubt. And yet, Matania believes it’s possible, and essential.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

Following a Pew report on the religious composition of the incoming Congress I wrote this:

Is it good for Jews to have many Jews in Congress? This is a complicated question to answer. A large number of Jews in Congress attracts attention, sometimes conspiracy theories, often feelings like jealousy. On the other hand, the Congress is a focal point where it is possible to influence “Jewish interests,” assuming there is such a thing (fighting antisemitism is perhaps the only one to which all Jewish members of Congress will subscribe). Congress is a place that radiates power, and the presence of many Jews there indicates that this group has power. It is good for Israel that when its enemies look at Congress, they recognize that there are many Jews in it — even if, in the eyes of Israelis, a large portion of these members of Congress do not support Israel to the extent desired. It is good for all Jews that when non-Jews look at Congress, they recognize that the Jews are a successful elite group, and therefore, at least sometimes, will want to engage with it. In other words, it’s complicated.

A week’s numbers

See the above text.

A reader’s response

Debbie Dorch writes: “President Carter succeeded because he was the only president willing to pressure Israel to accept peace for land.” My response: Or maybe because Anwar Sadat was the only Arab leader to truly mean “peace” when he proposed a peace.

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.