1. Good or bad
In the coming days, assuming an agreement is reached and presented to the public, assuming there will be a debate, the “good deal” or “bad deal” tagline will constantly be used. The Obama administration used it before and will use it again. Its opponents, and the opponents of the deal, the government of Israel included, will also use it.
That some of them will say it is “good” and some will say it is “bad” can be the result of three things (that are not exactly identical). It can be the result of a different understanding of what the agreement says; it can be the result of a different assessment of how the deal would impact different countries in the region and beyond; and it can be a result of a lacuna inherent to the good-bad formulation – that is, because the good-bad formulation does not say good for whom and bad for whom.
2. America and Israel
Americans use to think about the world with American at its center. ‘What is good for America is good for the world’ is what many of them believe – and in many cases they are right to believe it. But the case of Iran might be one in which what's good for America – or not quite important for America – is crucially important for other countries and terribly bad for them.
That is the issue at the core of the US-Israel rift on Iran. The Obama administration is convinced that a deal with Iran is good for America. Israel is convinced that a deal is bad for Israel. Thus, the Obama administration conveniently attempts to convince itself that a deal is also the best outcome for Israel. And Israel, for its part, conveniently attempts to argue that a deal is bad for America.
Of these two competing arguments, I find the Israeli case more compelling. Many American critics of the administration also find Israel's argument more compelling. But the Obama administration does not. And while it will have a hard time convincing Israel that the deal is good for Israel – in fact, it will be impossible for the administration to do so – it is doing a decent enough job in convincing itself that the deal is good for Israel. It is also doing a good enough job in convincing large segments of the American Jewish community that the deal is better for Israel than a no-deal.
3. Congressional approval
A lot of ink is going to be spilled over the question of Congressional approval of the deal. Indeed, the Obama administration will need to make an effort to gather the votes that would guarantee the deal. But the battle is not really over congressional approval. It is a battle over the support of the public. If a large majority of the American public will approve of the deal, Congress will find the way to approve it.
4. Israel's battle
Israeli officials say the battle against nuclear Iran is not over. Of course it isn't. No one knows how the implementation of the deal is going to work and what changes in the region in the coming years would alter the situation regarding Iran. But note the following development: Israel just began its annual fight over the budget, and the budget of the IDF and other Defense institutions is going to be on the table again. For several years now, Prime Minister Netanyahu was an adamant defender of this budget and was reluctant to make any cuts in it. So much so, that one Likud Party member disapprovingly said this morning that Netanyahu has become a “lobbyist” of the defense establishment.
This is not some whimsical tendency on the part of the Prime Minister. Netanyahu believes that only an Israel that is very strong has any chance to survive. Moreover, he believes that even in the diplomatic arena the only way for Israel to gain support is to remain strong. True – people like to use David-and-Goliath metaphors to explain why Israel, now stronger than ever, has difficulties in getting the support of other countries. Netanyahu does not buy these metaphors. A weaker Israel – so he thinks – is not going to be more popular. Just weaker.
5. Itself, by itself
Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon said earlier today that a bad agreement with Iran is coming. He said that Israel is going to have to get ready to protect itself by itself. Of course, there is nothing new about this idea: Israel was always ready to protect itself by itself. But if the idea is not new, the tone is somewhat new. Yaalon, without saying it, signals to Israelis that the days in which Israel could rely – or delude itself that it could rely – on America are over. Israel will still need American support, is going to ask for such support and will, hopefully, get such support. It is going to be appreciative of American support – as it should.
Still, the deal with Iran is a sobering moment for Israel – a necessary reminder that it’s every country for itself.
