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October 30, 2020
Democratic presidential candidate, former Vice President Joe Biden delivers remarks on the Trump administration’s recent actions in Iraq on January 07, 2020 in New York City. Biden criticized Trump for not having a clear policy regarding Iran after the killing of Qasem Soleimani ratcheted up tensions between Iran and the United States. (Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images)

For a counterpoint, see “Trump’s Iran Plan is Best.”

Five years ago, I wrote that “it is in our vital interest to stop Iran from getting the bomb.” That remains the case today, and it is a compelling reason why people who are concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear capability should support Joe Biden for President over Donald Trump. Vice President Biden’s plan to roll back Iran’s nuclear program remains the wisest and most realistic strategy for doing so, tackling a thorny issue that poses an intolerable threat to the United States and our allies in Europe and the Middle East, especially Israel.

Both candidates say that they want a better nuclear deal with Iran, but their strategies differ considerably.

In 2018, President Trump tore up the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, the multilateral accord that the Obama Administration had accepted three years earlier. Trump instead embarked on a policy of “maximum economic pressure” to force Iran to accept a nuclear accord with stricter provisions than the JCPOA. His secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, declared, “Iran must stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing” as part of America’s many additional demands for any new deal. This is an appealing goal but probably, lamentably, unrealistic.

The Trump Administration has made a riverboat gambler’s bet that, before achieving nuclear weapons capability, Iran either will come to the table on bended knee and accept the new maximalist U.S. terms or, better yet, it will collapse under American sanctions. However, there is little reason to believe Iran would accede to the Trump Administration’s demands.

First of all, the Iranian regime has never valued the economic well-being of its people over its determined pursuit of nuclear capability. That’s why ultimately, the JCPOA had to accept that Iran would continue enriching uranium at a symbolic level in exchange for forcing it to abide by tough, enforceable limits on that activity. Second, Iran is unlikely to trust a president who tore up one nuclear agreement to be faithful to a new one.

Meanwhile, it certainly doesn’t help that Trump’s reckless brinksmanship has alienated America’s most important European allies for such a campaign of persuasion: Great Britain, France, and Germany. These three allies rebuffed the Trump Administration’s recent effort to reimpose tough multilateral sanctions on Iran by invoking the JCPOA’s “snap back” clause at the UN Security Council. Because the United States left the accord, the allies said, Washington has no standing to impose its provisions. It’s difficult to disagree with their logic.

And what about an Iranian regime collapse? Few analysts think it is likely, other than perhaps a few who have been predicting it for the past forty years. Despite recent economic downturns and periods of protests, the regime has survived, thanks to its ruthlessness. Should we bet that this time will be different?

Yet with the Trump approach, a lost bet means the intolerable: a nuclear-armed Iran. After the United States stopped adhering to the JCPOA, Iran resumed enriching uranium at a rapid rate. It reportedly has now stockpiled ten times the amount of enriched uranium to which it had been successfully limited by the Iran deal before we dropped out. Now the time it would take Iran to acquire enough fissile material to build a nuclear weapon has slipped far below the critical one-year mark.

Vice President Joe Biden’s proposal to reenter the JCPOA if Iran adheres once again to its limits is far more likely to succeed at creating the right conditions for further rolling back the Iranian nuclear threat. The JCPOA contains technologically precise provisions, as well as means of verification, that foreclose Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons for years to come. At the same time, Biden has repeatedly made clear that rejoining the JCPOA would not be his policy’s endpoint, but rather a starting point for mobilizing a strong international coalition to “extend the deal’s nuclear constraints” and for “effectively pushing back against Iran’s other destabilizing activities,” including regional aggression, ballistic missiles, and domestic repression.

I recognize, as I did in 2015, that the JCPOA is not a perfect document. I sincerely wish it did not contain “sunset provisions” that limited the time Iran must adhere to its various restrictions. In 2010, when I was Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and authored extraterritorial sanctions legislation that helped bring Iran to the table, I wished for a more ideal outcome. But as others have pointed out, it’s easy to negotiate a perfect deal, as long as you’re only negotiating with yourself. However, when you actually need the agreement of another party, that party’s demands must also be taken into account.

Total elimination of Iran’s enrichment capacity proved unachievable in 2015, and, in my view, so it would be today. Yet because of the JCPOA’s intrusive inspection regime and rigorous restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities, I concluded in 2015 that “the agreement is our best alternative at this time.” I am convinced that this remains the case today. And by credibly agreeing to resume compliance with this accord if Iran does the same, a Biden Administration would be forcing Iran’s hand by calling its bluff.

Furthermore, I trust Joe Biden’s word as well as his judgment.

I believe him when he says that his administration “would do whatever necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, taking no option off the table,” including military force. I also believe his pledge to increase intelligence-sharing and security cooperation with America’s Middle Eastern allies — including “ironclad” support for Israel — against the threats posed by Iran. These commitments ensure that Israel’s concerns about Iranian aggression will be better addressed in the future, both in Washington and internationally.

I believe that, as president, Biden would do everything in America’s power to extend the time frame of the JCPOA’s nuclear restrictions and expand its restrictions to roll back Iran’s other aggressive behavior. I know the chances of achieving those goals are significantly enhanced if we have our allies and others in the international community on our side.

Despite Donald Trump’s tough talk, he is doing little more than rolling nuclear dice. Joe Biden’s approach is tough, systematic, and certain of international backing. And in my view, it is a much better bet — for both America and our allies in the region — than Trump’s reckless “hail Mary.”


Howard Berman served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1983 to 2013, including as Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs from 2008 to 2011.

 

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