Rosner’s Domain— Israel’s Demographic Time Bomb

At the heart of the battle against the legal reforms initiated by the Israeli government lies a great fear: the fear of a future that does not bode well for the opponents of the government. The fear of a future in which Israel will look different, simply because its population will be different. So, it is quite possible that the turmoil we are witnessing now is less about the specific details of a certain reform and more of a battle cry, a last-minute call to arms before it is too late. 

This battle is not just to prevent reforms tomorrow, but to ensure that even in 20 or 50 years there will still be a place in Israel for groups that do not belong to the current ruling majority. It is a desperate battle in the hope of changing a powerful trend – when it’s not even clear exactly how such a trend can be changed. What is certain – while not explicitly said – is that the opposition to the government does not truly believe that it will soon return to power. And even if it does, its supporters understand that this will only be a short-term incident, not a real taking-back-the-country moment.

The opposition is rational not to fully believe in the idea of a comeback: Israel’s demography would not allow it. The currents are pulling the groups supportive of the ruling coalition up the river. There is nothing new in the data: three groups in Jewish Israel have high birth rates. The ultra-Orthodox, the religious and the traditional-religious. These are three groups that vote at a high rate for right wing parties. They vote and grow. Mainly the ultra-Orthodox. The predicted number of children per ultra-Orthodox woman, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, is 6.64 (2020 data). Gabriel Gordon of the Israel Democracy Institute disagrees with this figure. He claims that the birth rate among ultra-Orthodox women is decreasing and stands at six children per woman. That’s a significant difference, but not as one factors in the birth rate of the groups opposing the government. For secular women, it is less than two children. For a traditional non-religious woman it is 2.24 children.

Of course, the demographic story of the political camps is more complex. There are religious people who become secular, and move to the center and even the left. There are aliyah from various countries, and some Olim vote for the center-left. There is an ongoing alteration of the structure of the political sphere that could make voters slightly yet crucially move in this or that direction.  

But the overall, long-term picture is of an opposition camp facing an unsurmountable demographic wall. What options can it ponder? To have a bloc with the Arab camp. But there’s no great passion for such combination, partly because the Jewish-Israeli Center is not exactly interested in joining forces with those who seek to abolish Israel’s Jewish identity. A second option for the opposition is to persuade certain groups from the ruling camp to switch sides. This effort is centered on groups of secular or liberal-religious right-wing voters who are not satisfied with the cloud of ultra-Orthodoxy that casts a shadow over what the government plans to do. Meanwhile, this effort doesn’t seem promising: The voters of this government knew they were getting a package deal, and they bought it as a package deal that includes Haredi influence.

Can a group with two children per family see any hope to ever return to power against a group with 6 children per family? 

The result of what we described here is distress. Not just distress over legal reforms – but a distress about a much more profound change, of which the legal reform is merely a symbol. Can a group with two children per family see any hope to ever return to power against a group with six children per family? 

Of course, this is all a bit premature. The secular and non-religious camps still form the majority in Israel. A significant majority. But now is the time for the majority to ensure a future in which it could also thrive as a minority. Because it might be on its way to becoming a minority, or a much smaller majority, perhaps for many years, perhaps forever.

Or maybe not. A note of caution should be attached to all demographic forecasts. Fifteen years ago some Americans believed in an “emerging Democratic majority” that would rule for many decades. It did not quite materialize for reasons beyond the scope of this article. This could happen in Israel too. When reality changes, views change, coalitions split, alliances break down. President Nixon understood this in the late 1960s, when he devised the southern strategy, and tied the American South to the Republican Party. 

What would be the Israeli equivalent of such a strategy? That’s not easy to figure out. Not long ago, a survey question was presented to the ultra-Orthodox public in the following way: “Do you agree or disagree with the claim ‘The ultra-Orthodox parties should return to the political alliance with the center-left parties’?” Very few – about one and a half in ten respondents – said yes. So, this is not a likely southern strategy for Israel. At least, not anytime soon.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

Dozens of Israeli economists warned the government that the legal reform endangers Israel’s economy. Here is what I wrote about their letter of warning: 

The letter is both a warning and the threat. Both a warning about the impending crisis and the accelerator of the crisis. As soon as the economists warn of possible damage to the economy, they are hinting to outside investors, rating companies, other countries, economists around the world, to pay attention. They hint that Israel could become a little less attractive to investors. The Israeli economists warn against a risk that their very warning increases. Supporters of the legal reform will undoubtedly accuse them, or some of them, of politicization. This will make it difficult for them to talk to the supporters of the reform. 

A week’s numbers

A return to old days’ alliance between Labor (or similar parties) and the ultra-Orthodox camp? Read more about it in the above column.

A reader’s response:

Alan Goldfarb asks: “how come Israel’s secrets about attacks in Iran keep leaking out?”. My answer: I’d like to think this is all part of a big plan campaign, but I’m afraid it’s just, well, people can’t keep secrets to themselves (in many of these cases, it’s Americans leaking about Israel).

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.