Israeli Election Avoided? The Meaning of Political Delays

This weekend, the U.S. House and Senate approved a one-day extension of government funding, all of which was part of a bipartisan deal on an approximately $900 billion economic relief package. Why the extension? To allow the text of the bill to be written. Why one day? Because this is all the time the legislators need.

In a parallel universe, the Likud party and the Blue and White party in Israel agreed to delay the deadline for avoiding new elections from December 23 to January 5. Why the delay? To have enough time to pass two budgets, one for 2020, then one for 2021.

In the United States, the delay is likely to provide a remedy and achieve its goal. Of course, we could still wonder why the government could not achieve this goal without a delay. It seems almost silly to ask, but was it really impossible to get the same result a day or two in advance? Do legislators only internalize that a deadline is looming when it’s becoming clear that the time for resolving an issue has passed?

In Israel, it is more likely the delay will not resolve. The delay is supposed to allow for enough time for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gantz to compromise, but the road for both of them is rocky. Netanyahu will have to accept the inconvenient reality of rotating the prime minister position with Gantz in a few months (next fall). Gantz is facing an internal party revolt of people who see no reason to compromise with Netanyahu, in whom they have zero trust.

So, an attempt was made to extend the deadline, but the date of the possible election was not changed. If by January 5 all is resolved and the budget passes, there will be no election. However, if by January 5 there is no agreement and no budget, the election will be on March 23 — as if there was no extension of the deadline.

In Israel, no less than in the United States, politicians knew the time for compromise well in advance. Back in the late summer, when the government almost collapsed, a previous compromise delayed the deadline for another few months, until the end of December. So Netanyahu and Gantz had September, October, November and December to negotiate and bridge their many differences. What did they do? The answer is basically nothing. To be fair to Gantz: this is Netanyahu’s fault. He was playing for time in the hopes that later, someday, an improved situation will provide him with the opportunity to strike and get something that benefits him more than his political partner.

What do we learn from all this? Nothing new, but these events remind us of something that we often tend to forget. Politics is a cruel game of power. Politicians act when they are forced to act. Politicians compromise when they have no better choice. For them, compromise means a loss — they could not win. Netanyahu might not have a choice because of political realities. The polls, both public and internal, tell him that a new election could mean the end of his long political rule. Gantz has no choice. Both public and internal polls tell him that a new election likely means the end of his political career.

This inherent feature of politics is a problem even on regular days, when a political crisis drags on instead of being resolved before the deadline. But it has become much more problematic when there is a pandemic and the government, rather than preempt dangerous developments, behaves as if the virus is another politician. The government delays, hesitates, fudges. On  Sunday, the cabinet could not decide on a lockdown, even though such a decision is needed — and will ultimately arrive. I suspect that the ministers instinctively behave as if the virus will wait for them and delay its spread until they decide.

The government, rather than preempt dangerous developments, behaves as if the virus is another politician.

No, they aren’t stupid; they don’t actually think the virus is going to wait for them. But that’s their modus operandi. That’s the only way they know how to operate: wait until the crisis is at the door and then — only then — take the necessary action. Yes, a little too late. Yes, this usually means a little more robust action. If two weeks ago, a weeklong lockdown could do the trick, now Israel will need a three-week-long lockdown. If two weeks ago, we could still slow down the spread of the pandemic by merely halting the rush of tourists to foreign countries, we now have to restrict more Israelis.

Politicians know of no other way. Some would argue that humans know of no other way. You disagree? Think of climate change.