Why Did Israel Suddenly Attack?

At the heart of Israel’s assault on Iran lies a structured, solid logic. Israel made a decision that is easy to justify and easy to explain. If its military has the ability to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, or to bring about regime change in Tehran, then launching an attack is – without a doubt – the correct decision.

And yet, as the Americans discovered in Iraq in the 2000s, and as Israel is reminded daily in Gaza, a rational, well-designed plan does not always produce the desired result. Robert Kagan’s 2002 article about Power and Weakness comes to mind as we ponder the logic behind the attack: “A man armed only with a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger, inasmuch as the alternative — hunting the bear armed only with a knife — is actually riskier than lying low and hoping the bear never attacks. The same man armed with a rifle, however, will likely make a different calculation of what constitutes a tolerable risk. Why should he risk being mauled to death if he doesn’t need to?”

As Israel attacks, the logic is solid, but it could still discover that the forest is dense, the bear may be near, the rifle could jam — so, in fact, all that remained is the knife. Or the bear may be closer than expected, and wounding it only makes it more dangerous. Or worse: it turns out there are three bears. Or that it’s not a bear at all — but a tiger, slinking quietly between the trees.

What are Israel’s chances of success in this war? Most observers have no real way to answer such a question. They don’t know Israel’s true capabilities, nor Iran’s, and they certainly can’t predict the dynamic that will emerge in the coming days and weeks. Still, Israelis may draw a measure of encouragement from what happened in the confrontation with Hezbollah. Just a few months ago, the conventional wisdom held that war with Hezbollah would unleash tens of thousands of rockets on Israel, causing vast destruction — an assessment that led Israel to deter itself from attacking the Lebanese group. It led PM Netanyahu, according to a former defense minister’s account, to deter himself.

“He led me to the window and pointed at the skyscrapers,” Yoav Gallant recalled in an interview with Channel 12 News. “Netanyahu said to me: ‘Do you see all these buildings? Hezbollah will destroy everything after we hit them.’”

Israel struck — and the buildings remained standing. It turned out that Israel was more capable than we thought, and Hezbollah less dangerous than we feared. There is a scenario, one not to be dismissed, in which the same proves true with Iran. That we’ll discover this strike should have happened long ago. That Iran is a tiger with blunt teeth. That Israel’s ability to strike hard can neutralize the enemy’s capacity to respond effectively. In such a case, the question asked in hindsight will be: why only now?

And then there is the other possibility — the one Robert Kagan failed to consider when he assumed that the United States held a rifle, and that hunting the 2003 Iraqi bear would be easy. The possibility that Israel is biting off more than it can chew. That the war will drag on, that Israel will absorb painful blows, and that it will not achieve its objectives. Not long ago, many of Israel’s senior political and military leaders believed this was the likely outcome. And that is precisely why, for twenty or thirty years, they refrained from attacking Iran.

So what made them change their minds?

Perhaps it was the confidence gained in Lebanon and Syria. Perhaps new operational capabilities. Perhaps the sense that Iran is more exposed than it was. Or a judgment that the U.S. administration will provide cover — and might even join the offensive, if Iran gives it a pretext. Perhaps a genuine feeling that this is the last possible moment. That unlike in the past, Iran’s recent steps reflect a real intent to cross the nuclear threshold. Perhaps a shift in Israel’s domestic political climate made broader consensus possible. Or perhaps it’s simply that Israel is already at war — and if so, it might as well strike wherever it can, before the window closes.

What made Israel’s leaders change their minds? That is the key question of this moment. It is not a change in their belief that Iran must be stopped from acquiring a nuclear weapon — that belief has been shared in Israel for decades. It is a change in their belief about Israel’s ability to achieve that goal. That belief — demonstrated by the attacks now underway — is the genuine shift.