Can This Be The End?

Israelis are worried. Jewish Israelis especially so. The old joke about a Jewish telegram that reads “start worrying, details to follow” comes to mind as I see how many people are worried. Except, in this case the joke doesn’t apply: we already got the details. We know why Israelis are worried. In fact, they are worried now for the exact same reason they were worried exactly a year ago. 

It’s been two years since Israel was forced into war by a vicious attack on its military and citizens. As wars go, one could argue that this is not such a long time. The Russia-Ukraine war is longer. The Vietnam war was longer. Both world wars were longer. The Seven Years’ War, Thirty Years’ War, Hundred Years’ War – well, all these were longer than two years. But for Israel, a two years’ war is long in at least two ways. First – it is longer than any of Israel’s previous wars (not all of them took just Six Days but, generally speaking, they were counted in weeks and months, not years). Moreover – a two-year war is a clear deviation from Israel’s national strategy that calls for short and decisive wars. 

So, Israelis are worried. After one year, the war seemed too long, and they were worried. After two years, the war seems too long, and they are still worried. In fact, after two years of war, the share of Israelis who say “I worry” is their dominant feeling is almost identical to their share after one year of war. It’s as if … as if nothing changed; as if… as if our clocks stopped ticking. The second year of the war was dramatically eventful – Hezbollah was decapitated, Iran was attacked, Gaza was reentered. And yet, Israelis’ feelings have frozen in time. Fifteen percent are sad – exactly like last year. Thirteen percent are angry. Almost exactly like last year (11 percent). The share of those who say they are “optimistic” or “determined” – two positive emotions – changed from 25 percent to 26 percent. That is, remained the same. And more than all these feelings, there’s worry. It is clear when you look at a JPPI survey (29 percent). It is clear when you look at a Gallup survey in which the question was somewhat different, but the result remains almost the same: “Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day yesterday?” A third of Israelis say that yesterday they were worried (33 percent).

They are still worried. They are worried that President Trump promises more than he can deliver. They are worried that Prime Minister Netanyahu was too optimistic when he said, last Saturday, that a breakthrough is near. They are worried that Hamas will back out of a deal, that Qatar will trick Trump into changing his positions, that the Israeli government will insist on some minor detail that could derail the prospect for closure. In two years, Israelis were repeatedly disappointed by promises of a coming ending. Just count the number of times Trump prophesied about a breakthrough “maybe next week.” Just count the times Netanyahu declared that total victory is near. “Start worrying, details to follow.” This time, it is worrying that the news is too good to be true.  

In two years, Israelis were repeatedly disappointed by promises of a coming ending. Just count the number of times Trump prophesied about a breakthrough “maybe next week.” Just count the times Netanyahu declared that total victory is near. “Start worrying, details to follow.” This time, it is worrying that the news is too good to be true. 

This article is being written as the delegated teams – Americans, Israelis, Palestinians, Qataris, Egyptians – begin to talk about details. There’s a plan. The plan Trump laid out when Netanyahu was in the White House, two weeks ago. Israel accepted the plan. Hamas did not accept it. Then, the weirdest thing happened: Trump acted as if Hamas did accept it. What were his reasons? There are three options that come to mind. 

The least complimentary of the options is that Trump did not understand that Hamas said no. It said yes to some items and no to others. It said no to a crucial element concerning the future arrangement in Gaza – no to the demand that Hamas would disarm. 

A second option is that Trump wants to move forward no matter how, no matter the exact details, because of his unhinged, unconcealed desire to get the Noble Peace Prize. That is the option most concerning to Israel. 

The third option is that Trump wanted to keep the momentum toward pacification. In diplomatic negotiations a detail could be important, it could be the make or break of a deal, but the overall momentum is of no less consequence. President Jimmy Carter and his team understood that, when they pressured Israel and Egypt to get over their differences and sign a peace treaty in 1978 and ‘79. Both countries had caveats, both countries were not fully satisfied. But the momentum of peace was an important and useful tool that Carter used wisely. It is not impossible that Trump is hoping to use the same tool as he attempts to convince two exhausted groups that it is time for them to accept a certain compromise. 

Of course, no one in Israel’s leadership wishes to acknowledge that a compromise is what might be coming. Israel’s leadership wishes to present whatever comes next as clear victory. That, in itself, is an obstacle. Militarily speaking, there’s no doubt that Israel is winning in Gaza. The IDF can do as it pleases. It can occupy whatever territory he decides to enter. It can destroy whatever remains there. It can kill operatives, find and destroy tunnels, move almost freely in all the territory. Hamas – as an army – is defeated. 

It is not yet defeated as a player in Gaza’s future. That’s the meaning of its response to the Trump plan – the clear “no” that the president refuses to hear. 

Which sends us back to the “momentum.” To the possibility that a positive momentum is gradually building that could bring about an ending. Here’s a possible scenario (and as you read these words, you might already know if that’s the way things started developing). First – the parties deal with the “yeses.” Israel said yes to a hostage deal, Hamas said yes to a hostage deal – so let’s get the hostage deal done. Surely, Israelis will rejoice as their hostages get back. Surely, Hamas will take credit for its achievement as hundreds of Palestinian convicts, including vicious murderers, are released from Israeli imprisonment. 

A positive outlook would build on the assumption that a release of the hostages first makes the next move less complicated. Why? There are two reasons that seem to contradict one another but, in fact, complete one another. 

On the one hand, the next move becomes less complicated because the hostages are Israel’s most important tool as it argues that the war must continue. Even according to a recent Pew survey, from which one learns that Americans are quite critical of Israel’s conduct of the war, there’s still a majority who are extremely or very concerned about “remaining Israeli hostages not being returned to Israel.” So, even many critics of Israel understand that the release of hostages is an essential step on the road to ceasefire. And this means that by completing a hostage deal, Israel loses a strong argument for continuing the war. 

The flip side is that a release of the hostages unshackles Israel. If Israel had to be cautious around Gaza – lest its forces mistakenly hurt a hostage or make their Hamas wardens dangerously nervous – a hostage-free Gaza is a much easier military target. The IDF can bomb, it can capture territory, it is freer to operate in ways that weren’t available since the start of the war. 

So on the one hand, Israel loses a critical argument for more war, and on the other hand Israel gains a critical advantage in its ability to continue the war. How are these two seemingly contradictory things helpful? They are helpful as Trump puts more pressure on all sides to keep moving forward beyond the hostage deal and into the treacherous territory of agreeing to an arrangement for the future control of Gaza. 

After a hostage deal Trump can say to Israel: You got what you rightly declared to be a precondition to any settlement – the hostages are back. Now, no one is going to sympathize with Israel if it refuses to end the war and insists on perpetuation of the violence. 

After a hostage deal Trump can say to Hamas: You already saw what Israel can do in Gaza when it is shackled by its concern to the safety of the hostages. Do you really want to see what it can do when its forces become unhinged by such consideration? 

After a hostage deal everything changes. 

The copyright goes to Ehud Barak. When he was the chief of the IDF – before his tenures as prime minister and defense minister – Barak described the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinian leadership as “full of holes, like a Swiss cheese.” Some cheeses age well, and thus, more than 30 years later, the expression is still useful. In the last two weeks it was repeatedly used to describe the Trump plan for Gaza. American in origin, but Swiss in formation. 

Example. Point 13 of the Trump plan: “Hamas and other factions agree to not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form.” What do we mean by “agree”? What is “any role”? What is “indirectly”? Imagine a group of sanitary workers. Gaza is going to need people to collect the garbage. Would collecting garbage on behalf of a new governing body be considered an “indirect” “role” in the “governance” of Gaza? Ans what about the next sentence: “all military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt.” Destroyed by whom? And who’s in charge of verifying that “all” infrastructure was indeed destroyed? 

And look further: “there will be a process of demilitarization of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning…”. When Hamas operatives said “no” to the Trump plan (what some people prefer to call “yes, but…”) it specifically said “no” to this item. So just think about the practical aspects of implementing such a process. There’s a need for “monitors” that can be trusted (less they turn a blind eye to existing weapons). There’s need for agreement (no “agreed process” means no “decommissioning”). There’s a need to understand what “permanently beyond use” means. It is one thing to destroy all weapons, or put them in storage under IDF supervision, it is another thing to put them in storage in Gaza, where they can be reached when the “monitors” can no longer guard them.

Swiss Cheese

Consider this: most Israelis are afraid that an Oct. 7 type event could reoccur near Gaza. Consider this: most Israelis think it’s time to end the war. They understand that the plan for ending the war is as solid as you-know-what. And yet, they accept it, because they see no point in perpetuating the bloodshed. And no – they do not believe that the Trump plan is likely to stabilize Gaza and turn it from a threat to an opportunity. They don’t believe Gaza can be pacified not because they don’t trust Trump – in fact, he is possibly the one leader in the world, and this includes all foreign and Israeli leaders, that the vast majority of them trust (a in a recent Gallup poll: 76 percent). 

They don’t believe Gaza can be pacified because they don’t trust their own leadership and they don’t trust the Palestinians, and neither the public nor the leaders trust the international community. In the past year, the trust of Israelis in countries in Europe collapsed. France is the best example. Is it an ally? Nineteen percent of Israelis say yes, 55 percent call it “unfriendly.” One wonders: can Israelis trust an international force whose members come from France? From Britain (a mere 27 percent call Britain “friendly”)? From Qatar (most Israelis would call it a foe)? From Egypt? The Trump plan calls for the Palestinian Authority to ultimately have a hand in ruling Gaza. More than four in 10 Israelis say that such vision is unacceptable for them “under any circumstances.” 

You still wonder why the dominant sentiment is “worry”?

After two years of war, a 62 percent majority of Israelis agree that “the war was prolonged because no clear and realistic goals were set that would allow it to end.” Again, the numbers from a year ago are basically unchanged. In October 2024 39 percent “strongly agreed” with this claim, and today, October 2025, it is the same number – 39 percent. A year ago, 39 percent disagreed with this statement (“no clear and realistic goals”), today it is just slightly less – 35 percent. Nir Hasson of the newspaper Haaretz, in an article whose conclusions I mostly reject, used a metaphor worthy of borrowing amid these unchanging numbers. “For Israelis,” he wrote, “the sun that rose on Oct. 7 has not yet set.” After two years, it is still the same long, bloody, painful, worrisome, devastating day.

Does President Trump possess the mercurial power to make a sun set? His ambition seems to be of such magnitude, and similarly, his ego. Earlier this week, he pushed an exhausted region towards the scorching heat of the sun. As if telling us all: help me make it set – or risk burning. 

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.