Some Americans are undergoing a period of introspection, recognizing that something about the U.S. Middle East policy isn’t working. Part of this is reflected in their frustration with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. President Biden tried to avoid having conversations with Netanyahu and was almost forced into having one such talk. He has also spoken unfavorably about Netanyahu, as Bob Woodward reports in his new book. No one should fall off a chair because of these revelations. With Biden, Netanyahu completes a full series: Four presidents were in power during Netanyahu’s long tenure as the Prime Minister of Israel – Clinton, Obama, Trump, and Biden – and all four have spoken ill of him at one time or another. If Kamala Harris is elected in November, one might safely bet that a fifth president would be added to the series.
Netanyahu was not elected to befriend American presidents; he was elected to safeguard Israeli interests. Clearly, in a friendly situation, it’s sometimes easier to safeguard these interests. Conversely, safeguarding friendship sometimes requires compromising on interests. It’s up to the PM to decide when it’s better to insist on something he deems crucial, at the cost of an eroding friendship, and when it’s better to be flexible, and avoid straining the relationship. In the war so far, he has been more flexible than it appears (thus, the full attack in Lebanon came very late). He also clashed with the US in several cases where it indeed seemed appropriate to do so (example: his insistence that Israel must enter Rafah).
Why do many American officials seem frustrated? For two main reasons. The first – because the war is risky and it is a distraction for the administration. The U.S. wants it to end while Israel does not want it to end too soon. That’s a cyclical phenomenon in U.S.-Israel relations. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, after the encirclement of Egypt’s Third Army, Israel was forced by the U.S. to back down. You’ve achieved enough — was the claim. Henry Kissinger did not want an excessive defeat of Anwar Sadat’s Egypt. He did not want to witness the fall of a pro-American Egyptian regime. In hindsight, he probably was right. Israel stopped in a place that allowed progress to ceasefire talks, and subsequently, peace talks. But this, as mentioned, is what we know in hindsight. The alternative path, continuing the fight until IDF forces entered Cairo and Damascus, was not tested.
Americans today want what they wanted during the siege of the Third Army. They believe that Israel has done its part; they believe it’s time to end the war. This is peculiar in two ways. First, Egypt was an ally; Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran are not. It’s not entirely clear why the U.S. wants the war to stop when Israel might be progressing toward defeating some of these forces (not Iran, but maybe the other two). Perhaps U.S. officials assume that Israel cannot achieve a full victory. Perhaps they surmise – that’s a defensible position – that the cost of continuing the war in blood and regional stability would be too high.
The second thing the U.S. wants is a vision for a “day after” that includes several staples of American policy (Palestinian Authority control over Gaza, pushing forward the two-state solution, etc.). On this matter, they’ve been at odds with Israel almost from day one of the campaign. And it’s not at all certain their stance is the more valid stance.
Some of the officials recognize that something in their policy isn’t working. In Gaza, no agreement was reached, few hostages were released, and no arrangement was made for the day after. In Lebanon, a year of negotiations yielded no result and war broke out. In Iran, not enough deterrence was achieved, neither toward the Iranians, who insisted on attacking, nor toward Israel, which insists on responding. In The New York Times, Ezra Klein wrote a piece titled “How Biden’s Middle East Policy Collapsed.” It was an illuminating piece that leads to an interview with journalist Franklin Foer, who wrote a lengthy article in The Atlantic, also testifying to the administration’s failure. And there were several others, in various newspapers, saying the same thing in different ways.
Where did the administration fail? Let’s try to summarize a long explanationby relying on one key sentence in Klein’s article: “Like many Americans,” Klein wrote, “my frame of reference after Oct. 7 was Sept. 11, when America was attacked, when civilians were killed by an adversary who wanted to provoke us into a destructive response.”
Herein lies the reason of failure. The frame of reference of Americans like Klein, and like some government officials, is misplaced. Oct. 7 was not Sept. 11. Israel is not a superpower like America. Lebanon is not as distant as Afghanistan. Without belitlling the severity of the Sept. 11 blow, without questioning the need for the U.S. to react forcefully to the Al-Qaeda attack, the attempt to present that event as a relevant framework for Israel today shows the difficulty Americans have in understanding Israel’s true situation.
Sept. 11 was an act of lethal provocation, intended to undermine the strength of the world’s strongest empire. Oct. 7 was a move aimed at starting a chain-reaction whose end goal was total destruction. Al-Qaeda did not have the power to threaten the U.S. with annihilation. In contrast, Israel’s enemies have the power to pose a threat of complete destruction. And they have such intentions, as newly released documents revealed this week. So after Oct. 7 Israel had no choice but to fight for its life. It is not a “War of Revival” as Netanyahu pompously proposed, but it is a war of survival, in the most basic sense of the term.
Sept. 11 was an act of lethal provocation, intended to undermine the strength of the world’s strongest empire. Oct. 7 was a move aimed at starting a chain-reaction whose end goal was total destruction.
American officials see a short-term goal: to stop the bloodshed, to stabilize the region.
Israel sees a long-term goal: Oct. 7 taught us that a short-term calm, if not accompanied by a significant change in the regional balance of power, is a long-term threat.
Much of what the American officials say is valid. It’s unclear how Israel comes out of the war, who will manage Gaza, how calm will be maintained in Lebanon without the need for an Israeli occupation, how Israel will avoid a long-term entanglement that ends with an inability to decisively conclude the fighting. The Americans suspect – understandably – that Netanyahu does not want to talk about “day after” plans because these would complicate his political situation. Netanyahu suspects — understandably — that the Americans are ready to bet on Israel’s future security for the sake of achieving quiet. This is why Israel must insist on acting even in the face of American opposition. This is why Israel must make sure to identify the boundary of American patience. Just as Golda Meir did in the weeks after the encirclement of Egypt’s Third Army.
There were debates back then, too. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan (as Amiram Ezov writes in his book about the final days of the 1973 war) wanted to conclude with a resounding victory, amid Kissinger’s pressure. Dayan wanted to extend the war a few more days to bring the Third Army to its knees. And this was after Israel had already strained the relations with the U.S. quite a bit, as researcher Hagai Zoref describes in his article titled “Golda Meir Against Kissinger.”
The Israeli government, Tzoref wrote, “gave the IDF all the political backing needed to complete the territorial and tactical achievements on the southern front, preventing the retreat Israel was required to perform in the face of heavy international pressure, mainly American, which would have led to the forfeiture of these achievements. To achieve this, Golda Meir and her ministers managed a policy of risk management that significantly worsened the relations with the United States.”
It’s worth revisiting this article, because it teaches that not much has changed since 1973. “The main issue on the agenda,” wrote Tzoref, “was the growing rift between Golda Meir and Kissinger. The prime minister’s statements already expressed a personal disdain and a loss of trust towards the American. ‘He is not modest, he thinks his intelligence will suffice to solve everything,’ she said.” As then, so now, “the factor that most influenced the conduct of the Israeli leadership at that time was thus the need for risk management – defying the American government while taking into account the extent of Israel’s ability to push back.”
Golda pushed back — and stoped pushing back at the right time. Now Netanyahu is doing the same thing. Time will tell if he also recognized the right time to stop.
Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.
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