Why So Long?

As the first anniversary came and went, it was no longer possible to deny the extended duration of the conflict. Israel has seen long wars before – the 1948 War of Independence and the 1967 War of Attrition are examples — but typically, Israeli conflicts have been shorter. 

As the current struggle unfolds, few in Israel anticipate a swift conclusion. The prevailing expectation is for the conflict to extend several more months, if not years. Thus, at the next Oct. 7, in 2025, we might still be questioning the war’s endpoint.

Wars drag on for multiple reasons, but often because no decisive victory has been achieved, and because the parties involved believe continued fighting might yield a more favorable outcome. They also drag on when leaders do not have the courage to say enough. And they drag on under the influence of “loss aversion.” That’s the reluctance to accept the idea that past sacrifices may be in vain and the war is lost.

Prof. Gadi Heimann of Hebrew University illustrated this nicely in his book “Fear, Regret, and Wishful Thinking: Why Leaders and Nations Choose War.” He recounts how during World War I, the severe toll of the British blockade pushed Germany into naval engagements. “Initially reluctant to risk their navy, the Germans shifted from risk aversion to loss aversion, deciding to confront the British at sea.” The resulting Battle of Jutland was a tactical victory for Germany. However, this was a pyrrhic victory as the German navy ultimately failed to break the British blockade.

Who, then, declares a war lost? Who tells the Germans that they lost World War I, or the Japanese that they lost World War II? Who pulls the IDF out of Lebanon after two decades of guarding a security perimeter? Who informs the Ukrainians — or the Russians — that a protracted war ends without victory? These are questions that confront not only nations but also groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, challenging them to consider the option of reaching a settlement and move to a period of recovery, as they prepare for the next round of conflict.

For them, reaching such conclusions is not straightforward, because of loss aversion but also due to other factors. From the perspectives of players such as Iran, Hezbollah, or Hamas, Israel might not seem a prospective victor but rather a country mired in a never-ending conflict. Such interpretation demands careful consideration by Israeli decision-makers. They must consider the possibility that Israeli strikes, however forceful, might not lead to concession or ceasefire. An adversary unafraid to lose territory or account for casualties is a formidable one. An adversary that has no public opinion to worry about in the way democracies do can prolong the fight even when there’s nothing for him to gain. 

Why does the war persist? Primarily because the enemy remains undefeated and unyielding. Yet, when we ask the Israeli public about such a thing, it’s more interesting to question our own side: Could Israel have acted differently to shorten the war (not just to end it prematurely by surrender, which is certainly possible but not the intended strategy)? In a survey conducted by JPPI various reasons for the conflict’s extension were presented to Israelis, Jews and Arabs alike, with many foreseeing a lengthy continuation — months or even years.

So, what do they think is a reason for the long war? A consensus among many is that the government has been too slow in decision-making, implicating it in the protraction of the war. This sentiment is not unique to critics of the government. It is shared by many coalition supporters, some of whom believe that an earlier offensive in Lebanon could have been beneficial. Ironically, Israelis also believe that international pressure, intended to hasten the end of the conflict, may have contributed to its prolongation through delays and ineffectual diplomacy. The operation in Rafah is a clear example of such delay. The U.S. pressured Israel to reconsider its intention to enter the refugee camp, delaying the action, but did not preventing it. The attacks in Lebanon are another example. Almost a year was wasted on futile American diplomacy. During that year, Israel acted with its hands tied. The Americans succeeded in delaying the action, but the benefit of this success is questionable.

The most troubling finding in the JPPI survey relates to the possibility that “the war has been prolonged because the coalition has a political interest in prolonging it.” A majority of the public agrees or somewhat agrees with this claim. This implies that most Israelis assume that decision-makers mix political, partisan interests when they deal with the most sacred decisions concerning life and death. Naturally, this finding is inherently tainted with political bias, and this is both saddening and disturbing.

The most troubling finding in the JPPI survey relates to the possibility that “the war has been prolonged because the coalition has a political interest in prolonging it.” A majority of the public agrees or somewhat agrees with this claim. 

Pause for a moment and consider the chilling implication of that statement: More than half of Israelis think the war is being prolonged because the coalition has a “political interest” in prolonging it. One hopes they responded to the question without much reflection on its meaning. One hopes that if they thought about the question for another moment, they would come to the conclusion that they are mistaken. Of course, assuming that they are mistaken.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

There are troubling signs that more Israelis wonder about the future of Israel. Here’s something I presented this week:

We asked: “When you think about your child’s future in 10 to 20 years, how do you think Israel will be? Will it be ‘better than it was in the past,’ ‘as good as it was in the past,’ or ‘worse than it was in the past.'” About half said it would be as good as in the past or better. The majority of those who are not sure if it’s good for their children to stay in Israel, come from the other half. So, as you’d expect, there is a direct link between what Israelis think about the future of the country they live in and their desire to stay, or to see their children stay. This connection has various branches and characteristics, which you can probably guess. There are gaps between supporters of the coalition and supporters of the opposition, gaps between secular and religious Israelis, gaps between the more and the less educated. Furthermore, a relatively high percentage of Israelis who have “recently” started a process of obtaining a foreign passport say that perhaps it would be better for their children to live elsewhere. These are Israelis who have already taken a first practical step.

A week’s numbers

The operational successes in the campaign in Lebanon are reflected in a rapid change and sharp rise in the public’s assessment of Israel’s military might.

A reader’s response

David Rosen writes: “You should be worried about Kamala winning in November. She’s not a friend.” My response: 1. Worrying is our second nature. 2. A “friend” is difficult to define. 3. Israel is going to have to adjust to a Harris administration. It might prove to be a challenge, but it’d still be the new reality in which we all operate.

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.