Israel’s Civil War: Risk Assessment

Former Supreme Court President Aharon Barak warned Israelis last week that “we are very close to a civil war.” His statement stirred a storm. For several years now, whenever Barak speaks, a storm arises. And a talk about the possibility of a civil war is a hard pill to swallow. 

If you follow the news from Israel you know that the country is internally unwell. Polarization is high, moderation in short supply. Can this push Israel as far as a civil war? Let’s think about it in three steps.

First: the claim that Israel might face a civil war is an easy claim to defend. Civil wars are a historical routine. Those who think Israel is immune are suffering from hubris – they assume that Israel is protected from the evils that befall others, equipped with advantages that others do not have. The disease of hubris is dangerous. It led many of us to believe that Israel would never see the assassination of political leaders. The assasination of PM Yitzhak Rabin should have made us wiser, and more sober. What happens elsewhere, did happen to us.

Second: the claim that “we are very close” to a civil war is harder to evaluate. Some Israelis furiously deny it. They might not correctly assess the depth of the crisis Israel is in. Some believe Israel is already having a civil war. They should be sent to history refreshment courses. Israel is not in a civil war. There is no shooting in the streets, no arrests in the dead of night, no very violent clashes with the police, no military units defecting with their equipment. How close are we to any of those things? We have a crisis of trust in our institutions. Many citizens assume that some “other side” wishes them ill, or is dangerous to the country, or that if its plans are realized, the state will be destroyed. Such assumptions could lead to a breakdown. And that’s exactly what characterizes civil wars – a breakdown. On the other hand, Israel is still functioning, the camaraderie of soldiers inspires us all, hospitals treat patients from all communities, buses are filled with passengers of all viewpoints. Israel has a minority (not small) that is stirring up a conflict, and it has a majority that seeks calm. The problem, of course, is that many civil wars are sparked because of a minority that stirs up conflict, and a majority that doesn’t know how to impose its will for calm. 

So how close are we? It’s easy to say that the concern is exaggerated, because in most cases where there is a deep divide in civil society, no war breaks out. But a civil war is what Nassim Nicholas Taleb (author of “The Black Swan” and other important books) nicely defines as a case from “Extremistan,” the land in which events that have a low probability of realization should cause severe concern, because realization will lead to catastrophic outcomes (such as nuclear terrorism or a deadly plague). This means that both you and Aharon Barak assess the likelihood of a civil war in the near future at exactly the same level – let’s say, a meager 4% chance. But to him, such probability is already a reason to raise a warning flag (because 4% is a lot in Extremistan), while to others, it would not be a reason to raise a warning flag (because 4%, after all, is still a small chance). 

Third: there is always a tension that exists, between the desire to warn of danger and the desire not to accustom people to a catastrophic possibility (that is, not to “normalize” it). For example: when intelligence warns of the possibility that a war with Hezbollah means tens of thousands of rockets falling on Israeli cities, it does two things. The first – it warns of a danger. The second – signals to Hezbollah that this is Israel’s expectation in the event of a war. Not that this is what Israel wants to happen of course, but that this is what Israel understands will happen. This might lead Hezbollah to the conclusion that shooting tens of thousands of rockets at Israel is a reasonable thing to do. 

To this tension, which there is no way to resolve, many more examples can be offered, one of which is Barak’s warning. On one hand – if the danger of a civil war is tangible, it is fitting that someone should ring the alarm. On the other hand, talking about a civil war accustoms us to the unbearable possibility that there will be a civil war. 

Conclusion? You know me – I don’t always feel the need to say who’s right or wrong. In this case, the question is one of risk assessment. One thing is worthy of consideration: civil wars do not begin with an official announcement. They just start.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

Israel is going back to fighting in Gaza. But why?

It is certainly possible that Netanyahu and his advisors have reached a practical and calculated conclusion that there is no escape from renewing the fire in order for Israel to achieve its goals. It is certainly possible that the decision to end the ceasefire has good reasons, which have nothing to do with the political desire to see Itamar Ben-Gvir returning to the government, or with the wish to sack the Shin Bet head, or to undermine the power of the attorny general, or to pass the budget, and so on. It is certainly possible – but the very fact that it may not be the case, or that there are those who believe that it may not be the case, is disturbing. Netanyahu’s insistence on engaging in political and personal attacks on public servants while sending soldiers back into battle complicates any attempt to convince the public of the purity of his intentions.

A week’s numbers

What alternatives exist is another question, but “peace agreement” is not something that Israelis see as a viable option, not now, nor in an undefined future (a JPPI survey). 

A reader’s response

Tami Azulai writes: “Israel can’t trust Trump! Look at what happened to Ukraine.” My response: Well, it can’t, and it must. What other choice is there? 

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.