For a few weeks now, Donald Trump has faced two clear options in the war with Iran. He can either escalate or capitulate. He has instead chosen a third option: to equivocate.
It’s very clear that Trump dramatically underestimated Iran’s military capability before he began this war just over one month ago. Perhaps the relative ease of the U.S. and Israel’s attacks last summer, or even the assassination of Revolutionary Guard leader Qasem Soleimani back in 2020, had convinced him that this current conflict would be relatively fast and easy too. But while the American offensive has caused tremendous damage to Iran’s military, that country’s ability to control the Strait of Hormuz and choke off the world’s oil supply has left the conflict at somewhat of a standoff.
Just over a week ago it appeared that Trump was nearing a critically important fork in the road. He could either follow through on his threats to dramatically expand American aerial attacks, promising to rain missile fire down on Iran’s oil and energy infrastructure unless that country allowed the oil to start flowing again, or back down from these warnings and negotiate an accelerated and discomfiting peace agreement, allowing the current regime to remain in place with its military capabilities and ongoing control over the Strait of Hormuz. While Trump’s team would have marketed this agreement as an important victory, in truth it would have been widely and correctly seen as an almost-complete capitulation.
But Trump opted for neither option. Instead, he has since delayed his decision – twice – citing meaningful progress in peace negotiations that the Iranians say have not occurred. As a result, speculation continues both in this country and around the world about whether Trump has the stomach to continue toward a sweeping military victory that would still come at great cost to him.
Trump’s hesitation to take a stand reflects a deep equivocation on his part as to the domestic political ramifications of his decision. The president and his advisors understand that the war is deeply unpopular, and that even his MAGA base seems unsure of the path forward. While polls show that the president’s most loyal supporters still strongly support his goals in the Middle East, the worried and awkward conversations that marked last weekend’s Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) suggest that their reservoir of goodwill and patience is not infinite.
So the temptation for Trump to declare victory and come home is understandable. But that would also require him to tacitly admit that his attacks on Iran achieved little tangible gain and that he caused enormous economic disruption and diplomatic upheaval (not to mention considerable loss of life, massive property destruction and other outsized human costs) without accomplishing most of his original declared goals. Trump would never say anything like this out loud, of course, but his advisors recognize that such denials will not change the resulting political reality landscape.
But while the president does badly want his party to maintain its control of Congress for his last two years in office, that goal is beginning to look less achievable. Most prognosticators are no longer wondering whether Democrats will take back the House of Representatives but are now analyzing how sweeping a victory they can achieve on such a polarized political landscape. There is now serious speculation about whether the GOP could potentially lose its Senate majority too, a prospect that was dismissed as progressive dreaming six months ago but now appears more achievable (though still unlikely).
By avoiding the difficult choices he now confronts, Trump has managed to delay a commitment that may ultimately define the war’s trajectory and outcome. But these stalling measures are coming at unsustainable political, economic and human cost. The clock is ticking and Trump may soon decide that the only thing worse than a bad decision is no decision at all.
If Congress is slipping out of Trump’s grasp, does that make him more or less likely to double down on more aggressive action against Iran? We don’t know, but it appears that right now, neither does he.
Dan Schnur is the U.S. Politics Editor for the Jewish Journal. He teaches courses in politics, communications, and leadership at UC Berkeley, USC and Pepperdine. He hosts the monthly webinar “The Dan Schnur Political Report” for the Los Angeles World Affairs Council & Town Hall. Follow Dan’s work at www.danschnurpolitics.com.
