War and Patience

The public sentiment is clear: There is a majority of Israelis in favor of ending the war in Gaza — if the hostages are returned. A new poll confirmed it this week, as many others have before. In late March, a poll showed 69% supported “a deal to return all the hostages in exchange for ending the war.”

The government’s position is also clear: It will not end the war — even if all the hostages are returned. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated this explicitly last Saturday. He declared: “We will not end the war before Hamas is destroyed and before Gaza is no longer a threat.” Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich reiterated this Monday: “There is one thing we will not do to bring back the hostages — we will not surrender to a terrorist organization.”

The terminology differs, of course. The public is asked about “ending the war” — and supports it. The government talks about “surrendering to Hamas” — and rejects it. But the meaning is essentially the same: Ending the war would mean coming to terms with a reality in which the war’s objectives are not fully met.

Why is the public willing to accept that? For several reasons. First, it wants the hostages back. Second, it is tired — after a year-and-a-half, who wouldn’t be. Third, perhaps it has lost hope that Israel will achieve its full objectives. Netanyahu says, “Victory requires patience and resolve.” That might have sounded convincing in November 2023. Approaching May 2025, it’s harder to swallow.

Harder for two reasons. One: time has passed, the war drags on, and public trust in Netanyahu and his government is low. In fact, it’s been low all along. But early on, there was patience despite the mistrust — a sense that the goals were at least somewhat defined. Over time, that patience eroded. As the war dragged on, the low trust began to manifest in skepticism about government policy, actions and commands. By the one-year mark, most Israelis agreed with the statement that “the war has dragged on because clear and realistic objectives were never defined.” Most also agreed that “the war has dragged on because the coalition has a political interest in prolonging it.” That was six months ago. It’s unlikely the sentiment has softened since.

The second reason is the government’s failure to articulate its strategy and goals. Of course, that’s harder to do when trust is low and attention spans are short. And so the government has not done a good job of clarifying the path ahead. There are plenty of slogans: victory, no surrender, disarm Hamas, eliminate them, bring back the hostages without capitulation, and more. But how, exactly? That remains murky. Where the government sees determination, the public sees foot-dragging. Where the government claims resolve, the public sees hesitation. Where the government points to progress, the public sees repetition. The same slogans appeared in statements made a year ago: back then we were also “on the verge of a breakthrough,” Hamas was “on the verge of collapse,” and we were seeing the “cracks” that would bring down their regime. A year has passed, and every “special address” now sounds like the previous one, which sounded like the one before it.

This failure to clarify the objectives might stem from several reasons. One: the government does have a detailed, coherent, realistic plan — it just can’t share it. Let’s say Israel holds some unique asset, that needs perfect timing to activate. If that’s the case, the government has reason to remain vague.

Two: the government has a plan, and chooses not to reveal it — not for operational reasons, but for political ones. Maybe if the public knew the full picture, it would be even more eager to shut the whole operation down. Angry. Shocked. Who knows?

Three: the government has no plan. It speaks in vague terms because it, too, doesn’t know what comes next. Maybe it’s waiting for the Chief of Staff to come up with something. Maybe for Trump. Maybe for a miracle.

Of these three, the first is the one we should hope for. But it’s also the one that suffers most under the weight of public distrust. If people trusted the government, they might assume there’s a reason for the vagueness. They might grant the PM a bit more “patience.” Under current conditions — low trust — the request for patience is interpreted as a cover for one of the two less appealing alternatives: either the government has a plan the public would firmly oppose, or it has no plan at all and is just stalling.

The result is measurable in polls, in public discourse, in military reservists’ declining turnout. The more the government fails to convince the public that it knows where it’s going, the harder it will be to enlist the public for the mission. And an Israeli government that is waging war without public support is a government that cannot achieve its objectives. 

The public is all it has. 

Without that — it has nothing.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

When The New York Times reported that President Trump prevented an attack on Iran by Israel, I wrote this:

There is no real surprise in the fact that Trump has, for now, opted against a military strike and turned instead to negotiations. If anything, what’s surprising in The New York Times report is the implied possibility that Trump seriously considered a strike before trying diplomacy. If he really did. If he truly considered it, and not just pretended to consider it. From the outset — and for several months now — it’s been fairly clear that the big question is what Trump will do once he realizes the Iranians are dragging their feet, dodging commitments, lying … of course, there’s always the option that they offer him an agreement – one that suits them, and suits him. Not necessarily one that suits Israel. … An agreement that would make it harder for Israel to act against Iran. An agreement that Netanyahu would struggle to oppose with the same vigor he brought to the 2015 Obama deal.

A week’s numbers

For more on this, read the column on the left-hand side.

A reader’s response

Peter Ellenson writes: “I’m really worried about a 2025 repeat of the 2015 JCPOA [the so called Iran nuclear deal]”. My response: Come join the club of (mostly) Israelis. 

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.