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Rosner’s Domain: The Israel-Lebanon Deal— A Calm Evaluation

The question of whether this is the right point for Israel depends on priorities.
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October 7, 2022
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On Sunday, Israel accepted a U.S.-brokered proposal for a deal demarcating a maritime border with Lebanon. The deal – if accepted by the other side and signed – will open the way for a profit-sharing arrangement in a disputed gas project. Is this agreement good for Israel? You can’t expect Israelis to be in agreement concerning such questions. Not on the eve of another election. So, we should state at the outset: the agreement is neither a historical achievement (the government’s position), nor a shameful surrender (the opposition’s position). Israel did not obtain the most profitable deal, nor did it go bankrupt. This is an agreement between two parties who have decided that they have exhausted their ability to bargain, who have decided to stop at a certain point. The question of whether this is the right point for Israel depends on priorities.

We should state at the outset: the agreement is neither a historical achievement (the government’s position), nor a shameful surrender (the opposition’s position).

Of course, our government is no ordinary government. The government’s opponents ought to admit that even such a government must make decisions. The government’s supporters must admit that had it been an interim Netanyahu government announcing annexation of 800 square kilometers, their insistence of government prerogatives would not be as vocal (Israel is ceding 800 square kilometers — 308 square miles — to Lebanon in the forthcoming agreement). But we all know that intellectual honesty is a rare commodity in the political arena, especially on the eve of elections. 

Where do we go from here? Let’s start with the obvious: Opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu’s announcement that he will not honor the agreement is nonsense. An international agreement signed by Israel is a done deal. It is possible that the whole purpose of his fierce rhetoric is to make the Lebanese hesitate, or force the government to ask for approval from the Knesset (which it will not get). Perhaps Netanyahu truly believes that the agreement is bad. Perhaps he does not want to let the government have an achievement. Perhaps he does it because the debate about “territorial compromises” is a convenient one for him to have before a vote. Can you believe it? On the eve of these elections, Israel is repeating the old debate about territories – just not the territories we are used to talking about.

And why do Prime Minister Lapid and Defense Minister Gantz want to sign the agreement? We don’t have access to their hearts and minds. They certainly want the best for the State of Israel, but don’t they also have a political interest that influenced their considerations? Would they have compromised in the same way had there been no elections on the horizon? The elections are a stopwatch that forces all parties to stop and decide. Menachem Begin attacked the nuclear reactor in Iraq on the eve of elections. His opponent Shimon Peres protested vigorously; later Peres himself was a guest at the Sharm el-Sheikh conference on the eve of the elections. His opponent Netanyahu protested vigorously. Lapid and Gantz, like all their predecessors who worked to achieve goals on the eve of elections, know that if not now, maybe never, or maybe not them. So yes, the election is a factor, a stopwatch, but not the only one. Alongside it there is also the plan to begin drilling for gas. 

Israel had two options for compromise, which the opposition would paint as surrender, and one option to hold firm, and take a risk. Compromise one: sign – as the government wants to do. Compromise two: postpone the driling, so as not to risk a violent outbreak. Option to hold firm: begin to drill without reaching an agreement. Hezbollah would likely respond with fire. Israel would respond to the response. Maybe this means a short exchange of fire, maybe an all-out war. Either way, it is clear that choosing to hold firm and drill is more dangerous – at least in the short term.

And what about the long term? That’s the root of the real debate. Did Israel act wisely when it decided not to insist on secondary issues (disputed territory at sea) and get a practical arrangement that allows it to do what’s really important (drill, produce, make a profit). Or maybe Israel acted foolishly, by teaching Hezbollah how to use threats to advance its goals. And in this matter, there should be no doubt: Hezbollah’s threats had an effect on the negotiations. Because of them, Israel had to choose between a somewhat painful compromise and an insistence that could lead to war. Should this be considered a “surrender to terrorism”? Any negotiated compromise between any two countries requires surrendering to something. Israel surrendered the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt to prevent a future war. Was it surrender to terrorism? Sure – the Egyptians essentially said, either you return Sinai, or there will be another war. Was it worth it? Israel gained peace on the Egyptian border, and lost territory. 

There is no return without paying a price. Hence, what is required is an evaluation of the return compared to the price. One is willing to pay a lot for a certain product; the other believes that the price is too high for such product. All else is just politics.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

Look at this, and then at the table below it:

Only one significant political change took place in September, and that is the transition from two Arab parties to three. One of them does not cross the electoral threshold in the polls (Balad) but takes from the two other parties (Hadash-Taal and Raam). Both of them are very close to the electoral threshold, barely above it. On average – this is just one seat less for the Arab parties., But potentially, this is a significant seat, because of the possibility that all three parties will end up below the thresholds, which means no Arab representation at all, and eight seats for grabs that will likely hand Netanyahu a victory. 

A week’s numbers

In the most static election in Israel’s history, the polls barely move.

A reader’s response:

In response to my last week’s article (how do we define a good year), Fred Ginzburg writes: “A year without Netanyahu was definitely a good year”. My response: so this year is up for grabs. 


Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.

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