Thou Shalt Not Surprise Thy Allies

Surprises can be delightful. A woman surprises her husband with tickets to his favorite band’s concert. He surprises her with pearl earrings she has wanted for years. But in international relations, surprises are problematic. Nations plan their moves in advance, and surprises disrupt these plans. A country formulates policies, and surprises force updates. A nation designs a work plan, and surprises ruin it. A country prepares for one thing and suddenly faces another. Surprises accelerate the heartbeat, provoke anxiety, and increase the risk of misunderstandings. While surprises might be enjoyable for couples, nations, particularly friendly ones, prefer to avoid them.

This is especially true in the relationship between Israel and the USA – a relationship that has seen ups and downs, disagreements, and yes, surprises. Contrary to what one might think, disagreements are relatively simple to manage. Surprises are the destructive element in relationships. One example: Israel surprised the Eisenhower administration by invading the Sinai Peninsula in coordination with Britain and France. At the time, the American administration was not exactly an ally and barely supported Israel. Yet, the surprise provoked a severe reaction. In fact, a dictate that Israel was forced to accept. Another example is when U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers launched an uncoordinated peace plan for the Middle East, which stirred controversy and ultimately contributed to his political decline. In 2015, Prime Minister Netanyahu surprised the Obama administration by accepting an invitation to speak at the U.S. Congress. In his defense, the issue was important (Iran), and it must also be noted that the Obama administration itself surprised Israel more than once.

This week, it appears that Donald Trump surprised Israel by approving significant secret talks with Hamas. This is interesting for several reasons:

First, Trump had already surprised Israel positively more than once. The known example was his decision in his first term to move the American embassy to Jerusalem. Many officials in Israel doubted he would actually do it until the moment he did. This might lead Israelis to think that a Trump surprise is more welcome and more manageable than those from other presidents, which could complicate matters when less pleasant surprises arise.

Second, Trump is a president full of surprises. His policy relies on his personality, which is fundamentally unpredictable. He shifts positions quickly, keeping everyone, including Israel, on their toes. Expecting Trump not to surprise is like expecting the sun not to rise.That’s his very nature.  

Third, Trump did with Hamas what many Israeli prime ministers did in previous decades: he operated through parallel channels of communication and policy. In one channel, Steven Witkoff pushed to prolong phase A of the hostage deal, while in another, Adam Boehler directly explored additional options with Hamas. This raises questions about the level of coordination inside the White House between these various channels. Presidents like Richard Nixon, and Israeli politicians like Shimon Peres, specialized in navigating parallel paths whose operators were not aware of each other’s existence. This also raises questions about how much coordination there was with Israel in pursuing these different tracks. Boehler said this week that Israel was aware of his moves, while Israel hinted that it knew less than it would have liked to know. The U.S. administration hinted that Israel attempted to sabotage the secret talks with Hamas. In Jerusalem, officials leaked that the news of the secret channel came from Israeli intelligence sources, not from proper communication by the U.S. government.

As mentioned, it’s possible that behind the U.S. talks with Hamas there is a significant policy dispute over how to proceed with negotiations with Hamas, how to manage the return of the hostages, whether a day-after for Gaza with Hamas as part of it is feasible, and more. But the significant dispute is less important, and the surprise is more critical. A significant disagreement can be discussed, while a surprise creates an atmosphere of suspicion and stifles discussion. What if the U.S. is conducting unknown talks with Iran about a new nuclear deal? What if the U.S. is having unknown talks with the Saudis about a political move concerning Gaza or the West Bank? What if the U.S. is paving paths unknown to Israel, putting it into policy dilemmas it is not prepared for?

Surprises are gateways to an atmosphere of paranoia. An atmosphere of paranoia is a gateway to miscalculations. Miscalculations are gateways to hasty moves. Hasty moves generate even more surprises — and the cycle repeats. 

Israel had a strange week. A week that in and of itself necessitates a new thinking about opening new paths.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

Trust in the leadership of Israel’s Shin Bet – the internal security service – is low. Why?

It is no wonder that trust in the top brass of the Shin Bet is low. It is absurd to think that public trust in the top brass of the Shin Bet should be high. After all, it is the top brass that failed to identify the preparations for the Oct. 7 attack … But if this were the main explanation for the low trust in the Shin Bet, we should have seen low trust in the top brass of the Shin Bet in all strata of society, all of whom recognize the failure and the tragedy. This is not the case … On the right, 85% have no trust in the top brass of the Shin Bet… a mirror image of opinions in the center and left … The ranking of the Shin Bet’s top brass is derived primarily from a political position.

A week’s numbers

This came out surprisingly close… 

A reader’s response

Ruby Aronson asks: Is Naftali Bennett running for PM again? Answer: All signs show that he is, when there’s an election, and current polls give him a shot at winning.

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.