Rosner’s Domain: The Other Iran-Strategy Also Doesn’t Work

The clichés are familiar: you have to be smart. And another one: Energy and persistence conquer all things. The reality is a little different: sometimes smart is not enough, nor is energy and persistence. Sometimes events are simply out of Israel’s control.

We are probably getting closer to getting such a lesson on Iran. In 2015, President Barack Obama had decided to sign an agreement with Iran. Israel made great efforts to prevent the agreement. It did not help. The agreement was signed. True, later it was canceled. But the cancellation had a price, to be paid now, in any new agreement. It’s an agreement that President Joe Biden looks like he’s going to sign. In the case of Biden, Israel has changed its policy and tone. Instead of the aggressive and public approach, it launched a quiet dialogue. The result seems similar to the one produced by the previous approach. Or maybe a little worse? Prime Minister Naftali Bennett said on Sunday that the coming agreement would be weaker than its predecessor. 

What is the lesson in all of this? One lesson is unclear. Proponents of the current Israeli line would say that instead of double damage — both an agreement with Iran and a quarrel with Israel’s U.S. friends — we now only see a single damage — the looming agreement. At least, they say, we maintain a close relationship with the administration.

This is a possible conclusion, but not the only one. Proponents of the aggressive approach (that is, Benjamin Netanyahu,) will say that if an agreement with Iran is a done deal, it is better for Israel to accept it under fierce, blatant protest, so as not to create the impression that Israel is willing to live with it. A clear protest opens the door to a later change when, say, Donald Trump is re-elected president, or Nicki Haley, or Ron DeSantis.

There is also a clearer, more definite lesson to be learned, and Bennett seems to have missed it. He said earlier this week that “Israel will not accept Iran as a nuclear threshold state.” This is similar to previous statements on what Israel will or will not accept about an Iran nuclear deal. That is, a statement that has no connection to a reality over which Israel has no control.

In other words: just as in the case of the agreement, when it was proved that two different approaches could not prevent it, so it is with the case of Iran as a nuclear power. Israel can “accept” or “not accept” reality. The ultimate question will be not whether Israel accepts reality, but whether Iran is a nuclear threshold state, and it is not at all certain that Israel has the option to prevent such scenario from materializing. Maybe it does. We all hope it does. But we cannot be certain. Had it been simple, had it been foolproof, Israel would probably already be doing it.

The implication of this understanding is that Israel must prepare, as PM Bennett also said. It is essential to prepare for an agreement which will undermine stability in the Middle East. It is essential to prepare for a weak agreement that will allow Iran to continue to advance its nuclear program. 

As for America, the next test of Israel’s current approach will be the ability of Bennett’s government to get something tangible in return for its tacit acceptance of the nuclear deal. Not that they agree to the agreement – they agree to remain relatively silent. At least until now. A grateful administration (so the Israeli government hopes) will provide Israel with more means to deal with the consequences of the agreement. And forgive me for being a little suspicious about this possibility. The administration is going to want to make sure that the compensation for Israel would not allow Israel to take steps that would undermine the agreement. 

That’s really the point. The interests of Israel and America are different. And the public seems to understand this as much as the leaders do. Even among Republican voters there is not a clear majority opposing an agreement (see a recent Morning Consult Poll). In fact, Netanyahu would probably look at the numbers and say ‘I told you so’. He’d say, not without reason, that had Israel protested more vigorously, at least the proportion of Republicans who object to an agreement would have been higher (to which Bennett would respond: yes, but this comes with a price on the other side).

Israel and America don’t see eye to eye on Iran. That was as true when Netanyahu was vocal as is it is when Bennett is restrained. 

So, Israel and America don’t see eye to eye on Iran. That was as true when Netanyahu was vocal as it is when Bennett is restrained. Israel expects from Americans the kind of support that it could get in a different era. But in the current era, of battle with China, of focusing on domestic problems, of attempting to ease the burden of being a global policeman, of energy independence — in this current era, Israel’s concerns are, well, less important to American administrations. 

This should be stated, clearly and calmly: Israel is less important to the Americans. And that, too, as Bennett says, is something for which Israel must prepare.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

Israel’s Finance Minister is trying to tempt ultra-Orthodox men into the workforce. Here is something I wrote about his plan:

The habits of ultra-Orthodox society cannot be changed in one or two years. The first reaction of ultra-Orthodox communities to the Lieberman decrees will be to wait… If the government disintegrates in six months or a year, it is doubtful it will be able to anchor the necessary change and make them irreversible… a change is conditional on the habituation of a new generation of ultra-Orthodox men to conditions it will no longer want to roll back… If 200,000 men go out to work and do so for a long enough time to get used to it, and decide that it is good for them, only then the ultra-Orthodox leadership would no longer be able to persuade them to give up the new lifestyle to which they were accustomed.

A week’s numbers

Are we still “the people of the book”? These are the numbers from Israel. And note the exact language: this is how much Israelis say they read, not necessarily what they read (when asking such questions, we should take into account social desirability). 

A reader’s response:

Erwin Goldstein did not appreciate the idea of an “Israeli Century” that was presented in a cover story I wrote. Here’s Goldstein’s comment: “why do we have to decide between ‘Israeli’ or ‘American’ century – can we not compromise on a joint ‘Jewish century’?”. 

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.