How Could This Have Happened

In its War of Independence, Israel lost 3,600 soldiers and 2,400 civilians. It was close to 1% of the Jewish population. The war lasted from November 1947 to July 1949. So, 6,000 casualties in more than a year. 

In the Yom Kippur War, year 1973, 2,800 soldiers were killed. The war lasted for about a month. 

In the Second Intifada, 1,115 Israelis were killed, 785 of which were civilians. The wave of terrorism lasted for about three years. 

Last Saturday, Israel lost more than 1300 civilians and soldiers in one day — the deadliest day in Israel’s history.

In Israel we’re seen the realization of a nightmare that every human, every parent dreads: A killer in the living room, a terrorist infiltrating the sacred space of the private home, pointing a gun to a child’s head, abducting an elderly woman and, to add insult to injury,  broadcasting it all live from the sofa of the victims. 

Some writers suggested that it was Israel’s “Pearl Harbor” or Israel’s “9/11.” But in the macabre contest of surprise horrors, the massacre of Simchat Torah was much worse than these two. Considering the countries populations, 1300 Israelis compares to more than 45,000 Americans – much more that the number of Americans killed in either the Pearl Harbor attack or the 9/11 attack. Moreover, while these two surprise attacks were horrifying in magnitude, both were contained to a military installation (in the first case) and prominent buildings (in the other). In Israel we’re seen the realization of a nightmare that every human, every parent dreads: A killer in the living room, a terrorist infiltrating the sacred space of the private home, pointing a gun to a child’s head, abducting an elderly woman and, to add insult to injury,  broadcasting it all live from the sofa of the victims. 

Roi Idan, a photographer in Kfar Aza, took pictures of the first wave of Hamas attack: A group of terrorists that used motorized paragliders as their way of reach from within the Gaza Strip to Kfar Aza, about 2 kilometers from the security fence. You can see some of these photographs but on Tuesday, when this story is written, Roi’s whereabouts are not known. He took the shot and rushed back home. The terrorists got there not much later. They killed his wife, Smadar, in the living room. He was out carrying his 3-year-old daughter. It is likely that he was injured. A neighbor took the child from him, and was later abducted, along with her own children, to Gaza. Meanwhile, at home, Roi’s other two children, 9 and 6, hid in a closet. They survived. Would you call them the lucky ones?

It was ghastly, and heartbreaking, and that was just the first day.

How could this have happened?

Hamas assailants knew how to disrupt Israel’s communications, they knew where they’d find vulnerable entry points, they knew where young Israelis were having a party and could easily be slaughtered or captured — sitting ducks in the shooting range of merciless terror. 

The short story is simple: Hamas was able to plan and execute a masterful, ruthless, attack. Israel’s intelligence did not notice the preparations. Israel’s military forces, in the area near Gaza, were neutralized for many hours by the exact design and execution of a meticulous plan. Hamas assailants knew how to disrupt Israel’s communications, they knew where they’d find vulnerable entry points, they knew where young Israelis were having a party and could easily be slaughtered or captured — sitting ducks in the shooting range of merciless terror. 

Since Israel did not know what was coming, and did not even imagine such a scenario, it was ill prepared and slow to react. Confused policemen, soldiers and civilians fought heroically and died defending others. Trembling families hid in shelters, crying for help that in many cases was too late to arrive. Sporadic acts of bravery were the exception to the rule of chaotic muddle: No help in sight, for hours, even days. These acts of heroism proved, not for the first time, that Israelis are often much better than their institutions.  

Yair Golan is one such Israeli. He is a 61-year-old retired General. He is a former MK – that is, a politician of leftist tendencies. In recent years he was occasionally a divisive figure, making statements that portrayed Israel’s actions in negative light. In 2016, as vice chief of the IDF, Golan made a highly controversial speech. On Holocaust Remembrance Day, Golan said that he sees similarities between Nazi Germany of the 1930s and Israel today when it comes to “signs of intolerance and violence.” He was repudiated by politicians, mocked by pundits and called to resign. And that was before he became a leftist politician, so you can easily imagine the names he was called as a politician.

But earlier this week, Israelis learned to appreciate Golan as the fearless patriotic man he is. On Saturday, when the IDF was still in a state of shock, Golan put on his gun, his well-worn uniform, and drove south, into the war zone. His goal: To rescue civilians. He found and rescued two youngsters hiding under a bush, not far from the many bodies of dying festival attendees. He responded to calls of people crying that their loved ones were under fire. “Give me his location, and I will bring him back,” was his response to a call from an Israeli journalist. He brought the journalist’s son back, and many others. The next day, you could read tweets by many Israeli right-wingers, such as this one: “I feel personally obligated to apologize to Golan. He is brave and a hero who risked his life and rescued 6 people yesterday. I underestimated him and belittled him … I have now learned a very important lesson.”

How could this have happened?

The detailed story is longer than these pages would allow, more complicated, and often controversial. This story will haunt Israel for many years to come, and is likely to be investigated by committees, debated by historians, and affect Israel’s political landscape and social fabric. But it is much too early to comprehensively deal with that story, and Israel is much too busy to deal with it, as it has a war on its hands. It is impossible to investigate a “mechdal” — the Hebrew world coined to describe the negligence and dereliction of duty of the pre-Yom Kippur War – while engaging in war. So, the public, as eager as it is to get answers now, and point fingers at the men in charge now, and get rid of those guilty of negligence now, might have to wait. When the cannons are heard, the muses are silent. When the cannons are heard, a final account must be postponed. 

How could this have happened?]

In retrospect, it’s clear that Israel failed to appreciate the level of professionalism and planning Hamas is capable of (probably assisted by Iran and Hezbollah).

In retrospect, it’s clear that Israel trusted its security fence more than any fence deserves to be trusted. With civilians living so close to the border, more forces were needed to defend the perimeter when the fence was breeched. In retrospect, Israel assumed that Hamas rule in Gaza, as radical and brutal as it might be, was a tolerable arrangement. It never assumed it was an ideal arrangement, but considering the other options, Israeli governments repeatedly chose to let Hamas be. General Yaakov Amidror, former security advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu, candidly acknowledged that he, along with most government and military officials, made a tragic mistake. “I thought that Hamas, because of its responsibility and because it’s not only a terror organization, but also an organization with ideas about the future, a small branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, is more responsible, and I learned in the hard way that it is not so, that a terror organization is a terror organization”.

In retrospect, warnings about Israel’s weakening deterrence, because of social ruptures and political cynicism, were not taken seriously enough … it’s clear that Israel trusted its security fence more than any fence deserves to be trusted.

In retrospect, warnings about Israel’s weakening deterrence, because of social raptures and political cynicism, were not taken seriously enough. And of course, it is difficult to draw a clear line that connects the social upheaval to the Hamas attack. And yet, the timing is telling, and also the fact than when the political establishment is investing most of its energy on repeated election cycles, judicial reforms and other nonsensical initiatives, it does not have the energy to invest in more important fields of operation. In retrospect, it was obvious to assume that advancing talks with Saudi Arabia could become a trigger for disruptive terrorism. Israel was so focused on the upside of possible normalization, that it forgot to take care of the dangerous downside. 

What else? The IDF was busier than ever in the West Bank. Some Israelis would argue that this was the natural response of the IDF to tensions in Judea and Samaria, others would argue that this was a result of having a hardline right-wing government that skewed Israel’s actual priorities. Then again, this is one of the debates that Israelis had before the war. Debates smack of politics, and better shelved for the time being.

Until the war is over.

The cabinet instructed a wounded, shocked military to destroy the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza. It is an instruction that’s more precise that those issued in previous rounds of fighting against Hamas. Since Israel’s pullout from Gaza in 2005 and Hamas’ takeover in 2007, successive governments followed a similar script: Deter Hamas — but do not destroy Hamas. Why? For two main reasons. One: Destroying Hamas could be difficult and costly. Two: Destroying Hamas raises a follow-up question that must be answered — Who, then, is going to rule Gaza?

Israel’s calculus changed last Saturday. It changed because the cost paid for not dethroning Hamas was so high, that it makes the prospect of paying a price to take Hamas down seem lower. It also changed because Hamas as a ruler is no longer seen as the lesser of possible evils. Hamas is so evil, that Israel decided to make last week’s attack “the last time that we can allow Hamas to be strong enough to attack Israel,” as Amidror said.

That is the strategy, from which tactical decisions are derived. It started with clearing Israel’s south from all terrorist infiltrators and securing the border against more infiltrations. It continued with building the IDF forces to their full capacity — Israel called up for reserve duty around 300,000 men and women, and all of them packed their bags and answered the call. In fact, more Israelis than the units expected showed up. 

The manpower is needed to fight the war in Gaza and bolster Israel’s defense on the northern border. That is, because it is getting ready for the long-feared scenario of a two-front war — one in Gaza against Hamas, and one in Lebanon, against the much more powerful Hezbollah. On Monday, settlements along the northern border were evacuated as a precaution. Short exchanges of rocket and mortar fire erupted. A party of militants crossed the border and opened fire at soldiers. The infiltrators were killed, as was an IDF officer.

Israel’s strategy is to avoid a two-front war —  but that would ultimately be Hezbollah’s role to decide whether it stays on the sidelines or enter the fray and make the war a much larger affair for all parties involved.

Such news will be the norm in the coming days and weeks, and in such situations, it is crucial to separate the signal from the noise. Israel’s strategy is to disarm Hamas in Gaza, eliminate it as a security threat (not necessarily as a civilian ruler). Israel’s strategy is to avoid a two-front war — but that would ultimately be Hezbollah’s role to decide whether it stays on the sidelines or enter the fray and make the war a much larger affair for all parties involved. 

If Hezbollah decides to join in, Israel’s conduct of operation would be devastating for Lebanon. The operations of the Second Lebanon War, in 2006, were often restrained because of international pressure, including pressure by the Bush administration, whose Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice believed that Lebanon could be a truly democratic state that would be an example for other Middle Eastern countries. Clearly, her vision did not bear fruit, and Israel concluded that next time – namely, maybe now – the attempt to differentiate between Hezbollah-controlled targets and Lebanese-controlled targets should not be repeated. Hezbollah controls Lebanon, some of it directly, some of it indirectly. So, a war against Hezbollah is a war against Lebanon, with all the implications that conclusion carries. 

The Biden administration issued several warnings this week, whose aim is deterrence of Hezbollah and its sponsor, Iran. It also sent an aircraft carrier to the region as clear sign of skin in the game. By and large, Biden was a beacon of light in this dark week, and Israelis — while not always great fans of Biden and the Democratic party — did accept his clear statements and quick response with great appreciation. With American backing, Israel feels stronger, can project more power, and have more room to maneuver. It is good for Israel, and strangely, also for many of its enemies. When Israel feels secure, it is easier for its government to make clearheaded decisions. And this often means less bloodshed. 

Israel’s most difficult tactical problem is what to do with the many — more than 100 — Israelis that were taken to Gaza as hostages. Can you bomb an area in which Israeli civilians might be kept? Can you risk their lives by going after Hamas leaders? Holding to the captives makes Hamas look bad, but it’s an undeniable bargaining chip that the organization is going to use. Last time it did — with just one abducted soldier — Netanyahu made a highly controversial decision to release hundreds of terrorists in exchange for Gilad Shalit. The fact that Hamas currently has many captives, including elderly women and young children, is going to complicate things in multiple ways.

As the war moves forward, the enemy is going to reveal its own cards; it is going to make Israel pay in an attempt to wear out Israel’s current mood of determination.

This is just one of these places in which strategic goals meet a complicated reality. As the war moves forward, the enemy is going to reveal its own cards; it is going to make Israel pay in an attempt to wear out Israel’s current mood of determination.

This is where politics comes in, and Netanyahu’s decision — late, hesitant, unconvincing — was to expand his cabinet to a special national unity “war cabinet.” For Israel to be able to deal with what’s coming — the hurdles of war, the catastrophes of war, the fatigue of war — it must preserve this sense of determination and shove to the side all previous disagreements and grievances. This is a tall order, as no Israeli can easily forget the events of the previous months, the societal rupture, the irresponsible talk about internal civil war. So, this must be said: Netanyahu was forced by Hamas to lead Israel into war when confidence in him is very low. Complicating things further, it is also not a time in which Israelis have great confidence in their military, whose performance last Saturday was meager. 

So, Israel goes to war determined to win, but also highly suspicious of its political and military leadership. It is determined to win because its citizens know — they’ve just witnessed — what a loss means. It doesn’t mean having to compromise, it doesn’t mean negotiations, it doesn’t mean new arrangements, of disengagement. It means a pitiless slaughter of our families. It means terror in its most brutal form. TERROR. 

This is not the time for more horror stories of survivors. It is, of course, impossible to avoid them, and it is impossible not to give the survivors an opportunity to share with us what they went through. You can’t help but cry with them. But at the same time, the cabinet and the military must shield themselves from these stories. They must develop a certain degree of imperviousness to the incessant flow of chilling news about yesterday and think about tomorrow. 

This is not a good time for therapy, which will surely be needed. This is not an appropriate time for pointing accusing fingers at guilty actors, which will surely come. It is time to remember that Israel does not conclude an event – it is merely starting it. The most difficult day in Israel’s history is behind us, and very difficult days — hopefully not equally difficult, or more difficult — are still ahead of us. When Israel was taken by surprise in the Yom Kippur War the stories of the horrors were heard, but not immediately, not while the battalions were still on the battlefield. Some stories waited for the days after the war, some waited for years, even decades, until they were told. 

Because one can’t cry and win at the same time

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.