Predicting Trump’s Policies

Trump is Israel’s best friend.
Trump is an isolationist.
Trump is a dangerous bully.
Trump is a peacemaker.
Trump is unpredictable.

Trump is a Rorschach test. For now, that is what he is. All of the above are somewhat true, none of the above reveals much about his future policies in the Middle East. He is going to be in Netanyahu’s pocket – worries a European diplomat. He isn’t going to be in Netanyahu’s pocket – predicts a hopeful Netanyahu opponent. What people read into Trump’s intentions is their own fears and their own wishes. What people read into Trump’s intentions is based only on partial information.

Example: “Trump Won’t Move U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.” That’s a WSJ headline from 2017. But Trump did move the embassy. Example: “Peace in the Middle East? Why Trump, Clinton Are Unlikely to Help.” That’s from NBC, in 2016. And yet, Trump did help. In fact, he is the only U.S. President since Bill Clinton (peace between Israel and Jordan) who was able to complete a peace deal worthy of its name. 

Now take all the above listed truisms and turn them on their head. Israel’s best friend? I don’t think so. Trump doesn’t seem like the emotional type – he doesn’t seem to have attachment to any country, or ideology. An isolationist? So why the Abraham Accords, why the sanctions on Iran, why the involvement in the attempt to tame North Korea? A dangerous bully? Trump – as he repeatedly remarked during his campaign – did not rush to launch wars. A peacemaker? More a dealmaker. Unpredictable? In fact, his main unpredictability stems from the fact that people were astonished to see him act in ways that were in line with his campaign promises. He said he’d move the embassy, and he did. The surprise is only because many presidents before him made similar promises without feeling the need to do what they vowed to do.

On this last point, I’d start any attempt to assess Trump’s future policies by taking his declared intentions seriously. When he says he wants the war in Gaza and Lebanon to stop – he means it. Of course, stopping the war isn’t as easy as declaring your intention. The war has two sides and both must accept certain terms for it to stop. This means that Trump is going to have to make at least two important decisions as he strives to stop the war. One: he needs to decide what is in his view a reasonable framework that could become the exit strategy from the war. Two: following this decision, he’d need to put pressure on the belligerent parties to accept the framework, and such pressure could be applied in two possible fashions. On Israel – to accept Trump’s framework. Or on Israel’s enemies – to accept Trump’s framework. The challenge for Israel is clear: It is easier for the U.S. to put pressure on its ally Israel than it is to put pressure on its enemies. Israelis pushed back against some of the proposals put forward by the Biden administration because of their belief that Biden and his emissaries are trying to push Israel around – because it’s easier to do – rather than pushing Israel’s enemies, as the situation requires. 

Lebanon is going to be a clear test of Trump’s intentions. What Israel wants in Lebanon is a diplomatic settlement. The government wants it, the IDF preaches for it, and the public will support it – if, and only if, the security arrangements could guarantee the safety of Israel’s northern communities. What does this mean? That’s quite simple: Implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. That is to say: in 2006 the resolution was passed and accepted but it was never truly realized. The resolution has clauses demanding the disarmament of all nonstate actors in Lebanon. It has clauses insisting that only the Lebanese army and UNIFIL can operate in the area between the Israel border and the Litani River. Neither thing happened. The Resolution was good. The implementation was bad. 

This time around, what Israel wants is to make sure that implementation would be guaranteed. It wants to clarify, in writing, that a failure to implement the agreement is going to prompt legitimate Israeli actions. Trump can make such arrangement work by vowing to let Israel act if the implementation in 2025 is an agreement is a repeat of the implementation in 2006. Trump can make this arrangement work by pressuring actors such as France to publicly declare that they also accept the idea of serious implementation – or else. Trump can make such an arrangement work. 

And he can do all this by being Trump Israel’s best friend, an isolationist, a dangerous bully, a peacemaker. By being unpredictable. That is – by keeping his word.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

Last week, when Defense Minister Gallant was fired by the PM, I wrote the following paragraph:

Everything Netanyahu does is within the law. Netanyahu behaves with cold cynicism, with calculated cruelty and promiscuously – but the dismissal of the Minister of Defense is within his authority. This is what makes it very difficult for those who oppose him. If they want to maintain the formal framework of what citizens are allowed and forbidden to do, they don’t have many tools. If they decide to go beyond this framework, beyond closing a street for a day or two, they will be accused of disrupting the war effort. 

A week’s numbers

When the public doesn’t trust the government, that’s the sad result (a Ch.12 News survey).

A reader’s response

Naomi Brown writes: I can’t understand why Israelis were so pleased when Trump won. My response: Please see my column from last week (you can easily find it on JJ’s website).