This Thing Called ‘Victory’

In dictionaries, you will find various definitions for victory, such as “success in achieving objectives and defeating the enemy,” or “overcoming an opponent in war.” Thus, the definition of victory requires even more definitions. What is “success,” what is “defeat”? This is a discussion of some importance. Why? Because Israel wants a ceasefire in Lebanon, but it wants it only on the condition that it allows it to hold onto that elusive thing called “victory.”

Victory can be achieved in one of two ways. The first is a declaration of victory, coupled with a declaration of defeat by the opponent, or at least silence as an admission of defeat. This is formal victory. Everyone knows who won. Everyone accepts the certainty of victory. Japan was defeated in World War II. There is no debate about that. The South surrendered in the American Civil War. There is no debate about that either.

Another route to achieving victory is more ambiguous, relying on a feeling of triumph. A situation where there is no formal declaration. A victory as a mental and conscious state without formal recognition. And it could be tricky, because sometimes both sides will present themselves as victorious. It could be because both know who won and who lost even if they don’t say it, or because the sides have a different feeling about who won. For example, Israel believes it has won, and Hezbollah believes it has won. Of course, that’s a problematic situation because victory has a purpose: to prevent the recurrence of war. If the enemy knows it lost, it will think twice before launching another attack. If the enemy thinks it won, it might be mistaken to think that you — the side sure that it was the victor — are actually the one who should think twice.

Another route to achieving victory is more ambiguous, relying on a feeling of triumph. A situation where there is no formal declaration. A victory as a mental and conscious state without formal recognition. And it could be tricky, because sometimes both sides will present themselves as victorious. 

This theoretical convolution is tedious, but it underlies the difficulty in establishing a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. Israel wants a deal that allows it to say it had won. Hezbollah wants an arrangement that leaves the outcome obscure. Of course, it’s possible to dismiss all this as a pointless game of words. Let each say what they want. Yet, in many cases in the past, states insisted on a formal declaration. Ulysses Grant demanded explicit written surrender. In the Franco-Prussian War, the French surrendered. The Argentine forces in the Falkland Islands surrendered to the British in 1982.

Does surrender prevent the next war? Not necessarily. The Germans and the French continued to fight even after the French defeat. And what happens when there is no surrender, even if it’s clear who won? Saddam Hussein did not formally surrender after the First Gulf War. He simply accepted the terms of ceasefire that the U.S. and the international coalition imposed on him. He then violated them time and again, until the next war. And in that subsequent war, it was also clear who won – or was it? The U.S. defeated Iraqi military forces. Then it got stuck in Iraq for many years. Then more or less left. If that is victory (and it’s not clear that it is) most Americans would say it wasn’t worth the price.

Let’s return to Israel and Lebanon. Israel demands recognition of its right to monitor — by force, if necessary — the implementation of the agreement. It demands recognition of its right to act if Hezbollah violates the agreement. This is a reasonable demand, behind which lurks a dark reality: The next war is just a matter of time, because Hezbollah has no reason to exist if it does not violate the agreement. Hezbollah was established to harass Israel. An agreement that effectively prevents it from harassing Israel is the beginning of its disintegration. Thus, the ceasefire is not the end of the conflict. The next round will come, who knows when, maybe in half a year, maybe in two years, maybe 20. Of course, there is always a chance, a hope, that the next round will never come. Maybe regional processes will indeed lead to a gradual disintegration of Hezbollah (Hezbollah could hope that reverse processes will lead to the disintegration of Israel which would obviate the next war).

Israel will settle for that. It will settle for a ceasefire without a formal announcement of victory. It will settle for a ceasefire that merely restores the order that was promised nearly 20 years ago, in U.N. Resolution 1701, that was never seriously implemented. People might say: Israel was hammered for a year, and all it achieved was a return to the status quo ante, with vague promises that this time an agreement will be implemented. People might also say: Israel seized an opportunity, struck Hezbollah in a way that will make it hard for it to recover, and taught it a painful lesson that will deter it from another conflict for the next 20 years. Twenty years is not an insignificant period.

The question of victory will become a psychological factor. It will become a matter of dispute. The Israeli government will need to convince the citizens of Israel that this is a victory, that in this era, this is what victory looks like. It must do this to convince the residents of northern settlements that they can go back to their homes. It must do this to maintain public support. It must do this so that the soldiers who fought and sacrificed bravely come out of the war with a sense of achievement, not of missed opportunity. It must do this because there will be no surrender.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

Is Trump better than Harris for Israel, as most Israelis think? This can be debated. But that’s not the debate between the Jews in the U.S. who voted for her and him. The debate is about hierarchy. How significant should Israel be as a voting considerations of Jews in the U.S? What is the weight of the Iranian threat?  Trump’s Jews place such issues almost at the top of the agenda. Harris’ Jews place them pretty much at the bottom of the agenda. This is an important distinction that should be remembered in any political context. The question is not necessarily who will handle the economy better, but how important the economy is to you compared to, say, strengthening Jewish identity … It is possible for everyone to agree that Trump would be better for Israel — or that Harris would be better for abortions — and still vote differently because of the question: So which of these two, good for Israel or good for abortions, is more important to you?

A week’s numbers

After a year of war, Jewish Israelis’ confidence that they will win the war was almost restored to the high level of the war’s beginning.

A reader’s response

T. Hirsch commented: “Israelis are delusional to think that Trump will be good for them.” My answer: Why? He was good for them in his first term. It is at least a possibility that he’ll be good for them again. 

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.