When Bennett Meets Biden: Terms of Success

Ariel Sharon served as Israel’s Prime Minister for five years and visited the United States ten times during this period. His first visit was in March 2001, two months into George W. Bush’s term. Yitzhak Rabin visited the newly-elected President Clinton in March 1993. Prime Minister Netanyahu traveled to see President Donald Trump in February 2017, just a month after Trump was sworn in. After President Obama was installed in the White House in 2009, he had meetings first with President Peres and then with PM Netanyahu in May.

Naftali Bennett will be meeting President Joe Biden on Thursday, at the end of a long summer. More than half a year has passed since Biden took office. And he seemed to be in no rush to meet with an Israeli leader. Certainly not with former Prime Minister Netanyahu, who was unfashionably late to congratulate Biden on his victory, and whose history with the previous administration in which Biden served is hardly one of cordial relations. But Biden also seemed leisurely when Netanyahu was replaced by Bennett. He was surely pleased with the change of guard in Jerusalem. And yet, he kept Bennett waiting before scheduling a rendezvous.

This is no coincidence. It is not just the result of a busy schedule and an overwhelming agenda for both leaders—from the pandemic, to passing budgets and reforms, to handling foreign policy crises. It is also a result of intended delay. Biden wanted to delay the meeting because he didn’t quite know what he’d say to Bennett on the most pressing issue for Israel—Iran. In fact, it’s not unfair to suspect that he wanted to hold Bennett back until a deal with Iran is a fait accompli. And it’s not unreasonable to assume that the meeting was finally scheduled only when Biden realized that the mullahs are going to take their time—and that he can no longer defer the meeting without it seeming like a snub.

So, what could he tell him about Iran? Probably very little.

Biden cannot tell him that Iran has his full attention. Clearly, he has another theater of operation to worry about for the next few weeks, until the withdrawal from Afghanistan is completed.

Biden cannot tell him that Iran has his full attention. Clearly, he has another theater of operation to worry about for the next few weeks, until the withdrawal from Afghanistan is completed.

He cannot tell Bennett that Iran is responsive to American attempts to come to an agreement, because it’s not. In fact, the events in Afghanistan gave the Iranians a good reason to raise the bar and see if a post-withdrawal America is more receptive to compromise (that is, an agreement more favorable to Iran) than a pre-withdrawal America.

He cannot make promises about American commitments to regional security that would not sound a little hollow—not after the miserable fall of Kabul.

And he cannot tell him that Iran is in retreat because what happens in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria and other places would prove him wrong.

So, Biden has little to offer on this front, which could become a problem because clearly this is the main topic on Bennett’s mind. Yesterday, a high ranking “diplomatic source” briefed the media in preparation for the meeting, and had two main messages to communicate:

1. 1. Netanyahu is to blame for the situation in which Israel finds itself.
   2. A return to the JCPOA would be a mistake.

Think about these two messages.

The first one creates an atmosphere of mutual agreement. For Biden, as well as for Bennett, blaming the predecessor is a good start. Biden would say: it was a mistake (on the part of Trump, and he was influenced by Netanyahu) to ditch the JCPOA. Bennett would say: Netanyahu fought for something whose result is ultimately unfavorable to Israel (Bennett would not say that ditching the JCPOA was a mistake).

The second one is also not as problematic as it used to be, because at this moment, there’s no JCPOA to which to return. The Iranians seem uninterested. Bennett would say: an agreement isn’t going to solve the problem. Biden would say: we oppose a nuclear Iran and await Iran’s return to the negotiating table. No big dispute.

But note this: blaming the predecessor and waiting for a better agreement or no agreement is a political strategy, not a strategy against Iran. Does Bennett have such strategy to propose that Biden would accept? Does Biden have such strategy to propose that Bennett would accept? We can say even today, that the meeting is going to be declared a success. And it will be a success. The two leaders will probably get along, and will do their best not to muddy the waters of the U.S.-Israel relations. Israel is going to declare its commitment to a bipartisan policy. Biden will declare the commitment of his party to Israel is as strong as ever.

And yet, a nagging question remains: are the leaders in Tehran worried about the possible outcome of the Biden-Bennet meeting? If they aren’t, the meeting cannot honestly be declared a success.