Much has transpired since Joe Biden became the first sitting American president to visit Israel in wartime. From Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer’s unprecedented call for new elections in Israel, to the United States abstaining on a United Nations Security Council resolution demanding an “immediate ceasefire” in Gaza, the U.S.-Israel relationship is looking increasingly shaky.
To better understand these developments from an American perspective, I spoke with Aaron David Miller. Miller holds a PhD in Middle East and U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Michigan and served in the State Department for over two decades as a Middle East analyst and negotiator for both Democratic and Republican administrations. Having helped formulate U.S. policy on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli peace process, he has a better grasp than most on Biden’s approach to this war and his relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what’s motivated Biden since Oct. 7, American and Israeli intervention in the other’s domestic politics, and whether we’re witnessing what Miller calls “the cosmic oy vey crisis” in U.S.-Israel relations.
Analysts are providing varying explanations for the Biden administration’s increasingly harsh rhetoric toward Netanyahu and Israel’s war in Gaza, ranging from suggestions that Biden is fed up with a Netanyahu who’s solely interested in his political survival, to, on the other end, accusing Biden of throwing Israel under the bus to appease the pro-Hamas mob. What do you think is actually behind this changing American approach?
First of all, I’m not sure I would describe it as a changing American approach. In my view, the administration has been pursuing a passive-aggressive policy toward this Israeli government even before the war, in response to the most right-wing government in the history of the state. The administration has failed to impose a single cost or consequence even before October 7, and there are three reasons.
One, you have an American president alone among his predecessors. Biden and Israel go back decades, from Biden’s early recollections of his father repeating time and again that silence in the face of evil is complicity, and nothing should ever befall the Jews like the Holocaust, to Biden’s associations with almost every Israeli prime minister. Biden considers himself part of the Israeli narrative, and it should’ve surprised no one that he was the first American president to visit Israel during a major war. Biden is in love with the idea of Israel, the people of Israel, the security of Israel. Obviously not with Benjamin Netanyahu. So the first constraint that maintains the words over deeds policy is Biden’s personal commitment to Israel’s well-being.
Second is politics. While Biden is losing support among a deeply divided Democratic Party, there is also another political reality: Biden is navigating a course between a Republican Party, which is, I would argue, the Israel-can-do-no-wrong party, and a Democratic Party that’s deeply divided. He doesn’t want to get sandwiched between a Republican Party that will hammer him for being too tough on Israel, and a Democratic Party that is going to hammer him for being too lenient. So he has to be careful, particularly in a very close election where the presumptive Republican nominee fashions himself to be the most pro-Israeli president in history.
Then there’s the third issue. If Biden hopes to do anything in Gaza—surge humanitarian assistance; free any of the hostages; de-escalate the war; create any sort of stability going forward—he cannot do it by renouncing, calling out and going to war, figuratively speaking, with the Israeli prime minister. And the reality, which makes it more complicated for Biden, is that it’s not just Bibi against Biden. You have an emergency war cabinet. Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot may disagree with Netanyahu on hostages [and] the urgency of a deal, but they, most political elites, and the vast majority of the Israeli public side with Netanyahu’s war aims. So if Biden wants to do anything, he’s got to factor in how does he get Israel’s acquiescence, let alone its firm support? Does Biden want to make a point, or does he want to make a difference?
So far, he’s failed to use any of the levers available to him. He could have conditioned, restricted, ended U.S. military assistance to Israel, particularly munitions deliveries. He could have changed America’s voting in New York, abstaining or voting for a highly critical U.N. Security Council resolution of Israel. He could’ve said—as much of the international community has—you need a cessation of hostilities; we’ll deal with the hostages later. He’s not done any of those things.
Will he, as events play out? Perhaps. But there’s no indication right now—certainly not using the first lever—that he’s going to up the ante, and that has put this administration in a bind. The president shares the war aims of this Israeli government: One, preventing another October 7th, which essentially means dismantle Hamas as an organized military force, and two, ending or profoundly degrading Hamas’s sovereignty in Gaza; its capacity to influence—as it’s done since ‘07—the politics, economy, social structure, and security of Gaza. But as the Israelis have prosecuted this war, the rise of Palestinian deaths, the humanitarian catastrophe, has created huge problems for the administration—morally, politically, and in terms of its own policy. That’s the dilemma.
I worked for Republican and Democratic administrations that brought pressure against Israel, most notably George H. W. Bush and James Baker. [In 1991, President Bush delayed $10 billion in housing loan guarantees to Israel until Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir agreed to participate in the Madrid Peace Conference and halt settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza.] That was a one-off effort to achieve a specific objective, and it worked to the extent that Shamir did not get the housing loan guarantees.
By the way, let’s be clear, it’s an urban myth that we don’t intervene in their politics and they don’t intervene in ours. We should be very clear about that. We do intervene. We play a role in helping to choose our favorite Israeli prime ministers. There’s no doubt about that, and clearly, the Israelis, particularly under Netanyahu, have interceded in our politics as well.
Those who argue that pressure must be applied need to make a compelling argument to the president that if he did use any of these levers, it would get the results he desires. Those results I put under the broad heading of changing the pictures and creating a new reality in Gaza. That is the dilemma the administration faces. I don’t know whether pressure along the lines I described would work, but I suspect there are arguments inside the administration. I think it’s a tough sell to the president.
You’re correct in saying that Biden hasn’t chosen to abstain or support a U.N. Security Council resolution that’s highly critical of Israel, but on March 25 the U.S. did abstain on a Security Council resolution calling for an “immediate ceasefire” in Gaza. What do you think prompted that abstention?
Governments, bureaucracies, U.N. ambassadors don’t like to be in positions where they’re constantly saying no. I think it was a combination of the fact that [American ambassador to the U.N.] Linda Thomas-Greenfield did not want to veto, [and] it had a sufficient amount in it that the administration could defend. And then Netanyahu warned the administration that if they didn’t vote against it, he was going to withhold a delegation that the administration invited to Washington.
I think all those factors combined to say, “We’re going to abstain.” And if, in fact, that was pressure, it seemed to have had some kind of impact, because as we speak, there is a video conference going on between Ron Dermer, Tzachi Hanegbi, Jake Sullivan and other administration officials.
You said you don’t necessarily think there’s a changing American approach to Israel, and that Biden picking a fight with Netanyahu could be problematic, because even though most Israelis don’t like Bibi, they still support his government’s war against Hamas. With that in mind, why do you think Biden called Schumer’s speech on the Senate floor “a good speech,” given that it was bound to be interpreted as Biden supporting Schumer’s call for elections to replace Netanyahu?
If the president had given that speech it would have caused a firestorm. The president didn’t give that speech. Schumer gave it. I’m sure the administration saw the text of the speech. The president continued to pursue what I call the passive-aggressive policy. They’re angry at Netanyahu. They clearly prefer his putative successor, Benny Gantz. They know Gantz is not the key to the promised land. They understand exactly the shift that has taken place in Israeli politics.
And let’s be clear. The U.S.-Israeli relationship, the two drivers of that relationship, the two things that have made it so special—the perception of shared values, what I call value affinity, and a high coincidence of common interests—are now more fraught than at any time since the relationship became special during the 1970s.
“The U.S.-Israeli relationship, the two drivers of that relationship, the two things that have made it so special … are now more fraught than at any time since the relationship became special during the 1970s.”
The bases of support have been undermined by a series of Israeli governments on one hand, and by the polarization in America of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Bipartisanship is still strong on one level, but on another, the Israel issue has become highly partisan. This weakening of these two drivers of the relationship is amplified by a generational divide—you see it in a more diverse Congress. You see it on campuses. You see it in public opinion polling.
How do you think Biden actually views Netanyahu at the moment?
I think Biden is realizing he’s not dealing with the Netanyahu of old: the risk averse Benjamin Netanyahu. He’s dealing now with a risk-readiness Netanyahu, in many respects a desperate Netanyahu: on trial for bribery, fraud and breach of trust; understanding full well that he presided over the worst terror attack in the history of the country, the bloodiest single day for Jews since the Holocaust; coming off of a failed effort on the part of [Justice Minister] Yariv Levin and others to rearrange the political furniture in Israel, in order to strip the Supreme Court and the judicial branch of much of its independence.
“Biden is realizing he’s not dealing with the Netanyahu of old: the risk averse Benjamin Netanyahu. He’s dealing now with a risk-readiness Netanyahu, in many respects a desperate Netanyahu…”
I think he’s desperate to stay in power, and as a consequence, I think he’ll do more than any other single politician in Israel to stay in power, including, if it serves his interests, prolonging the war, which is, I think, a concern on the part of the [Biden] administration.
Following the Israeli strike that killed World Central Kitchen aid workers, both Biden and Blinken said U.S. policy with regard to Israel and Gaza will depend on Israel implementing certain steps that the U.S. wants, which seems to suggest an American policy change could be imminent if the Biden administration isn’t satisfied with Israel’s response. Do you think this signals a significant departure from Biden’s “passive-aggressive policy,” or is it more of the same harsh rhetoric with no actual cost or consequences?
Biden isn’t looking for an open breach with Israel. He’s put Israel on a kind of probation—proposing a to-do list that Netanyahu should have no problems completing, and which the Israelis are already addressing. The issue, and fight if it comes, may hinge on negotiations between Israel and Hamas. That deal is key to the administration’s entire strategy, and the president pressed Israel for flexibility. Whether there’s an increase or decrease in tensions will depend on two things: will Israel continue to do more on the humanitarian aid issue, and who does the administration believe is the bigger obstacle to reaching a deal on hostages—Israel or Hamas.
Looking at the far left flank of the Democratic Party, you’ll find people accusing Israel of committing genocide and other horrific crimes in Gaza. Biden’s in a bind here, because these critics, who support his party, want him to be much harder on Israel than he’s willing to be. Abstaining in a Security Council resolution, for example, is unlikely to appease them. Some of Biden’s critics on the right, however, say he’s trying to placate this crowd. Do you think they’re correct?
I don’t think so. Where’s the evidence? I’ll come back to what I said earlier. Not a single imposition of a cost or consequence, with the exception of denying Netanyahu a White House visit, which they gave to Benny Gantz, even though he didn’t see the president—he saw the vice president. Where’s the evidence that Biden is appeasing his critics?
The test may come on May 8, when the Secretary of State has to certify, according to National Security Memorandum Number 20, that the assurances Israel provided on the issue of humanitarian aid and U.S. military equipment are “credible and reliable.” I just see no evidence that Biden is appeasing those critics. I think they’re really angry. I don’t think that means they’re going to vote for Donald Trump, but I think a lot of them may not vote.
Are we really witnessing the major crisis in the U.S.-Israel relationship, as some are portraying it?
You’d have to go back to 1956, in the wake of Suez, when Dwight Eisenhower threatened, and would have imposed sanctions on an Israel that didn’t withdraw its troops from Sinai, in the wake of the abortive British-French-Israeli effort to seize the canal. No American president has ever used that kind of leverage on any Israeli government. So do I think this is the cosmic oy vey crisis that’s going to fundamentally undermine and destroy the U.S.-Israeli relationship? No, I don’t.
Josh Feldman is an Australian writer who focuses primarily on Israeli and Jewish issues. Twitter/X: @joshrfeldman
