Rosner’s Domain | Crime Game

As I write this, 154 Arab Israelis have been killed so far this year in criminal attacks. I hesitate to commit to a number, because by the time you read this column, the number is likely to get higher. Yes – it’s that bad. The crime rate — and murder rate  — of Arab Israelis has more than doubled this year. It is becoming a daily routine. And Israel doesn’t seem ready to enact the type of measures that could tame this violent wave. 

Why? It all starts with a seemingly simple question. A seemingly innocent question. A seemingly factual question. The answer to it tells an important story. Here is what Sivan Rahav-Meir, a well-known Israeli columnist, wrote last Friday: “This is first and foremost an internal, multidimensional problem of [Israel’s] Arab society.” Rahav-Meir declined to sign a petition that would call on the government to deal with the crime wave more seriously. This is of course her right, and one can offer many reasons why it would be inappropriate for her to sign such a petition. But there’s no reason to make arguments on her behalf, when she gave her own reason: “As long as certain parts of this [Arab] society have social norms that allow violence …” shifting the responsibility to the government would be wrong. 

I write about Rahav-Meir not because she is an exception that deserves condemnation or praise, but because she represents a widespread position. This — in general — is the position of the public that supports the current government. When a minister said, according to leaks to the press, that when talking about crime in Arab society the government still “needs to speak to the Jewish base,” she meant “the base” that supports such a position. All Israelis (one hopes) are shocked by the level of crime and murder in the Arab sector. But about half of them believe that the Arabs are to blame for it. And these Jews believe that as long as the Arabs don’t change their habits, or culture, or community, there is no reason to sign petitions, and no reason to demand action from the government.

Crime is of course a complex matter. Its causes are many. The claim that Arab society has a tendency not to cooperate with law enforcement entities is not an unfounded claim. The claim that it is difficult for the police to operate in Arab towns, is also not an unfounded claim. The claim that the leadership of the Arab public neglected internal problems in favor of dealing with the complications of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is certainly true. On the other hand, these are not the only reasons for crime in the Arab sector, and even if they were, at a certain point it no longer matters. Beyond a certain crime rate, even if all these faults are corrected, it will be very difficult for an “Arab society” to deal with its criminals without the active, aggressive involvement of the central government.

 When a crime threshold is passed, the criminals become powerful and terrorize the public. And even if the public wants to change “social norms,” it no longer can. Whoever speaks against the criminals is taking a huge risk. Whoever stands in their way, endangers himself and his family. In fact, as crime increases, and as criminals become more powerful, the pressure on the public to assist them increases. The public is forced to appease them, be careful with them, allow them to do as they wish. If crime is rampant, it is not a surprise that Arabs seek to purchase an illegal weapon, a rifle or a gun, for self-defense. If crime is rampant, it is not a surprise that Arabs remain silent in any crime investigation, refuse to provide information about their neighbors, do not want to be seen in the company of a police officer.

In fact, as the crime rages, the arguments become circular. Here is one: The Arabs are to blame for the increase in crime because they did not act against it; so crime runs rampant; so now they are even more inactive against it; so it becomes even more rampant. This a classic vicious cycle.

And here is another one: The Arab public has no trust in the police; so it is reluctant to cooperate with it; so the police are absent and crime continues to rise; so the public’s trust in the police decreases even more.

The Jewish “base” can think what it wants about the origin of crime in the Arab sector. Currently, the origin of crime is no longer important. The only important question is how to deal with it effectively.

The Jewish “base” can think what it wants about the origin of crime in the Arab sector. Currently, the origin of crime is no longer important. The only important question is how to deal with it effectively. And those who insist that the answer is “first we change their culture and then the government can help” are in fact giving up on effective confrontation. They are ready to abandon a fifth of Israel’s citizens to the rule of criminal thugs. Maybe because they don’t much care about Arabs. Maybe because they think it is an appropriate punishment for the failures of their leadership. Maybe because they truly believe that the answer to crime can only come from within.

Be that as it may, Israel is engaged in a fruitless blame game regarding an acute problem that requires emergency treatment.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

We know what is “religious” and “secular.” But the category “traditional” is apparently very unstable. Those who self-define as “traditional” tend to change their self-definition:

Among those who define themselves as “traditional” (both “somewhat religious traditional” and “not so religious traditional”) only about half kept their original definition. So we are stuck. On the one hand, there is value in the self-definition “traditional” (of both types); on the other, we see that this is an unstable definition. A definition that has a definite connection to a mood, or a period, or a state of life at a certain time.

A week’s numbers

A third of Israel’s Jews are traditional, and their self-defining identity is even more fluid than we thought. The numbers represent a change within a maximum of two years.

A reader’s response:

Max OV asks: “Is it true that more Israelis leave the country now?” My answer: It’s hard to tell, but note that 2022 and 2023 are record years of Aliya (immigration to Israel of mostly Russian and Ukrainian Jews and decedents of Jews).

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.