What We Should Know About the Dueling Definitions of Antisemitism

There are now dueling definitions of antisemitism: One offered by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance [IHRA] and a dissenting Jerusalem definition that attempts to articulate the difference between legitimate criticism of Israel, however harsh, and antisemitism.* 

A word of background on IHRA: In January 2000, Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson convened an international conference to consider mandatory Holocaust education in Stockholm. Twenty-one heads of state and delegations representing 46 countries attended. After all the appropriate speeches were given, a Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research was organized. Since 2013, it has become known as the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) (www.holocaustremembrance.com), a 31-nation intergovernmental body whose purpose, according to U.S. delegate Mark Weitzman, is to garner support for Holocaust education, remembrance, and research from state leaders, academicians, and politicians. Government funding and prestige is available to support national and international projects.

The task force adopted by consensus (and not without some controversy), working definitions of Holocaust denial, anti-gypsy/anti-Roma discrimination and most recently, antisemitism. Despite the fact they much operate via consensus, this unique combination of experts and governmental diplomats have not succumbed to anticipated paralysis. Instead, the IRHA greatly facilitates international cooperation. As the problem of antisemitism in Europe grew, they sought to articulate a working definition of antisemitism, making clear that it was a working, evolving definition — not a legal definition.

IHRA defines antisemitism as:

“Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”

It then illustrated the working definition by giving examples of antisemitism:

• Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.

• Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.

• Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.

• Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).

• Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.

• Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.

It is important to note that IHRA defines Holocaust denial as antisemitism, plain and simple, something scholars in the field have been contending for decades. 

IHRA then confronted the thorny issue of distinguishing between legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitism. They were clearly influenced by former Soviet dissident and former Israeli Minister for the Diaspora, Natan Sharansky’s important contribution. He invoked the “three Ds” for distinguishing between the two: 

• Double Standards, judging Israel by one standard and the rest of the world, including democratic countries, by another.

• Delegitimization, moving from criticism of Israel policies toward the notion that Israel has no right to exist or is an illegitimate country. 

• Demonization, regarding Israel as the source of (all) evil, a demonic force in the world.

IHRA argues that antisemitism is:

• Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.

• Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.

• Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.

• Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.

• Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.

In 2021, a rival definition was introduced: The Jerusalem Declaration was written by a group (most identifiably and proudly on the left) of some 200 scholars in Antisemitism Studies and related fields, including Holocaust Studies, Israel, Palestine, and Middle East Studies, Jewish History and Political Science. This declaration may now become even more controversial because Harvard University just appointed one of its signers and advocates Professor Derek Penslar, as co-Chair of its taskforce on antisemitism.

The Declaration seeks to understand and describe antisemitism while protecting free speech and leaving room to criticize Israel, even harshly, without such criticism automatically being labeled antisemitism.

The Jerusalem Declaration states:

Antisemitism is discrimination, prejudice, hostility, or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish).

Like IHRA, the definition was the easy part, the most important distinctions are to be found in the commentary guidelines that also engage the larger issue of racism. It views antisemitism as a form of racism, not or not merely sui generis. 

It is racist to essentialize (treat a character trait as inherent) or to make sweeping negative generalizations about a given population. What is true of racism in general, is true of antisemitism in particular.

1. What is particular in classic antisemitism is the idea that Jews are linked to the forces of evil. This stands at the core of many anti-Jewish fantasies, such as the idea of a Jewish conspiracy in which “the Jews” possess hidden power that they use to promote their own collective agenda at the expense of other people. This linkage between Jews and evil continues in the present: In the fantasy that “the Jews” control governments with a “hidden hand,” that they own the banks, control the media, act as “a state within a state,” and are responsible for spreading disease (such as COVID-19). All these features can be instrumentalized by different (and even antagonistic) political causes.

2. Antisemitism can be manifested in words, visual images, and deeds. Examples of antisemitic words include utterances that all Jews are wealthy, inherently stingy, or unpatriotic. In antisemitic caricatures, Jews are often depicted as grotesque, with big noses and associated with wealth. Examples of antisemitic deeds are: Assaulting someone because she or he is Jewish, attacking a synagogue, daubing swastikas on Jewish graves, or refusing to hire or promote people because they are Jewish.

3. Antisemitism can be direct or indirect, explicit, or coded. For example, “The Rothschilds control the world” is a coded statement about the alleged power of “the Jews” over banks and international finance. Similarly, portraying Israel as the ultimate evil or grossly exaggerating its actual influence can be a coded way of racializing and stigmatizing Jews. In many cases, identifying coded speech is a matter of context and judgement, taking account of these guidelines.

4. Denying or minimizing the Holocaust by claiming that the deliberate Nazi genocide of the Jews did not take place, or that there were no extermination camps or gas chambers, or that the number of victims was a fraction of the actual total, is antisemitic.

They then directly engage the question of when criticism of Israel is antisemitic and when it is not, clearly offering both a more detailed depiction of the problem and greater room for robust, even angry criticism of Israel. Some critics of the Jerusalem Declaration regard this as giving cover to anti-Israel leftist views.

B. Israel and Palestine: examples that, on the face of it, are antisemitic

5. Applying the symbols, images, and negative stereotypes of classical antisemitism (see guidelines 2 and 3) to the State of Israel.

6. Holding Jews collectively responsible for Israel’s conduct or treating Jews, simply because they are Jewish, as agents of Israel.

7. Requiring people, because they are Jewish, publicly to condemn Israel or Zionism (for example, at a political meeting).

8. Assuming that non-Israeli Jews, simply because they are Jews, are necessarily more loyal to Israel than to their own countries.

9. Denying the right of Jews in the State of Israel to exist and flourish, collectively and individually, as Jews, in accordance with the principle of equality.

They then move on to the criticism of Israel that is not or not necessarily antisemitic:

C. Israel and Palestine: examples that, on the face of it, are not antisemitic (whether or not one approves of the view or action)

10. Supporting the Palestinian demand for justice and the full grant of their political, national, civil, and human rights, as encapsulated in international law.

11. Criticizing or opposing Zionism as a form of nationalism or arguing for a variety of constitutional arrangements for Jews and Palestinians in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. It is not antisemitic to support arrangements that accord full equality to all inhabitants “between the river and the sea,” whether in two states, a binational state, unitary democratic state, federal state, or in whatever form.

12. Evidence-based criticism of Israel as a state. This includes its institutions and founding principles. It also includes its policies and practices, domestic and abroad, such as the conduct of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza, the role Israel plays in the region, or any other way in which, as a state, it influences events in the world. It is not antisemitic to point out systematic racial discrimination. In general, the same norms of debate that apply to other states and to other conflicts over national self-determination apply in the case of Israel and Palestine. Thus, even if contentious, it is not antisemitic, in and of itself, to compare Israel with other historical cases, including settler-colonialism or apartheid.

13. Boycott, divestment, and sanctions are commonplace, nonviolent forms of political protest against states. In the Israeli case they are not, in and of themselves, antisemitic.

14. Political speech does not have to be measured, proportional, tempered, or reasonable to be protected under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and other human rights instruments. Criticism that some may see as excessive or contentious, or as reflecting a “double standard,” is not, in and of itself, antisemitic. In general, the line between antisemitic and non-antisemitic speech is different from the line between unreasonable and reasonable speech.

The most obvious differences between the two definitions are regarding BDS not as inherently antisemitic but as a reasonable — and because it is non-violent — a responsible form of protest. 

The most obvious differences between the two definitions are regarding BDS not as inherently antisemitic but as a reasonable—and because it is nonviolent — a responsible form of protest. The advocacy of a one-state solution that would see the country from the Jordan River to the Sea as the state of all its citizens — and one might say, not a Jewish State — would not inherently be antisemitic according to this definition.

The notion that some things are not “inherently” antisemitic does not help one clarify when they are and are not antisemitic. Where is the line to be drawn? 

The notion that some things are not “inherently” antisemitic does not help one clarify when they are and are not antisemitic. Where is the line to be drawn? The Jerusalem Declaration leaves room for such criticism not be considered inherently antisemitic or automatically antisemitic without quite detailing when or if it is antisemitic.

The 14th point of the Jerusalem Declaration moves in two different directions. It first proclaims political speech as protected speech under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 10 of the European Union and indicates that it applies even to political speech that is unmeasured, disproportional, distempered, or unreasonable. All speech is protected in the United States unless it is libelous. Yet all speech is also subject to criticism, which is the essence of free speech. 

However, when speech is “unmeasured, disproportional, distempered, or unreasonable,” one might reasonably ask, why? 

And one might very well conclude that the speaker is out of control and overly emotional. One need not be a psychiatrist to wonder if there might be a reason for such behavior. One possibility to be considered  — surely not the only one, is animus — a particular animus called antisemitism. 

The Jerusalem Declaration states: “Criticism that some may see as excessive or contentious, or as reflecting a ‘double standard,’ is not, in and of itself, antisemitic.” No one can argue against that contention, yet it may well be antisemitic, but the Declaration offers no guidance to determine when such criticism is antisemitic. It all depends on what is said.  Declaring speech not inherently antisemitic is different than contending that it is not antisemitic.

Let us return to Sharansky’s notice of three Ds; Double Standards, Delegitimization and Demonization, to determine where to draw the line in understanding of what is legitimate (often well-warranted criticism) and what is antisemitism. These three demarcations point the way and we might truly want to return to Potter Stewart’s wisdom: “I know it when I see it.”

Michael Berenbaum is director of the Sigi Ziering Institute and a professor of Jewish Studies at American Jewish University.