1.
If you are under the impression that a third Palestinian Intifada has begun – in recent days we’ve seen many occurrences of violence both in the West Bank and within Israel – the embarrassing fight between Israel’s military (IDF) and Israel’s internal security service (Shin Bet) might give you reason for hope. That these two important institutions found the time to battle over prestige and fame in a childish manner might prove that Israel is not yet in an emergency. Had it been an emergency, a third intifada, both sides would hopefully be too busy to battle with one another.
Why are they fighting? It is really quite silly. It appears that some people at the Shin Bet felt that the credit they got for the summer war in Gaza was insufficient, and went ahead to air their frustrations on a TV show. One claim that they made, without showing convincing evidence, is that the IDF got specific warnings from Shin Bet that a war was coming. This is quite a serious allegation: if the IDF was warned in advance and did not properly prepare, then the IDF is guilty of neglect. Thus, it was reasonable for the IDF chief of Staff to have steam coming off his ears as he heard about these allegations. The General complained to the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister called the two sides – that made their clash a public spectacle – to order. Today, the Shin Bet clarified its position: no warning, no neglect.
Surely, there were debates within the intelligence community about the meaning of certain developments in Gaza and about the future intentions of the Hamas government. There is still no agreement as to whether Hamas planned the war or was dragged into a war that it did not intend to have. Surely, some Shin Bet operators believe that the IDF did not properly understand what is going on – and some IDF operators believe that the Shin Bet is trying to reinterpret past events in ways that will make the organization seem wiser than it really was. Intelligence work is not an exact science, it is an art, and differences in the interpretation of information inevitably lead to disagreements. And at times to a juvenile scuffle.
A scandal? It will be short lived, and its most urgent outcome will involve a more careful handling of media relations. Not intelligence – emotional intelligence.
2.
The expectation of a third Palestinian Intifada has been a constant feature in Israeli public life since the end of the “second” one.
There should be no surprise about this: the first Intifada brought change to the Palestinians – in forcing Israel to more seriously consider the political future of the Palestinian population under occupation. When the first Intifada subsided, the era of the Madrid conference and the Oslo accords arrived. Then a second Intifada erupted, and the conditions of the Palestinians changed again. Israel pulled out of Gaza, and more rounds of negotiations, with more Israeli concessions, occurred. More – but not nearly enough for the sides to agree on an “end of conflict” formula.
All these changes were less fundamental than they seemed at the time. The Palestinians are still under occupation, and still see little hope for political independence, and are still far from agreeing with Israel on the terms for peace. So all the ingredients for a third attempt at forcing Israel’s hand are in place – Mounting Palestinian anger and frustration, a political impasse, international sympathy, and the usual inclination of the Palestinian leadership to turn to violence as a substitute for the much more difficult work of building an orderly community that some day can turn into an orderly and well managed state.
3.
So, are we looking at the beginning of a third Intifada? No one can say for sure that we aren’t, but it is premature to already conclude that we are. A string of violent acts, murders and attempted murders, raise the suspicion that the tide has turned. A string of comments from Palestinian leaders who seem to endorse violence raise the suspicion that a psychological tide has also turned. In such an atmosphere, any match can ignite more violence, and every rash decision can be fateful. A steady hand and a cool hand is what we need from Israel’s leaders and its security forces.
Israel is not blameless in getting us to this moment of danger: its leaders might be right in contending that a peace agreement with the Palestinians at this stage is no more than a delusional pipe dream. But the Palestinians are right to suspect that the current Israeli leadership is not quite sincere in its pursuit of an end to the occupation; The Israeli public would be right to conclude that some of its leaders are not demonstrating the kind of judgment that is expected of them.
In other words: to achieve their political goals Israeli leaders are playing with matches, behaving irresponsibly, making unnecessary statements. Pretending to be patriotic tough guys, members of the ruling party Likud and its partner the Jewish Home (but not just them) are unnecessarily putting Israel in danger. Much like the battle of IDF vs. Shin Bet, their main problem is not one of intelligence gathering and interpretation – it is a problem of public stances, responsibility, and maturity.
