Saudi Arabia Is Encircled. The Way Out May Run through Jerusalem

“Everything Everywhere All at Once,” the title of the 2022 American independent film, aptly describes Saudi Arabia’s current predicament. A series of shocks has thrust the kingdom into a serious strategic crisis on several fronts at once. Yet Saudi Arabia’s growing vulnerability also presents Israel – and the United States – with an opportunity to deepen the partnership between two of the region’s most important forces against extremism.

Above all looms the encirclement of its oil export routes. To the east, the Strait of Hormuz – through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil normally passes – has become an arena of direct confrontation between the United States and Iran, disrupting shipping. To the west, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is at risk of falling under Houthi control, amid warnings that it is no longer safe for Saudi vessels. And in the center, one of the kingdom’s most important oil pipelines has been knocked offline by drones launched from Iraq, apparently by an Iran-aligned militia. Iran and its proxies are effectively closing in on Saudi Arabia and threatening its economic lifeline. Even before the events of recent days, Saudi crude oil exports fell in August to roughly 3 million barrels per day, their lowest level since at least 2017.

The encirclement extends beyond the energy sector. In recent months, Saudi Arabia has come under direct fire from Iran and the Houthis, underscoring its vulnerability to external aggression. Riyadh is trapped: Iran and its proxies are exposing the kingdom’s vulnerabilities and striking its civilians and energy facilities, yet a forceful Saudi response could provoke harsher retaliation without improving its position. Behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia is seeking back channels to de-escalate tensions with Iran, so far without success. For now, neither Iran nor the Houthis appears inclined toward conciliation.

Saudi Arabia is also discovering the limits of the American security umbrella. Despite investing hundreds of billions of dollars in its ties with Washington, Riyadh cannot assume that the United States will intervene directly on its behalf. According to reports, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman urged President Trump at least twice in recent days to act against the Houthis, to no avail. Trump’s reluctance is understandable: He is already grappling with the larger challenge of Iran and has been burned by an unsuccessful campaign against the Houthis. For bin Salman, Washington’s refusal revived memories of the unprecedented Iranian attack on the kingdom’s energy facilities in 2019, to which Trump also declined to respond. The kingdom now faces a painful reality: It cannot counter the aggression on its own, while Washington has little appetite to fight in its place.

Compounding the problem is the deterioration in relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two of the Arab world’s most influential states. Their dispute has deepened in recent months, centering on the future of Yemen, their differing approaches to the Muslim Brotherhood, and their competition for prestige and regional influence. This is a serious blow to Saudi Arabia, which for years coordinated its regional strategy closely with the UAE and now finds itself nearly alone at a critical moment. The two countries once served as force multipliers for one another in a volatile region; their partnership is now more fragile than ever.

The United States should be watching closely. This pressure could push Saudi Arabia to expand its security and economic cooperation with China and Russia, both to diversify its sources of support and to demonstrate to Washington the price of nonintervention. Chinese arms exports to Saudi Arabia increased by nearly 400% between 2016 and 2020, albeit from a low base. But Riyadh’s room to maneuver is limited by its deep military dependence on the United States, which currently supplies more than 75% of the kingdom’s arms imports, and by the difficulty of replacing such a deeply rooted strategic relationship on short notice.

Sustained external and economic pressure could also destabilize Saudi Arabia from within. For all the past rhetoric about treating Saudi Arabia as a “pariah,” Washington has a clear interest in preserving stability in the kingdom, which underpins the broader regional order.

Yet the crisis may also create a strategic opportunity to bring Saudi Arabia and Israel closer together. During nearly two decades in Israeli intelligence, I came to understand how closely the two countries’ strategic interests align. Few states in the region face such a similar set of threats, above all Iran and its proxies, and recent developments in the confrontation with Iran and the Houthis have only deepened that shared threat perception. Israel cannot choose to leave the Middle East, and its demonstrated military capabilities and willingness to use them have increased its value as a partner at a time when Saudi confidence in the American security umbrella is weakening and Riyadh’s partnership with the UAE is fraying.

Against this backdrop, reports that Israel is providing intelligence support to Saudi Arabia through U.S. Central Command are important, if accurate, but not sufficient. Washington should seize the strategic opening created by Saudi Arabia’s current predicament and press both governments to move their relationship onto a formal, public, and bilateral track, with full diplomatic relations as the ultimate goal. That process would naturally begin in the security and intelligence spheres, where shared needs are most urgent, but it should gradually expand into economic, technological, diplomatic, and other forms of cooperation. Saudi Arabia may now be more willing to show flexibility on the Palestinian issue – long a central condition for normalization with Israel – if doing so strengthens its ability to defend itself. That need not require Riyadh to abandon its position; it would require enough room for a formula that allows the process to move forward. Israel’s late-October election could also help accelerate the process.

The responsibility therefore rests with all three capitals. By helping its regional partners convert quiet, tactical coordination into a durable strategic partnership, Washington could strengthen the regional balance without assuming a larger direct military burden. Such an alignment would be an especially effective inoculation against Iranian aggression, making it far harder for Tehran to isolate either state. As the ring tightens, Saudi Arabia may discover that the path out of encirclement runs through Jerusalem.

Or Horvitz is a senior fellow at JPPI. A former Lieutenant Colonel in Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI) and served as Head of the Hezbollah and Lebanon Branch (2022–2024) and later as Senior Advisor to the Director of IDI (2024–2026), where he was centrally involved in post–October 7 transformation processes and Israel’s campaigns against Hezbollah and Iran.