Hamas vs Hostages

It’s Monday morning and a friend sends a quick message: “Turn on your TV, Smotrich is doing a special announcement.” What could that be – resignation, or a threat of possible resignation or just harsh words aimed at the PM? Is the government about to fall down, my friend asks. I hesitate to say no, even though I assume it’s a no. Because, well, who knows … 

The night before, the cabinet convened to talk about the coming steps in Gaza. Operation “Gideon’s Chariots” had begun, a renewed attempt to achieve what Israel failed to achieve in a year-and-a-half of war: the elimination of Hamas power in Gaza and the return of all hostages. 

Why Gideon, why Chariots? Prophet Gideon triumphed over the Midianites, without ever using chariots. His tools of war and destruction were quite different. “He divided the 300 men into three columns and equipped them all with a ram’s horn and an empty jar, with a torch in each jar.” So it’s not the means that made the IDF call this operation after this prophet. Maybe it’s the ends: “Thus Midian submitted to the Israelites and did not raise its head again; and the land was tranquil for 40 years in Gideon’s time.” 

The cabinet was informed that the operation is moving forward. It was also informed that humanitarian aid will be entering Gaza. Informed – but never asked to approve of this measure. No vote was taking place. Prime Minister Netanyahu made a decision and presented it to his colleagues as a fait accompli. Had he asked them for their support, he might not have gotten it. Israelis are tired of aiding the enemy while the war is ongoing. They know that when aid gets in, Hamas gets to breathe. Sending aid into Gaza is not a popular move, and ministers tend to vote against unpopular moves. So Netanyahu didn’t ask them to vote. He made his decision, and the next morning issued a statement using the IDF as his cover: the IDF recommended to send aid, I merely accepted the recommendation. Taking clear responsibility for his actions is beyond the mental abilities of this Israeli leader.

Enter Smotrich. For many months, the leader of the Zionist Religious Party, one of the most combative members in the cabinet, warned against sending more aid to Gaza. In fact, he even made a threat: if aid goes in – he, and his party, go out. Namely, a likely end to the coalition and the government. Thus my friends’ WhatsApp message. The naïve Israeli that he is, he thought Smotrich was probably going to do what he vowed he’d do. But Smotrich had no such intention. In fact, he had the opposite idea in mind: climbing off the ladder of bombastic threats and accepting reality. “This will be a different operation,” he explained, more aggressive, more robust, more in line with his beliefs, and hence, the need for him – Smotrich – to do what he said he’d do is now moot. 

If one suspects that Smotrich had other considerations on his mind, such as the fact that in most polls his party doesn’t cross the electoral threshold –  that if he quits, a new election would take place and he’d have little chance of returning to the Knesset and the cabinet – one has to be ashamed for entertaining such cynical thoughts in a time of war. And yet, many Israelis entertain such thoughts. In fact, a majority of them just answered a poll in which they expressed these thoughts quite clearly. 

The question wasn’t about humanitarian aid to Gaza. It was about a much more important subject – the return of Israeli hostages from Hamas’ captivity. You’d expect a government, whether you agree with its policies or not, to separate all discussions about the terms under which hostages will be released from the petty consideration of elected politicians. And yet, a majority of the public says that the government either “doesn’t care” about the hostages, a damning allegation, or “refuses to make a hostage deal because of political consideration,” which, if true, is in some way even more damning (50% of the public chose one of these two responses to the question about hostages).

As Israel launched its new Gaza operation, the question about the fate of the hostages became, once more, urgent. Does the government care, does it mix politics with policies when discussing the hostages? There is reality and there is perception. Perception: many Israelis are suspicious, as we’ve seen. Reality: it’s complicated, as actions cannot always reveal the motivation behind the policies. So, let’s begin with facts. Fact: Israel does not agree to end the war in exchange for the release of all hostages. Fact: Israel decided to go into Gaza once more. Fact: Hamas would not willingly release all hostages unless it is guaranteed that the war is over.  

As Israel launched its new Gaza operation, the question about the fate of the hostages became, once more, urgent. Does the government care, does it mix politics with policies when discussing the hostages?

We can list more facts and still end up with the same question: what is the government’s true position on the issue of hostages? There are at least three options we can think of. Option one: the government doesn’t care about the hostages as much as it says it does; it only cares about (possibility one) its political survival, or about (possibility two) eliminating Hamas. This means that the two parallel objectives of the war are not truly parallel. There is a more important thing (winning the war, or preserving the coalition), and the less important thing (getting the hostages back). The government is choosing the former over the latter.

Option two is the one the government presents as its logic for action. The two objectives, it says, are indeed parallel, and the debate isn’t about what’s more or less important, it is about the right way to meet the two objectives. Cabinet ministers argue that Hamas will only agree to reasonable terms and release the hostages when it feels the noose tightened. Get into Gaza, kill more Hamas operatives, capture more territory, destroy more infrastructure and thus force Hamas back to the negotiating table to make a deal that Israel can accept.

Of the three possibilities we presented – it’s about politics, it’s about prioritizing the war over the hostages, it’s about the right way to get the hostages out – only one is intolerable and indefensible. It is the option that the government is playing a political game on the backs of soldiers who have to fight the war, and the backs of the hostages, who remain in Gaza.  

Of the three possibilities we presented, only one is intolerable and indefensible. It is the option that the government is playing a political game on the backs of soldiers who have to fight the war, and the back of the hostages, who remain in Gaza. 

The two other options are difficult to swallow, but defensible. A minister such as Smotrich – who says that by risking the lives of 20 hostages he is defending the lives of hundreds, maybe thousands of Israelis against future attacks from Hamas – is doing what a leader is supposed to do: making a hard choice by setting priorities. Of course, one could argue that his choice is the wrong choice. One could argue that the fate of concrete hostages ought to be prioritized over the vague possibility of a future threat. One could argue that the hostages need rescue now while dealing with Hamas can wait for a later time. One could argue that preserving Israel as a close-knit and dedicated society by getting the hostages back is strategically more important than defeating Hamas. All these arguments are indeed made, if often confusingly and even more often angrily. And yet, if the cabinet decides to prioritize the attempt at defeating Hamas over the lives of the hostages, that’s a decision that can be defended. 

It is also possible to defend a decision based on the assumption that the only way to release the hostages without paying a price that Israel could not pay is to launch an attack and raise the pressure on Hamas. Past instances somewhat prove that Hamas is readier to talk when the pressure is on. Experience teaches that Hamas is a tough negotiator and only caves when it has its back to a wall. A reasonable analysis of Hamas’ options would lead to the conclusion that Hamas would never make a deal for the hostages that leaves the door open for Israel to relaunch the war after the deal is done. And if that’s the case, Hamas is likely to drag its feet and postpone a deal for as long as possible, risking the lives of the hostages and their future. Thus – cabinet members argue – if we truly want the hostages back, our better option is to wage war. 

Is this argument valid? Let’s look at more facts. Fact: for a year-and-a-half the IDF was unable to find a way to release the hostages from captivity by force. With very few exceptions, hostages were freed by negotiation. Fact: the most successful negotiations took place when Israel was attacking, or when the U.S. president-elect hinted that if a deal isn’t made by Hamas all hell will break loose. Fact: Hamas has not once retreated from its demand that the war must end before all hostages are released. Fact: Israel was the one refusing to discuss the possibility of ending the war (because this means Hamas stays). 

Can we use these facts as a key to determine whether a deal or pressure is more likely to lead to the release of hostages? The answer is no. Different people, professional soldiers and experienced diplomats, former negotiators and current decision makers all have a opinion on this question. And to be honest: often times it is quite difficult to separate their view on this supposedly operational question from the views they have on supposedly unrelated things, such as their support or dislike of the current government. 

That’s one reason why the debate about the hostages is so fierce and even ugly. Of course, any debate about the hostages must be highly emotional, it must have an aura of urgency, it must be heated – this is human life we are talking about, there are families involved and there is the almost intolerable thought about the poor souls underground, waiting for rescue, counting the days. But the debate turns from heated to ugly because most Israelis became convinced that the arguments publicly presented for and against are only the cover for dark, defeatist or sinister motivations. Cabinet supporters assume that the opposition is ready to capitulate, to let Hamas stay, to risk losing the war. Cabinet opponents assume – well, we covered that. They assume that politics is what the coalition truly cares about, not the war, or the hostages. 

And hovering over all of it there are the questions we’d only be able to answer after the fact. Can Israel even defeat Hamas? Forget about the problem of a hostage release – can it defeat Hamas? And what will be the price for defeating Hamas? Earlier this week, dozens of countries essentially threatened Israel with sanctions if the crisis continues and the war is not ended. The response from Israel was justifiably angry, but the fact remains – Israel’s ability to withstand international pressure, including, possibly, from the U.S., is not unlimited. It could be forced to end the war before its main objective – ensuring a future Gaza without Hamas – is met. 

Such a conclusion to the war will have both a psychological and a geopolitical effect, both difficult to navigate. 

Psychologically speaking, the public is likely to be frustrated, angry, possibly scared. If Israel cannot win the war decisively, if Hamas is able to withstand the attack and recover having launched the deadliest attack ever on Israel on Oct. 7, what are we to learn from the experience: that Israel isn’t strong enough? That our future is in doubt? If Israelis are frustrated and scared, this could lead to radicalization, it could lead to people fleeing to other countries, it could have many unforeseen consequences. Among which – a push to replace the current leaders with better ones. That is one reason why Israelis suspect that the government has some illegitimate motivation to prolong the war, even if the chance of winning it is slim. 

The geopolitical effect could be no less disturbing. What would Hamas learn from this experience, what would other organizations learn from it, how would Israel’s enemies respond in case Hamas is able to survive? Would we still be able to say that Iran was weakened because of the war, would we still be able to argue that the blows Hezbollah absorbed were a great achievement, would we still be able to claim that Israel is stronger today, having spent a year-and-a-half battling its enemies?

Knowing when to stop is often the most difficult decision a leader must make in a time of war. Earlier this week, several cabinet members compared Israel’s current demand for total defeat of Hamas to the demand by the World War Two allies for total defeat of the Nazis. Such a comparison involves two assumptions. One – that Hamas is comparable to the Nazis. Two – that defeat of Hamas is within reach. Maybe a lack of historical literacy, or maybe a lack of imagination, make the Nazi example the one most often used by Israeli politicians on almost all matters. But what if Hamas isn’t Nazi Germany (it’s not – because it doesn’t have the same power). And what if Israel today is less like Eisenhower after Normandy, and more like Napoleon after Borodino?

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.