The recent election results are the consequence of developments in Israeli society that have been analyzed extensively since November 1st. Many expert analyses have touched on vital aspects of Israel’s current reality, while others have exuded the usual dramatic pathos surrounding Israel and proven to be nothing more than overblown theatrics.
By examining global trends, Israeli society, Jewish-Arab relations and the electoral system, it has become easy to identify three key factors that led to the current circumstances: years of political gridlock and the rise of Israel’s most right-wing government.
Global Trends
First, the global context of Israel’s predicament cannot be ignored, nor should it be separated from its current state of affairs. Nearly all consolidated democracies are being faced with the question as to whether democracy as an institution can survive without liberalism as its partner in value. Democracies worldwide are currently experiencing a breakdown of the traditional political parties in one form or another, as well as witnessing the ascent of populist right-wing leaders with a crude nationalism tethering on xenophobia and racism. We have seen this in the United States (Donald Trump) and Britain (Brexit), in France (Marine Le Pen), and now in Italy (with the rise of Giorgia Meloni and her party, which has neo-fascist roots). Even the Scandinavian countries, which for generations were a beacon of social democracy, are currently dominated by parties with a xenophobic character—in Sweden, the ruling party is allied with a party that has a neo-Nazi past.
The reasons for these processes vary by country. Still, they share some characteristics: The political ossification of traditional parties that have failed to adapt to the fast-changing conditions of the world, massive waves of immigration from the Third World, and the socio-political impact of 24-hour news cycles, the information age or more emphatically the disinformation age and political polarization resulting from social media. Israel is currently in (very bad) “good company” as an inseparable part of the rest of the world’s democratic challenge.
More specifically, in Israel’s case, the rise of the far-right can be largely attributed to the politics of resentment.
The Politics of Resentment
Resentment as a political force has never been adequately appreciated in its role throughout history. Consider how different the world might have been if George Washington’s fellow British officers had treated him and his Virginia militiamen with dignity during the French and Indian War rather than dismissing them as “Americans” (at the time, an insult). Would this most English of Englishmen have become a revolutionary and the “father” of the new country? What if Clemenceau had not forgotten the contempt with which the French were treated by Bismarck after being defeated in the Franco-Prussian war? His bitter resentment led to the vengeful terms of the Versailles Treaty. The German resentment of these vengeful terms was then skillfully exploited by Hitler, leading directly to World War II.
Clearly, resentment has the ability to pave a self-destructive path and spur on a chain of events leading to more political and moral errors.
Consider how Palestinian resentment toward the Jewish state caused them to reject various Israeli peace offerings (Camp David I as well as II and Taba), even though these peace deals would have birthed a sovereign independent Palestinian state, ending the occupation, removing the settlements and birthing a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem. Clearly, resentment has the ability to pave a self-destructive path and spur on a chain of events leading to more political and moral errors.
Israeli society is rife with similar historically rooted resentments dictating the current political discourse. The political disposition of Israel’s Mizrahi citizens has been molded by the resentment at how they were treated by the Israeli left-wing establishment when they arrived in Israel. Today, they have become the electoral backbone of the Israeli right. This resentment is directed against left-wing Israeli intellectuals who lecture them that Arab and Muslim anti-Jewish attitudes are of no consequence, that if Israel only gave up the occupied territories and established a Palestinian State, these anti-Jewish attitudes would vanish. Too many of them have heard stories from their parents and grandparents about the ill-treatment and discrimination of Jews in their Muslim countries of origin dating back centuries.
Then there is also the resentment of more traditional Israelis regarding perceived Western indifference to the special affinity Jews have to the Land of Israel. The Palestinian perspective that the Jews do not have a unique historical and cultural attachment to the Land generates a disdainful resentment that has left little room for political maneuvering.
The denial of Israel’s right to exist by segments of western society has also stimulated tremendous resentment. Italy’s descent into fascism in the first half of the twentieth century did not call into doubt the right of the very existence of the Italian state. The Armenian genocide was an outrage that did not result in questioning the very right of the Turks to have their own Turkish state, even when the Turks continued to deny that it even happened. Israel’s far more minor transgressions, compared to the above, have put its right to exist into question.
The campaign to delegitimize Israel has been unprecedented in modern history, and most Israelis have come to view this fanatic anti-Zionism as the postmodern iteration of antisemitism. This has unintended consequences. All criticism of Israel is now viewed as antisemitism, and thus Israel is becoming deprived of the beneficial role that criticism plays in a robust democratic society.
These processes of resentment were only intensified by the Israeli-Arab conflict, and the Palestinians continued refusal to accept any peace deal that requires them to reconcile with the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East. The far-right has utilized this resentment in an attempt to damage the prospects of progress in Jewish-Arab relations. Why? Because, at one point in time, they believed that the greater Israel ideology to redeem the entire land would become the state’s primary goal. This is not the case today, nor has it ever been; whenever Israel is met with a genuine opportunity for peace, it has chosen this path over territorial maximalism. This began with the withdrawal from Sinai in 1982 and peace with Egypt. The transfer of Areas A and B of the West Bank to Palestinian control in the 1990s during the Oslo process. Peace with Jordan and returning the territories to Jordan, which Israel had taken control of in the Arava. The disengagement from Gaza in 2005 and even the Abraham Accords in 2020, where Netanyahu traded annexation for peace with the UAE, Morocco and Bahrain. Any other peace deals with the Arab world, particularly with Saudi Arabia (Netanyahu’s main focus), will require similar, if not more significant territorial measures, (most likely a total freeze on settlements).
So, with the idea of annexation dropping from the chapter of Israel’s story, as well as the political power of Israel’s Arab citizens becoming more robust, the militant wing of religious Zionism realized that their struggle to achieve one Jewish state throughout the Land must transform from an ideological pursuit to weaponizing what they portray as the Arab “threat” within Israel.
This transformation was only accelerated due to the increased radicalization among the Palestinian public, a rise in Palestinian violence, and the intensification of the religious aspect of the conflict, giving the likes of Smotrich and Ben Gvir a perfect opening to exploit the hostilities and push their agenda.
Here is a recent example of how the politics of resentment works: In December, a week after the Palestinian Authority called for a vote at the Hague to determine whether Israel’s occupation is de-facto annexation, Netanyahu met Ben Gvir’s coalition demands, agreeing that within 60 days of the establishment of the government, infrastructure will be provided for a series of illegal settlement outposts, and that moves will be made to expedite the planning and paving of bypass roads, as well as the expansion of highway 60—the main route for West Bank settlements—with 1.5 billion shekels budgeted for the project. This reaction to the Palestinians’ otherwise illegitimate claim shows how chronic resentment has affected policymaking and caused Israel to make political decisions based on indignation rather than rationally evaluating what is best for the state.
Resentment can override reason and confound the post-Enlightenment rationalist mentality. The way forward would be to realize that resentment is like alcoholism: The first step to overcoming it is to recognize that it has become the defining framework of our behavior.
And yet, none of this festering radicalization would have even had a platform, if it wasn’t for the 2014 electoral reform.
The Defining Issue
Those who followed the Israeli election would have come across some variation of an article titled “Netanyahu’s Sweeping Victory,” only to be perplexed when they discovered that the Netanyahu bloc received 48% of the vote. This is because the election outcome was decided by the Israeli Knesset’s high electoral threshold.
The electoral threshold in Israel was initially set at 1% when there were only one million eligible voters and later raised to 2% as the number of eligible voters increased. But in 2014, MK Avigdor Lieberman proposed raising it to 3.25%.
Many political scientists from both the left and the right appeared before the Knesset, warning how this could negatively impact Israel’s democratic system and representation.
So, if that is the case, what was the motivation behind it being raised?
Israel’s parliamentary system is perfectly proportional, which with a low threshold, encourages a lot of small parties to run, as their chances of winning at least one seat in the national parliament are relatively high. Once they do so, they essentially have the same bargaining power as any of the larger parties, which was seen as creating an unfair situation. Raising the threshold was also a measure to avoid granting a platform to a plethora of ephemeral parties that were essentially ego trips made by fringe personalities (think Ben Gvir). The fear was that an extremist faction being able to enter the parliament with such minimal democratic support gave them leverage to gain even more power out of the system to sabotage it from within. At the time, this seemed logical and fair.
The threshold reform was decreed “racist” by politicians from the Arab parties and “anti-democratic” by politicians from the Jewish far-right. Still, these complaints were generally dismissed as instinctive opposition to healthy change by fringe politicians who had benefited from a flawed system. At the time, most Arab-majority parties drew between 2% and 4% of the vote and were threatened by the change. Most far-right Jewish parties drew less than 2%; the increase seemingly put the Knesset far beyond their reach.
The reformers explained that this only meant they’d have to join with larger factions outside the confines of their narrow ideological camp, and that this unification with larger parties would naturally lead to moderation.
However, the threshold reform has wrought the opposite of its intended purpose, destabilizing and radicalizing Israeli politics. Instead of integrating themselves into the larger parties leading to moderation, the smaller, more radical parties banded together and created joint lists to cross the raised threshold. This unified electoral power has made it nearly impossible for the larger-moderate parties to cross the 61 seats needed to form a government without bringing the joint lists into their coalition.
This is what occurred in the last election. To get the 61 seats needed for re-election, Netanyahu negotiated a deal with three extremist factions (Smotrich, Ben Gvir and Maoz) to run as a joint list. If they hadn’t, there’s a good chance Smotrich wouldn’t have crossed the threshold, depriving Netanyahu of a crucial source of support. This collaboration provided leverage for Smotrich, who has gone from worrying about crossing the threshold to holding the Finance Ministry.
Moreover, the Bibi bloc ran as four parties, and the anti-Bibi bloc ran as seven. This means that even though the two blocs could win the same number of votes, the anti-Bibi bloc’s seats are distributed among a larger number of parties, thus increasing the likelihood of some individually not crossing the threshold. This is precisely what happened to Meretz and Balad. Once that happens, their votes are automatically transferred and re-distributed equally among the parties that did make it in, benefitting the side that did not lose parties to the threshold. This is why the Bibi bloc’s slight advantage of a few thousand votes became a massive advantage in the number of parliament seats that led to Netanyahu’s victory.
The impact of this is significant to note: Because of the high electoral threshold combined with population growth, hundreds of thousands of voters—150,000 Meretz voters and 138,000 Balad voters—are now denied representation in the Knesset.
The impact of this is significant to note: Because of the high electoral threshold combined with population growth, hundreds of thousands of voters—150,000 Meretz voters and 138,000 Balad voters—are now denied representation in the Knesset. These are not negligible numbers, and they represent significant parts of the public.
If reducing representation by forced unification radicalizes the system, the opposite can be achieved by expanding representation. A corrective measure would be to lower the threshold back down to 2%, bring more marginal forces into play rather than fewer—and you might shrink the power of the radicals back to their natural size.
Political theorist Shany Mor put it best when he said, “It turns out the old messiness that so offended the reformists was, in the clarity of hindsight, one of the great strengths of the Israeli political system, granting it the flexibility, stability, and moderation now lost in the fallout of the threshold reform.”
There are few Israeli political traditions more venerably and authentically Israeli than a reform that ends up perpetrating the disastrous opposite of its intended goal.
Radical elements of a society will always exist on the fringe, resentment can always be cured. The corrective measure to the electoral system will go a long way in aiding that process. It is of the utmost importance that the main lesson of this experience is to respect the political structures, treat them as more than accidents awaiting some “smart” change, and consider what will be lost with any change, rather than what might be gained in an overly optimistic assessment of one’s predictive powers.
Samuel Hyde is a writer/researcher based in Tel Aviv, Israel. He is the editor of the book “We Should All Be Zionists” by Dr. Einat Wilf and is currently co-writing a second book with Wilf titled “Political Intelligence.”
The State of Israel’s Democracy
Samuel Hyde
The recent election results are the consequence of developments in Israeli society that have been analyzed extensively since November 1st. Many expert analyses have touched on vital aspects of Israel’s current reality, while others have exuded the usual dramatic pathos surrounding Israel and proven to be nothing more than overblown theatrics.
By examining global trends, Israeli society, Jewish-Arab relations and the electoral system, it has become easy to identify three key factors that led to the current circumstances: years of political gridlock and the rise of Israel’s most right-wing government.
Global Trends
First, the global context of Israel’s predicament cannot be ignored, nor should it be separated from its current state of affairs. Nearly all consolidated democracies are being faced with the question as to whether democracy as an institution can survive without liberalism as its partner in value. Democracies worldwide are currently experiencing a breakdown of the traditional political parties in one form or another, as well as witnessing the ascent of populist right-wing leaders with a crude nationalism tethering on xenophobia and racism. We have seen this in the United States (Donald Trump) and Britain (Brexit), in France (Marine Le Pen), and now in Italy (with the rise of Giorgia Meloni and her party, which has neo-fascist roots). Even the Scandinavian countries, which for generations were a beacon of social democracy, are currently dominated by parties with a xenophobic character—in Sweden, the ruling party is allied with a party that has a neo-Nazi past.
The reasons for these processes vary by country. Still, they share some characteristics: The political ossification of traditional parties that have failed to adapt to the fast-changing conditions of the world, massive waves of immigration from the Third World, and the socio-political impact of 24-hour news cycles, the information age or more emphatically the disinformation age and political polarization resulting from social media. Israel is currently in (very bad) “good company” as an inseparable part of the rest of the world’s democratic challenge.
More specifically, in Israel’s case, the rise of the far-right can be largely attributed to the politics of resentment.
The Politics of Resentment
Resentment as a political force has never been adequately appreciated in its role throughout history. Consider how different the world might have been if George Washington’s fellow British officers had treated him and his Virginia militiamen with dignity during the French and Indian War rather than dismissing them as “Americans” (at the time, an insult). Would this most English of Englishmen have become a revolutionary and the “father” of the new country? What if Clemenceau had not forgotten the contempt with which the French were treated by Bismarck after being defeated in the Franco-Prussian war? His bitter resentment led to the vengeful terms of the Versailles Treaty. The German resentment of these vengeful terms was then skillfully exploited by Hitler, leading directly to World War II.
Consider how Palestinian resentment toward the Jewish state caused them to reject various Israeli peace offerings (Camp David I as well as II and Taba), even though these peace deals would have birthed a sovereign independent Palestinian state, ending the occupation, removing the settlements and birthing a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem. Clearly, resentment has the ability to pave a self-destructive path and spur on a chain of events leading to more political and moral errors.
Israeli society is rife with similar historically rooted resentments dictating the current political discourse. The political disposition of Israel’s Mizrahi citizens has been molded by the resentment at how they were treated by the Israeli left-wing establishment when they arrived in Israel. Today, they have become the electoral backbone of the Israeli right. This resentment is directed against left-wing Israeli intellectuals who lecture them that Arab and Muslim anti-Jewish attitudes are of no consequence, that if Israel only gave up the occupied territories and established a Palestinian State, these anti-Jewish attitudes would vanish. Too many of them have heard stories from their parents and grandparents about the ill-treatment and discrimination of Jews in their Muslim countries of origin dating back centuries.
Then there is also the resentment of more traditional Israelis regarding perceived Western indifference to the special affinity Jews have to the Land of Israel. The Palestinian perspective that the Jews do not have a unique historical and cultural attachment to the Land generates a disdainful resentment that has left little room for political maneuvering.
The denial of Israel’s right to exist by segments of western society has also stimulated tremendous resentment. Italy’s descent into fascism in the first half of the twentieth century did not call into doubt the right of the very existence of the Italian state. The Armenian genocide was an outrage that did not result in questioning the very right of the Turks to have their own Turkish state, even when the Turks continued to deny that it even happened. Israel’s far more minor transgressions, compared to the above, have put its right to exist into question.
The campaign to delegitimize Israel has been unprecedented in modern history, and most Israelis have come to view this fanatic anti-Zionism as the postmodern iteration of antisemitism. This has unintended consequences. All criticism of Israel is now viewed as antisemitism, and thus Israel is becoming deprived of the beneficial role that criticism plays in a robust democratic society.
These processes of resentment were only intensified by the Israeli-Arab conflict, and the Palestinians continued refusal to accept any peace deal that requires them to reconcile with the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East. The far-right has utilized this resentment in an attempt to damage the prospects of progress in Jewish-Arab relations. Why? Because, at one point in time, they believed that the greater Israel ideology to redeem the entire land would become the state’s primary goal. This is not the case today, nor has it ever been; whenever Israel is met with a genuine opportunity for peace, it has chosen this path over territorial maximalism. This began with the withdrawal from Sinai in 1982 and peace with Egypt. The transfer of Areas A and B of the West Bank to Palestinian control in the 1990s during the Oslo process. Peace with Jordan and returning the territories to Jordan, which Israel had taken control of in the Arava. The disengagement from Gaza in 2005 and even the Abraham Accords in 2020, where Netanyahu traded annexation for peace with the UAE, Morocco and Bahrain. Any other peace deals with the Arab world, particularly with Saudi Arabia (Netanyahu’s main focus), will require similar, if not more significant territorial measures, (most likely a total freeze on settlements).
So, with the idea of annexation dropping from the chapter of Israel’s story, as well as the political power of Israel’s Arab citizens becoming more robust, the militant wing of religious Zionism realized that their struggle to achieve one Jewish state throughout the Land must transform from an ideological pursuit to weaponizing what they portray as the Arab “threat” within Israel.
This transformation was only accelerated due to the increased radicalization among the Palestinian public, a rise in Palestinian violence, and the intensification of the religious aspect of the conflict, giving the likes of Smotrich and Ben Gvir a perfect opening to exploit the hostilities and push their agenda.
Here is a recent example of how the politics of resentment works: In December, a week after the Palestinian Authority called for a vote at the Hague to determine whether Israel’s occupation is de-facto annexation, Netanyahu met Ben Gvir’s coalition demands, agreeing that within 60 days of the establishment of the government, infrastructure will be provided for a series of illegal settlement outposts, and that moves will be made to expedite the planning and paving of bypass roads, as well as the expansion of highway 60—the main route for West Bank settlements—with 1.5 billion shekels budgeted for the project. This reaction to the Palestinians’ otherwise illegitimate claim shows how chronic resentment has affected policymaking and caused Israel to make political decisions based on indignation rather than rationally evaluating what is best for the state.
Resentment can override reason and confound the post-Enlightenment rationalist mentality. The way forward would be to realize that resentment is like alcoholism: The first step to overcoming it is to recognize that it has become the defining framework of our behavior.
And yet, none of this festering radicalization would have even had a platform, if it wasn’t for the 2014 electoral reform.
The Defining Issue
Those who followed the Israeli election would have come across some variation of an article titled “Netanyahu’s Sweeping Victory,” only to be perplexed when they discovered that the Netanyahu bloc received 48% of the vote. This is because the election outcome was decided by the Israeli Knesset’s high electoral threshold.
The electoral threshold in Israel was initially set at 1% when there were only one million eligible voters and later raised to 2% as the number of eligible voters increased. But in 2014, MK Avigdor Lieberman proposed raising it to 3.25%.
Many political scientists from both the left and the right appeared before the Knesset, warning how this could negatively impact Israel’s democratic system and representation.
So, if that is the case, what was the motivation behind it being raised?
Israel’s parliamentary system is perfectly proportional, which with a low threshold, encourages a lot of small parties to run, as their chances of winning at least one seat in the national parliament are relatively high. Once they do so, they essentially have the same bargaining power as any of the larger parties, which was seen as creating an unfair situation. Raising the threshold was also a measure to avoid granting a platform to a plethora of ephemeral parties that were essentially ego trips made by fringe personalities (think Ben Gvir). The fear was that an extremist faction being able to enter the parliament with such minimal democratic support gave them leverage to gain even more power out of the system to sabotage it from within. At the time, this seemed logical and fair.
The threshold reform was decreed “racist” by politicians from the Arab parties and “anti-democratic” by politicians from the Jewish far-right. Still, these complaints were generally dismissed as instinctive opposition to healthy change by fringe politicians who had benefited from a flawed system. At the time, most Arab-majority parties drew between 2% and 4% of the vote and were threatened by the change. Most far-right Jewish parties drew less than 2%; the increase seemingly put the Knesset far beyond their reach.
The reformers explained that this only meant they’d have to join with larger factions outside the confines of their narrow ideological camp, and that this unification with larger parties would naturally lead to moderation.
However, the threshold reform has wrought the opposite of its intended purpose, destabilizing and radicalizing Israeli politics. Instead of integrating themselves into the larger parties leading to moderation, the smaller, more radical parties banded together and created joint lists to cross the raised threshold. This unified electoral power has made it nearly impossible for the larger-moderate parties to cross the 61 seats needed to form a government without bringing the joint lists into their coalition.
This is what occurred in the last election. To get the 61 seats needed for re-election, Netanyahu negotiated a deal with three extremist factions (Smotrich, Ben Gvir and Maoz) to run as a joint list. If they hadn’t, there’s a good chance Smotrich wouldn’t have crossed the threshold, depriving Netanyahu of a crucial source of support. This collaboration provided leverage for Smotrich, who has gone from worrying about crossing the threshold to holding the Finance Ministry.
Moreover, the Bibi bloc ran as four parties, and the anti-Bibi bloc ran as seven. This means that even though the two blocs could win the same number of votes, the anti-Bibi bloc’s seats are distributed among a larger number of parties, thus increasing the likelihood of some individually not crossing the threshold. This is precisely what happened to Meretz and Balad. Once that happens, their votes are automatically transferred and re-distributed equally among the parties that did make it in, benefitting the side that did not lose parties to the threshold. This is why the Bibi bloc’s slight advantage of a few thousand votes became a massive advantage in the number of parliament seats that led to Netanyahu’s victory.
The impact of this is significant to note: Because of the high electoral threshold combined with population growth, hundreds of thousands of voters—150,000 Meretz voters and 138,000 Balad voters—are now denied representation in the Knesset. These are not negligible numbers, and they represent significant parts of the public.
If reducing representation by forced unification radicalizes the system, the opposite can be achieved by expanding representation. A corrective measure would be to lower the threshold back down to 2%, bring more marginal forces into play rather than fewer—and you might shrink the power of the radicals back to their natural size.
Political theorist Shany Mor put it best when he said, “It turns out the old messiness that so offended the reformists was, in the clarity of hindsight, one of the great strengths of the Israeli political system, granting it the flexibility, stability, and moderation now lost in the fallout of the threshold reform.”
There are few Israeli political traditions more venerably and authentically Israeli than a reform that ends up perpetrating the disastrous opposite of its intended goal.
Radical elements of a society will always exist on the fringe, resentment can always be cured. The corrective measure to the electoral system will go a long way in aiding that process. It is of the utmost importance that the main lesson of this experience is to respect the political structures, treat them as more than accidents awaiting some “smart” change, and consider what will be lost with any change, rather than what might be gained in an overly optimistic assessment of one’s predictive powers.
Samuel Hyde is a writer/researcher based in Tel Aviv, Israel. He is the editor of the book “We Should All Be Zionists” by Dr. Einat Wilf and is currently co-writing a second book with Wilf titled “Political Intelligence.”
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