Rosner’s Domain | High Anxiety in Israel: Are There Incentives to Compromise?

Monday was a day of anxiety. The Knesset voted – and passed an initial approval of some of the items on the long list of proposed legal reforms. The opposition marched, protested, blocked roads, harassed Members of Knesset – to no avail. 

Tuesday was a day of reckoning and debate: what should the coalition do next – and what should the opposition do next. A few hours before the vote, I visited a scholar whose views are well known to the Prime Minister. He did not seem elated by the reforms, even though he supports many of the specific items that were proposed by Justice Minister Yariv Levin and MK Simcha Rothman. After the vote, I asked him if  —  when the coalition is done proving its ability to do whatever it pleases — will there be a compromise?

It was not a question of what’s good for the country, not a question of what’s right, or what’s sensible. It was the question about incentives. 

He gave me the scholarly look and said: Politicians are like most other people. They respond to incentives. And so, the question for him was simple. It was not a question of what’s good for the country, not a question of what’s right, or what’s sensible. It was the question about incentives. Does the PM and his peers have tangible reason to compromise? Does the opposition have tangible reason to compromise?

Then he sat with a sheet of paper and put together a list of whys. Why yes, why nots. Preventing chaos is a yes – on the government’s side. It is a maybe on the opposition’s side. If there’s chaos, the government – the coalition in charge – is going to have to deal with it. Dealing with chaos can be a headache and a distraction. But not for the opposition. The opposition is a free rider. If there’s chaos it might even lead to a desired outcome. Maybe a political collapse of the government and a need for new election. Some opposition leaders could be tempted to risk it. 

Passing the reform is a maybe … on the government’s side. The proponents of reform might agree to compromise, but not a lot. They have the majority to pass legislation, so any compromise means that they agree to accept less than what’s possible for them to get by not compromising. Passing a tolerable reform is a maybe for the opposition. They could compromise only if the benefit justifies the price. What’s the price? It is acceptance of a far-reaching reform, a clear score for the government that they oppose, and one that cannot be undone, if they signed off on it. What’s the benefit? That’s a mystery. It must be a true compromise, not a symbolic concession that leaves the reform almost intact. 

So, there you have it, the scholar said: The coalition would compromise if the concession were insignificant (because they can have the whole package). The opposition would compromise if the concession were significant (otherwise, the cost is higher than the benefit). 

So, you’re optimistic, I chuckled. He grinned back: Remember, they are just people: No incentive, no action. 

Is preventing a crisis not an incentive, I asked. It is, he said, but an actual crisis is a stronger one. The stage of prevention is a time in which a politician can still choose between taking a risk or playing it safe. He can win by preventing crisis or lose by acting to prevent a crisis that might not materialize. So, a lot depends on whether the politician believes the crisis is close to a certainty, and whether he thinks that the crisis could be severe. If the leader believes that the crisis could be averted without compromise or could be easily overcome in case of eruption – he is likely to take the risk. 

Are you talking about Benjamin Netanyahu, whom you know so well? I asked. 

No, he said. Netanyahu tends to be cautious. It is his new allies I’m worried about. Most of them never managed a national crisis. They could err because they have the vanity of rookies. 

And so, on Tuesday morning, we were facing many days of waiting.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

The government decided to pass a law that would prevent Israelis from bringing chametz into hospitals during Pesach. Here’s what I write:

There is a good chance that the chametz law will be passed, which means there will be more chametz in the hospitals on Passover. You heard right: there will be more chametz! Because we have already learned this lesson many times: Jews in Israel do not like to have a religious behavior imposed on them by laws. Jews in Israel tend to despise such laws, to ignore them, to defy them. If if you don’t believe me, count the restaurants near your place of residence, which are open in the eve of Tisha B’Av.

A week’s numbers

A country of many children. 

A reader’s response:

Jim Hertz commented: “Shmuel, I still can’t figure out if you support the judicial revolution in Israel or not”. My answer: I prefer to call it a “reform” and not a “revolution”, and I do not support it in its current form. I’d also say that not supporting it doesn’t mean I can’t accept and even sympathize with some of the arguments behind it. That’s why I support a compromise. 

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.