In the early Nineties, a controversial plan was passed by a small majority in the Knesset, over the objection of half the Israeli population. It was a dramatic shift for Israel that the government decided to implement using political trickery, without much regard to the sensibilities of the opposition. It was also an irreversible decision: Israel committed itself internationally to the Oslo Accords. And for many right-wingers this is proof that the current opposition is dishonest as it cries foul over the initiative to implement a radical reform of the justice system, strengthening the parliament and weakening the courts and the legal advisors.
There are similarities between then and now: In both cases, the proposed change is dramatic. In both cases, Israeli is deeply divided. In both cases, the opposition takes to the streets. There are also differences: the Oslo Accords came as a surprise, the legal reform was put before the voters prior to Election Day. The Oslo Accords were in many ways unalterable. The legal reform can be reformed back when a new government is implemented. But there’s also another important difference: the Oslo Accords were a political decision, a change of policy. The legal reform is a change of the rules of the political game itself.
That’s why the opposition seems so angry and desperate, that’s why it feels as if this change is more profound that previous governmental alterations of policies. A country divided over its vision for the future can stick together if the rules of how decisions are made are clear and legitimate. But when one camp feels that it is about to be cheated out of the game – losing its ability to function in a free society – it immediately radicalizes.
For many Israelis what’s about to happen is not a change – for good or bad – in policy. It is a change in how Israel functions as a society. It is a change in Israel’s identity as a liberal democracy.
This is what we see in Israel today: a radicalization of a perplexed opposition. For many Israelis what’s about to happen is not a change – for good or bad – in policy. It is a change in how Israel functions as a society. It is a change in Israel’s identity as a liberal democracy.
Last Saturday night, 80,000 protestors took to the streets in the pouring rain. And that was just the beginning, the opening salvo of a long battle. But there are two problems with this battle: First, the coalition has a majority to pass the reform. Second, the opposition is not always clear on what it wants. Some opposition leaders believe that all proposed changes are damaging and even reprehensible. They want the majority to forget its pre-election promises and forgo all plans for change. But that’s not a realistic expectation, nor a fair one. The coalition has an agenda. It was elected to implement its agenda. That the opposition who lost the election opposes this agenda has little relevance today. Elections are held for coalitions to win and make changes.
Other opposition leaders understand that a change must take place, both for political reasons, and (some recognize) because the legal system is not perfect and cannot be immune to all demands for alterations. They believe, with good reason, that the government is engaged in overreach, so they propose to have a discussion and try to mutually agree on the changes that could be acceptable to both sides. But such negotiations did not yet materialize. The coalition suspects, not without reason, that all proposals for consultation are merely a delay tactic aimed at torpedoing all reforms. Also, it has a majority and feels little pressure to compromise. The opposition is divided and incoherent, and it’s not clear that anyone could speak for it with an authoritative voice.
So, what’s going to happen? It is likely to get worse before it gets better. The Knesset had begun its legislative process. The opposition is geared toward more protest, and possibly other measures. And everybody is shouting – that is to say: a calm conversation is currently impossible to have.
Something I wrote in Hebrew
In a long report for JPPI titled “Who is a Jew? Viewpoints of Israeli Jews” I wrote the following paragraph (you can find the full report online):
We found no common element that all Israeli Jews, or even a large majority of them, agree is indispensable – a specific belief that one must share, or a specific action that one must perform, in order to be Jewish, with those who do not share the belief or engage in the action being considered less Jewish. Of all the options we offered, it turned out that even things that most Israeli Jews feel should be done, such as remembering the Holocaust, are not prerequisites for membership in the Jewish community.
A week’s numbers
What is Judaism? For Leftist Israelis, more a “culture”, for rightist Israelis, more an ethnicity. By and large, traditional definitions of Jewishness as an “ethnicity”, a “religion” and a “nationality” take precedence over definitions such as “culture” and “values”.
A reader’s response:
Mor Levin writes: “I hear very little about the Palestinians these days, why is that?” Answer: because there is little to say. The Palestinian issue is on hold for many reasons and is likely to remain in such a state until there’s a generational leadership change in the Palestinian Authority (Abbas is 87), or a wave of violence of which many security experts in Israel warn.
Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.
