1. Iran — a matter of trust
It is heartwarming to watch President Barack Obama talking about “the deep affinities that I feel for the Israeli people and for the Jewish people.” Whether one believes him is another matter. Obama is campaigning to sell a deal with Iran, and the deal is not an easy one to swallow. The president calculated that showing his warm side toward Israel is a better sales tactic at this time — so he is making the effort.
Obama might succeed in convincing some legislators and voters that the devil is not as threatening as Israel makes it seem. But that will not turn a bad deal into a good deal. Zalmay Khalilzad (and many others) explained why the deal is alarming, and he names four “fatal flaws”: First, using the so-called fatwa by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as an indicator of Iran’s true intentions — present and future — is a mistake; even if Obama is correct that the agreement puts Iran one year away from producing enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon, it involves substantial risks. The president is counting on the efficacy of inspections — believing that Iranian efforts to cheat or deceive will be discovered and exposed in a timely manner, allowing the United States and its partners to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons; the framework agreement assumes that if Iran violates the deal, the sanctions that were lifted can be re-imposed — or can snap back into place.
All four flaws, and most other flaws writers talk about, focus on the issue of trust: Do you trust Iran to do what it says it will do? Do you trust the international community to implement the agreement properly? Do you trust Obama’s understanding of the situation and of Iran’s interests and actions?
Obama says he has Israel in his heart.
Obama says he is going to make sure Iran complies with the agreement.
If one is inclined to trust the president, then one is well-positioned to be gradually convinced that the deal with Iran is the best available option for America and for Israel. If, however, one believes the president has no real understanding of the Middle East, no good instinct for foreign affairs and no strategy to match Iran’s, one is not likely to be convinced that this deal is good for anyone.
2. Israel’s next coalition
Pay attention to Israel’s changing mood and changing outlook on the outcome of the elections. Two weeks before Election Day, a majority of the Jewish public opposed a unity government. Opposition to such a coalition was especially high among left-wing voters. In a poll by Menachem Lazar, which I wrote about, 55 percent of the public opposed a unity government, with just 28 percent supporting one.
From my column a few weeks ago: “Moreover, Lazar analyzed at my request the division of opinion by political camp and came up with the somewhat surprising finding that opposition to unity is widespread among all Israeli factions. Opposition on the left — 68 percent — is higher than the opposition on the right — 58 percent. But even in the Israeli center there is a majority — 53 percent — against a unity government. Without public pressure, it is not clear any leader would want to make a move toward unity.”
This is no longer the case: A Peace Index poll from March 29 found growing support for unity, especially, well, on the left. The voters of Yesh Atid (83 percent) and the Zionist Camp (73 percent) favor unity. This is significant. At this time, it is not at all clear that Benjamin Netanyahu wants unity — he is playing his cards carefully and exhausting his future partners, as he should in such negotiations.
But based on both political calculations and the realities with which Israel has to deal, it is not unreasonable to suspect Netanyahu is considering the option of unity with the Labor Party (Zionist Camp). A unity government will be more stable internally and more effective internationally.
But the obstacles to such a government are many — including, notably, the fear that while Netanyahu can close a deal with Labor’s Yitzhak Herzog, Herzog might not be able to close the deal with his own party and get its members on board. Thus, a survey that shows such high support for a unity government among Labor voters is significant. Herzog can now show his friends that joining a unity government is in line with what the voters — Labor voters — want.
3. The opposition and Iran
The Obama administration would like you to believe that “we’re not going to convince Prime Minister Netanyahu” that the Iran deal is a good deal. It is convenient for the administration to try to portray Israel’s opposition to the deal as a personal problem of a hawkish prime minister. But note that the Israeli opposition did not endorse the agreement with Iran. Herzog — and Tzipi Livni — did not criticize it as harshly as Netanyahu did, but were far from accepting it as a great achievement for anyone. In fact, Herzog’s choice for defense minister, Gen. Amos Yadlin, concluded that the agreement is “a compromise that tilts toward the Iranian side.”
So what do they think? They think that the deal is not very good, and that Israel should find a way to convince the Americans that the final deal should be better. Their approach is not confrontational — it emphasizes accommodation: It is what it is — let’s work to improve it. If Netanyahu has no trust in Obama and is putting all his eggs in the congressional basket, Herzog would try to convince the president and his team that some things need to be changed.
In a unity government, he might get his chance to try this approach.
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