The Gaza Convoy Takeover: An Effective Casus Belli?

When there is a negative sentiment in financial markets, a small economic or political hiccup can cause the markets’ decline. Similarly, when regional relations between states are volatile, a minor provocation can escalate into a full-fledged war.

Israel’s leadership is highly aware of the region’s over-sensitivity to military hiccups. For this reason, a possible way to explain Israel’s decision to stop the aid convoy to Gaza yesterday was the Israeli government’s readiness to accept the development of a potential war with Iran.

Israel’s military history is fraught with examples of fragile situations escalating into regional wars. In 1956, Gamal Nasser’s attempt to nationalize the waters of the Suez Canal provoked the Israeli operation in the Sinai, resulting in the Suez Crisis. In June 1967, Nasser’s closing of the Tiran Straits instigated Israel’s swift response, which resulted in the Six-Day War. In 2006, the kidnapping of two IDF soldiers triggered a month long operation against Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. In all these examples, Israel did not shy away from using political crises as a casus belli, or a cause for war.

To argue that the IDF’s command did not foresee a worst case scenario in which violence erupted on the Gaza convoy, causing the death of dozens of pro-Gaza activists, and escalating into a regional crisis with Turkey, Syria and possibly Hezbollah and Iran, is to underestimate its conservatism and strategic foresight. The IDF is no handicap in foreseeing violent eruptions. If anything, it consciously and readily chose to allow this event to develop into a possible war.

But why?

A plausible explanation may very well lie in the realm of international relations. If not for economic or political reasons, Israel may very well be meaning to seize this regional crisis as a casus belli to challenge Tehran.

In a world of tightening military networks, Iran has become a natural alley of the parties involved in yesterday’s flotilla. Iran’s involvement can hardly be separated from regional events such as this one. Tehran’s financing of Hamas, its alliance with Syria (Turkey’s close alley) and its supply of arms to Hezbollah are all matters that are well-known to the Israeli Intelligence community. Israel does not need the Iranians to be physically present on the boats, to link such activity to whom it perceives as the instigator of the disquiet in the region – the ayatollahs.

To be sure, Israel can very well use a regional event such as this as a trigger to target its archenemies in Tehran. The idea that Iran may well be Israel’s indirect target settles with the Sunday Times’ recent report that Israel has deployed nuclear submarines off the Iranian coast.

A wide-lens view of the recent crisis in the waters of Gaza can hence shed light on Israel’s otherwise thoughtless takeover of the pro-Gaza flotilla. If Israel’s government hasn’t completely lost its mind, it has probably decided to come nearer to a point of no return with Tehran.

Shira Kaplan graduated from Harvard with a degree in Government, and was a Milken Fellow in 2008-9. She can be reached at {encode=”kaplan2@post.harvard.edu” title=”kaplan2@post.harvard.edu”}.