
Even before watching Donald Trump, Volodymyr Zelensky and J.D. Vance go toe-to-toe-to-toe in the Oval Office, it was already becoming clear that the long-standing U.S. relationship with Europe was undergoing dramatic changes. So the question arises whether America’s involvement in other parts of the world will be affected by the growing rupture between our country and our age-old Atlantic allies.
Trump and Zelensky will ultimately make a deal, because they both need one. Zelensky’s conciliatory social media postings in the days after the White House blowup suggest that he recognizes the benefits of not pushing Trump even further into Vladmir Putin’s arms. And Trump has promised the American people that he will end the Russia-Ukraine war, which will be much more difficult without Zelensky’s cooperation.
But the question of what will become of America’s relationship with Europe is much more difficult to predict. And it’s even harder to guess what this means for the West’s future dealings with China, North Korea, Iran … and Israel. We will learn in the months ahead whether Europe can provide Ukraine with the economic and military support it needs to stand up to Putin without the U.S. by its side. But whether they are successful or not, leaders across the continent are already making it clear that they anticipate that this new era will be much different for all involved.
The question of what will become of America’s relationship with Europe is much more difficult to predict. And it’s even harder to guess what this means for the West’s future dealings with China, North Korea, Iran… and Israel.
The incoming German leader, Friedrich Merz, has already called for Europe’s “independence from the USA.” Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s top diplomat, was even more stark, saying shortly after the Trump-Zelensky fracas that “Today it became clear that the free world needs a new leader. It’s up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.”
Both statements reflected a growing realization that Europe has no choice but to proceed without the United States. And while the leaders of Great Britain, France and other longtime partners have indicated that they still plan to work closely with Trump on many issues of overlapping interest, their public statements also make it clear that the decades of extremely close cooperation toward shared goals are at least on hold. A future U.S. president could decide to rebuild these bridges, but the post-WWII assumptions of mutual reliance and trust may never be rebuilt.
U.S. dealings with China are also likely to be impacted by this shift. The Chinese military has escalated military exercises in recent weeks, raising questions as to whether they see Trump’s move away from Ukraine as reflecting a similarly diminished commitment to Taiwan. Many Americans who have criticized the U.S. role in Ukraine point to Asia as a higher priority. But while China’s leaders would not relish increased American involvement on the Pacific Rim, they realize that it’s entirely possible that these calls for a pivot to the East may just be an excuse for broader disengagement and a U.S. retreat from the world stage altogether. The Chinese appear ready to test that theory.
American presidents of both parties have historically relied on international alliances to confront global troublemakers like Iran and North Korea. But it’s impossible to predict how — and whether — Europe will respond the next time the U.S. asks for help.
Nowhere should this question loom larger than in Israel. In the short term, Trump’s relationship with Benjamin Netanyahu and the commitment of his evangelical loyalists all but guarantee his continued strong support for the Jewish state. But the United States has always expended immense amounts of time, energy and political capital to keep Western Europe on board too. If ties between America and Europe continue to weaken, there’s no way of knowing whether the Europeans will be nearly as willing to commit themselves to future involvement in the Middle East.
NATO was founded in 1949, less than one year after Israel’s independence. In other words, the modern Jewish state has never been forced to navigate a global landscape in which the U.S. was not in a position to orchestrate broad international backing for Israel’s safety and security. The post-Gaza landscape might not be an ideal time to find out what that diminished American influence might mean.
Dan Schnur is the U.S. Politics Editor for the Jewish Journal. He teaches courses in politics, communications, and leadership at UC Berkeley, USC and Pepperdine. He hosts the monthly webinar “The Dan Schnur Political Report” for the Los Angeles World Affairs Council & Town Hall. Follow Dan’s work at www.danschnurpolitics.com.