
Even as we rejoice the return of the first few hostages, it is impossible to calculate how much we don’t know about the embryonic ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas.
We don’t know if a treaty actually exists, at least in a form on which both parties can rely as challenges emerge over the next several weeks. The negotiators have taken the classic Henry Kissinger diplomatic concept of constructive ambiguity to unprecedented levels, delaying the most difficult decisions until the second phase of the agreement is scheduled to be implemented in early March. The day after his cabinet formally approved the pact, Benjamin Netanyahu was still referring to it as “temporary.” Hamas’ leaders have sounded equally unenthusiastic.
Since many of the terms of the ceasefire are so ambiguous, we also don’t know exactly when and how the remaining Israeli hostages will be released, their physical and mental condition, or even how many are still alive. We don’t know if the list of Palestinian prisoners to be freed in exchange is final, or whether disagreements over the most violent terrorists will block further progress.
We don’t know the specifics of the Israeli military’s presence in the Philadelphi Corridor, which separates Gaza from Egypt, or the Netzarim Corridor that divides Gaza in half. Which means we don’t know what Israel’s security capabilities will be if Hamas fighters do become belligerent. We don’t know whether this first phase will lead to a more permanent cessation of violence, or if this fragile deal will survive even that long. Which means we don’t know if all 33 of the initial group of hostages will actually return home, and whether the remaining Israeli prisoners will ever be freed. Most outside observers hope that even small confidence-building steps can lay the foundation for sustainable and lasting progress. But of course, we really don’t know.
What we do know is that Joe Biden and Donald Trump have been much more motivated to bring this to fruition than anyone in Jerusalem or Gaza City. What we do know is that these two bitter rivals were able to put aside their differences – or at least compartmentalize them – on a range of other policy, political and personal matters, to team up to force the warring parties to some semblance of compromise. It has become clear that neither man could have achieved this partial success without the other. Improbably, the departing and incoming presidents had their advisors work together even while they fought angrily on many other fronts. Simply put, Biden needed Trump and Trump needed Biden.
What we do know is that Joe Biden and Donald Trump have been much more motivated to bring this to fruition than anyone in Jerusalem or Gaza City.
Trump’s warning that there would be “hell to pay” if the hostages were not released before he took office sent an unmistakable chill down the collective spine of Hamas’ leaders, and the private threats that his emissary Steve Witkoff delivered to Netanyahu last weekend had a similar impact on the Israeli prime minister. But without the months of intricate negotiations that Biden’s representatives had coordinated between Israel, Hamas, Egypt and Qatar, the Trumpian forcefulness would have been unlikely to succeed. In an era in which bipartisan cooperation has all but vanished, the prospect of a less violent Middle East was an incentive for two embattled partisans to find a way to work together.
The question going forward is how much longer Israel’s safety and security will provide a sufficient incentive for American bipartisanship. There are growing factions in both parties whose anti-Israel leanings will make this ongoing cooperation much more difficult to maintain. Just as we have watched the most progressive Democrats strongly protest Biden’s ongoing assistance for Israel, there is an equally determined group of ultra-conservatives who have the potential to undermine Trump’s goals in the Middle East given the slim Republican congressional majorities.
Does this mean that the growing polarization of the debate over Israel in this country can be overcome when its necessary for the Jewish state’s safety and security? Or are these two old men just the last vestiges of a dying generation that still does agree on the importance of continued U.S. support for Israel?
Once again, we don’t know.
Dan Schnur is the U.S. Politics Editor for the Jewish Journal. He teaches courses in politics, communications, and leadership at UC Berkeley, USC and Pepperdine. He hosts the monthly webinar “The Dan Schnur Political Report” for the Los Angeles World Affairs Council & Town Hall. Follow Dan’s work at www.danschnurpolitics.com.