Does Taglit make you right-wing? No! (And yes.)

I’ve been meaning to write about a (relatively) new study concerning Taglit-Birthright for quite some time, but other things – elections, Iran, Netanyahu, Congress – prevented me from finding the time to write and the timing to post something about the study. Still, it is a timely topic, especially so when talk about the “relations” between Israel and Diaspora Jews is once again becoming contentious, especially so following the summer war in Gaza, in which Taglit graduates fought, and died, for Israel, prompting some criticism of Taglit as a harbinger of unwelcome nationalism.

So a new study that puts forward the question “Does Taglit-Birthright Israel Foster Long-Distance Nationalism?” is a fine addition to the thickening volume of studies about Taglit. And since it was only published in a professional journal – Nationalism and Ethnic Politics – just a few readers with interest in Taglit had a chance to read it, while other readers who also have interest were not exposed to it.

The claim that Birthright promotes “a very simplistic picture of the political situation in Israel and the threat to Jews worldwide” – as Allison Benedikt argued in a vicious article that essentially blamed a 2012 program for the death of Max Steinberg as an Israeli soldier in 2014 – is not new. You can find articles that portray Taglit as a right-wing conversion tool for liberal Jews on every corner.

Here’s one from the Harvard Crimson: “Birthright’s idea of engaging with Israel means supporting an illegal and oppressive military occupation, claiming citizenship to a state that deports African immigrants, glorifying ‘the Jewish mind,’ and decrying all Arabs collectively for their hateful terrorist tactics”. The Nation: “What began as an identity booster has become an ideology machine, pumping out not only Jewish baby-makers but defenders of Israel”. ZEEK: “there is only one conclusion we non-experts in the Middle East could have drawn: an Israel that does everything in its power to achieve peace with its Arab neighbors, who are unfortunately hostile and hateful”.

Does this hold against scientific scrutiny? Is Birthright a nationalism booster? Researchers Theodore Sasson, Michelle Shain, Shahar Hecht, Graham Wright and Leonard Saxe have an answer. Or at least a partial answer to some questions: “feelings of homeland connection can be fostered without triggering ethnonationalist attitudes associated with the political right”, they argue. That is what Taglit is doing. Fostering connection – not right-wing political positions.

The writers also quote several articles that claim Taglit has a right-wing bias. “The critics’ suspicion regarding right-wing bias”, they claim (and I’m not certain if I agree with that claim), “derives in part from Taglit’s funding mechanism, which includes support from the government of Israel (currently led by a right-of-center coalition) and donations from individual philanthropists who are outspoken advocates of nationalistic views.”

The story encapsulated in this story is simple, really, and it could put to rest many of the common complaints against the program had they truly been about a narrow definition of “political beliefs”.

But you’d have to be naive to believe it will put those complaints to rest. I assume that suspicions would linger even without the significant investment of Sheldon Adelson – they do not name him, but he is clearly the main target – in the program. Adelson is a fine figurehead on which one could hang one’s opposition to Taglit, but the roots of opposition to making Israel a central component of Jewish diaspora life are much deeper. And the claim that Taglit makes its participants more right-wing is not about being right-wing in the simple sense – supporting settlements, opposition to Oslo, voting for Netanyahu and Bennett – it is about being right-wing in the sense that every view of Israel that is positive is “right wing”.

In a nutshell, here is what the study shows: participants in Taglit grow more connected to Israel following a trip, but do not significantly alter their views on the way forward for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Researchers asked the participants before and after the trip: “As part of a permanent settlement with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to dismantle Jewish settlements in the West Bank?” The outcome: “participation in Taglit had no impact”. Namely, if a Taglit participant believed in dismantling settlements before the trip, he’ll have the same view after the trip.

They also asked about Jerusalem, and on Jerusalem Taglit did make a difference. the question was: “In the framework of a permanent peace with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to compromise on Jerusalem’s status as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction?” In this case, participants were “24% more likely to oppose compromise (41% versus 34%). Thus, on the question of Jerusalem’s future, Taglit participants are slightly more likely to have an opinion and were more strongly opposed to division of the city.”

As I said, I don’t think this is going to convince the critics that Tagit is kosher. The program still has a meaningful impact in fostering “a generally favorable evaluation of the Israeli state and society”. I suspect that most of those who view Taglit as a political tool would point to that fact as proof of political impact. If one believes Israel is a nice place, and one feels connection to it, and one is “less likely to believe that Israel is guilty of violating the human rights of Palestinians and of treating non-Jews as second-class citizens” – as this study shows – one is suspected of having the wrong political view even if one continues to support the evacuation of settlements.