You probably know the basic facts. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was invited last week by the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives John Boehner to speak about Iran before a joint session of Congress. The Obama administration had no clue this was going to happen.
The visit is scheduled for early March, two weeks before Israel’s elections. The White House is furious — breach of protocol, etc. The Israeli opposition is furious — political ploy, etc. The Likud ministers are defending Netanyahu — Iran is essential, etc. Most of the media is unimpressed — a dangerous game, etc.
Four possible narratives emerged amid the cacophony:
1. Netanyahu made a mistake and did not realize how damaging this could be.
2. The damage is not as great as critics make it seem.
3. Netanyahu does not care about the damage and prefers a supposed political gain.
4. Netanyahu does not care about the damage because he believes that the speech is essential.
Let us deal with them one by one.
Netanyahu was surprised by the angry response:
On the morning of Jan. 25, Likud’s Deputy Minister Ofir Akunis said on a radio show that the prime minister did not expect his speech to come under such heavy attack. I find this hard to believe, but there are signs that Akunis might have been right, such as the possibly half-apologetic comments made by Israel’s ambassador to Washington, Ron Dermer, in Florida the same day: “The prime minister’s visit to Washington is intended for one purpose, and one purpose only: to speak up while there is still time to speak up.” Both Netanyahu and his Washington ambassador are serious people, smart and savvy, knowledgeable and supposedly very familiar with Washington politics. If they did not anticipate the storm — that is a serious miscalculation.
Let me put it simply: There was nothing more predictable than the angry response of the Obama White House to the speech. So I still assume that the angry response was expected and possibly even part of the plan — if not Netanyahu’s plan, then certainly Boehner’s plan.
The damage is not as great as critics make it seem:
I do not buy that argument, either. The damage is real. President Barack Obama has two more years in office and the White House is ready to exact a heavy price on Netanyahu because of the speech. It will be one that not just Netanyahu, but all Israelis, are going to feel. An American official explained it as follows: “If Israelis are foolish enough to put this man in charge again, we have no choice but to make them understand that there is a price to his actions. They cannot expect to be shielded from the consequences.” In other words: This administration is done with Netanyahu. If Israelis elect Isaac Herzog — that’s fine. No harm done. If they elect Netanyahu in spite (or even because) of what he did, they are going to have to live with the result.
The damage is real not just because of what the administration might do in the next two years. It is real because it puts Israel in a dangerous position, that of a political football. Israel should be grateful for the support it is getting from the Republican Party — and yes, the Republican Party has been, in recent years, more supportive of Israel than the Democratic Party. But Israel should not lend itself as a tool with which the Republican Party hammers the president. And Israel should work to mend the problem that it has with some factions of the Democratic Party (or with Democratic voters), and not work to exacerbate this problem.
Netanyahu does not care about the damage and prefers a supposed political gain:
This is what all of Netanyahu’s critics would like you to believe. The speech is a political maneuver aimed at the Israeli voter. There is a serious problem with this line of argument: It is based on guesswork, by people who do not much like Netanyahu’s politics and policies. They do not know that Netanyahu decided to speak in Washington for political reasons — they want to believe that he did, because they want to see him and portray him in the worst possible light.
Surely, Netanyahu is not going to acknowledge this motivation. In conversations he had in the last two days he vehemently denied these allegations. But that is still not proof that he wasn’t thinking about politics. Surely, Netanyahu’s critics also have political motivations. But that also is not proof that they are mistaken in their unkind assessment of Netanyahu’s actions.
Last week, I called the political debate over Netanyahu’s speech “noise.” I still think it is noise. That is, because I don’t much care if Netanyahu, or his critics, have political motivations — for a politician, there is nothing wrong with political motivations. I only care if the benefit of the speech is greater than the damage.
Netanyahu does not care about the damage because he believes that the speech is essential:
This is the only explanation of Netanyahu’s actions that puts him in a positive light. But there is a problem with this explanation: Thus far, I have not heard anyone making a plausible case for it.
What would be a plausible case under such circumstances?
Netanyahu would need to show that his decision to speak would have a benefit that outweighs the damage it causes to Israel’s relations with the Obama administration, and the possible damage it could cause to Israel’s relations with the Democratic Party, and the possible damage it could cause to Israel’s image.
He can do that in one of two ways.
He can argue that the damage to all of the above is not as serious as it seems, or he can argue that the benefit of the speech is not as small as it seems.
Some arguments were made to that effect by defenders of Netanyahu’s decisions. I did not find them “plausible”:
Netanyahu aims to better the chances of Congress putting more sanctions on Iran.
I think it would be easier to make the counterargument: By making this a political issue, by making this an issue of presidential honor, by making this a case of blunt foreign intervention in American affairs — Netanyahu probably weakened the chance that a Democratic senator could vote for sanctions. If a veto-proof legislation was a distant possibility to begin with, I think it is now more distant.
Netanyahu believes that he cannot, at this crucial time, decline an opportunity to speak up.
This is, until now, the strongest argument that I got from Netanyahu’s people and supporters. They invoke “Munich,” and they refer to “Churchill,” and they basically make the following case: If a “bad agreement” with Iran is around the corner, and if Netanyahu believes that such a bad agreement puts Israel at existential risk, then all “protocols” of good behavior should be cast aside, and all measured analyses of possible damage to U.S.-Israel relations should be suspended (I have a history of refusing to dismiss or mock Netanyahu’s alarmist approach to Iran). Dermer called it a “sacred duty.”
In other words: to accept Netanyahu’s speech as worthy of the trouble, one needs to accept these three premises:
A. Obama is ready to agree to a “bad deal” with Iran. I suspect most Israelis would accept Netanyahu’s implied claim that this is a possibility that cannot be dismissed.
B. That a “bad deal” is highly dangerous for Israel — more dangerous than having a big fight with the Obama administration. I suspect many Israelis would also accept this formulation of the situation at hand.
C. That now is the time to cry out about all this, and Congress is the place. That is the trickier part to defend — and I’m curious to see if Netanyahu is capable of doing it convincingly.
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