Robert F. Worth spent fourteen years as a correspondent for The New York Times, and was the paper’s Beirut bureau chief from 2007 until 2011. He is a frequent contributor to The New York Times Magazine and The New York Review of Books. He has twice been a finalist for the National Magazine Award. Born and raised in Manhattan, he now lives in Washington D.C.
The following exchange focuses on his critically acclaimed book A Rage for Order (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016). Part 1 can be found right here.
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Dear Mr. Worth,
In the previous round we discussed the role of Arab dictators in the current disorder, and you stated that strong autocrats are not the solution to the Middle East's state of chaos. As you wrote:
To feed and preserve these systems is the worst possible thing the West can do. I do not mean to suggest that the West should topple autocrats like Assad; again, more chaos would only make things worse. But it’s important to recognize that his regime, and others like it, do not represent a solution. The first step towards a healthier future in the Arab region – which will take a long, long time – is to acknowledge this.
Now, in your book you mention your decision not to focus on the United States' role in the uprisings, which you deem as “secondary.” The forces at play, as you describe them, are primarily indigenous, and this makes the tragic personal stories you tell seem frustratingly inevitable.
My question:
Does this mean that America and the West can do nothing better than remain on the side-lines? Are there any active measures that a White House executive who reads your book could be justifiably prompted to take?
Yours,
Shmuel
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Dear Shmuel,
I think the United States can and should play a somewhat more active role in the Middle East than it has over the past five years, by being more diplomatically engaged. But it should not expect immediate or large-scale results.
The Arab uprisings took Washington by surprise, and the subsequent descent into chaos would not have been much altered by a different American policy. In the coming years, any victories in peacemaking or political development are likely to be small and local, but that does not mean they are not worth the cost. The most important need, I think, is more aggressive and imaginative diplomacy. The United States has retreated too far on the diplomatic front, and that is a shame.
This trend started before the tragic death of Christopher Stevens, the US ambassador in Libya, in 2012. It has accelerated since then, with the White House unwilling to risk the political price of another such incident. In too many places, diplomats rarely venture from their fortress-like embassies. This kind of retrenchment robs us of our best resource in a time of chaos and civil war. Look at Yemen, where a US-brokered transition in 2011-2012 broke down, because there were no brokers who had credibility in Yemen’s various political camps.
We need more diplomats who speak the languages and have logged time in these countries, got to know the local players, and are empowered to make deals. There is no guarantee that this kind of expeditionary diplomacy can prevent or attenuate conflict, but it’s usually the best possible shot, especially if it’s matched with flexible, deft military tools. In Syria, for instance, I think the US could probably do more to save lives and pressure the Assad government. I doubt that such measures would end the war or change the current disposition of forces in the near term. Syria is a true problem from hell: a multi-sided, insidiously complex civil war, with numerous foreign powers playing proxy roles. But saving lives is always worth doing, and the longer it takes to reach a settlement in Syria, the more refugees will stream to Europe, damaging the EU and empowering Russia.
