When Israeli airstrikes killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several of his top lieutenants last Saturday, they left a gaping hole at the top of the Iranian government.
It’s been said that no war is ever as popular again as it is on its first day. Because President Trump has spent little time and effort toward building public support for military action against Iran, the first polls after the strikes show a tepid response at best from the American people. Trump devoted only three minutes of a nearly two-hour State of the Union speech last week to Iran and then released two short videos over the weekend. It’s difficult to see a significant shift in voter opinion absent a much more aggressive effort from Trump to make his case. Even then, waiting until after the fact to do so still may be insufficient.
Trump has been talking publicly about a full-scale regime change, all but daring the Iranian people to rise up against the remnants of Khamenei’s governing structure. But most military experts agree that fully replacing an authoritarian theocracy is much more difficult than merely decapitating it. Creating an environment where entirely new leadership can take over is an almost impossible task to accomplish fully through aerial attacks and missile strikes. It would almost certainly require a massive presence of U.S. ground troops, which would lead to large numbers of American casualties.
If support from the electorate does not grow very quickly, the likelihood of Trump continuing a prolonged military effort will shrink with equal speed. This means that the likelihood of sweeping change among Iran’s leaders is equally small. The president’s advisors told him in January that pushing for regime change in Venezuela would be exceedingly risky, so he decided that replacing Nicolas Maduro with his vice president would be sufficient if she were willing to be more cooperative. News reports suggest that Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have concluded that an overthrow of the Cuban government could be just as messy, pointing to a strategy of convincing Fidel Castro’s ideological heirs they can remain in power if they are willing to make certain economic and foreign policy accommodations.
That same theory could easily be applied to the evolving situation on Iran, given the logistical requirements of occupying a country of 93 million people that is about one-fifth the size of the continental United States. It’s theoretically possible that a more fundamental change can occur in the Persian Gulf without ground troops, if U.S. and Israeli air attacks are sufficiently devastating and are paired with more surreptitious measures such as cyberwarfare, CIA and Mossad special forces and other less visible tactics to aid the leaders of the nation’s recent protests. But it’s much more likely that Trump will be forced to choose between less ambitious change and the deployment of an immense U.S. military presence.
In addition to the loss of U.S. servicemembers, a months-long military engagement would carry other domestic political consequences for Trump. Widespread dissatisfaction over Joe Biden’s inability to confront higher prices may have been the most important factor in Trump’s return to office last year, but now Trump is facing the same challenge. The increase in gasoline prices caused by an extended closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be a major problem for the Republican candidates relying on his coattails this fall.
An unpopular war that would require American casualties and trigger inflation is not the ideal recipe for a successful midterm season. In all likelihood, Trump will spend the next several days hoping for a popular uprising from the Iranian people. We all share that hope. But the alternative is that he settles for a surviving and somewhat more compliant member of Khamenei’s inner circle, who will run Iran with a slightly less oppressive iron fist for the foreseeable future.
Note: in last week’s column I contrasted between pro-Israel protests outside of embassies and anti-Zionist protests that blocked schoolchildren and congregants from entering schools or synagogues. Two of my smart friends have reminded me of also acknowledging the difference between nonviolent and violent protest.
Dan Schnur is the U.S. Politics Editor for the Jewish Journal. He teaches courses in politics, communications, and leadership at UC Berkeley, USC and Pepperdine. He hosts the monthly webinar “The Dan Schnur Political Report” for the Los Angeles World Affairs Council & Town Hall. Follow Dan’s work at www.danschnurpolitics.com.
