Young Rebels, Why the Insistence on Hillel?

I made the effort and read John Judis' article on Hillel and Israel in its entirety. An effort- not because the piece is boring. It is probably not boring for people who aren't already familiar with the topic. Judis writes well even in the many cases in which I disagree with him. Yet in this case, he had trouble holding my attention, because there was little new in the article for people who have interest in the topic like I do. I guess that's the strength of the article: it communicates the issue comprehensively enough for newcomers to understand it. This is also its weakness: Judis himself comes across as a newcomer – and his familiarity with the facts he is dealing with is not quite up to date.

Thus, he quotes research that is rather old (Cohen and Kelman), research that I suppose he didn't even read, because the quote is from Peter Beinart's book. Since Beinart himself hardly understood the data he was using – or possibly he did understand it, but was using data selectively to score political points – Judis' espousing of Beinart's proof regarding “distancing” is sketchy and unconvincing (most claims about “distancing”, as they are often used by critics of Israel, are unconvincing). His use of the recent Pew data is even worse: “As this distancing grows”, he writes, “Jews no longer define support for Israel as being an essential part of being Jewish. Subsequent polling data confirms their findings. In the recent Pew Poll of American Jews, 92 percent of American Jews between 18 and 29 say “a person can be Jewish if they are strongly critical of Israel”.

What a mix-up. First, because the Pew data was actually quite encouraging when it comes to Israel. Second, because the most important aspect of the new data regarding Israel is that it provided us with proof that Israel isn't a separate issue – or, in other words: that Jews who care about their Judaism tend to care about Israel and vice versa. This means that there is no “distancing” from Israel, there is distancing from Judaism (Cohen and Kelman's initial study was actually quite good at identifying just that – with special emphasis on the role of intermarriage in causing “distancing”, another feature that is only strengthened by the Pew data).

Judis is also very wrong to confound detachment and tolerance of criticism. That most Jews agree a person can be critical of Israel and still be Jewish is hardly a surprise. Satmars are very critical, even hostile, to the state of Israel, and I don't know anyone who seriously disputes that they are Jewish. The relevant questions in the Pew study are those about the attachment to Israel and the centrality of Israel (43% of American Jews say caring for Israel is essential, 44% say it is important but not essential, and 12% say it is not important). “Distancing”, writes Judis, “has taken two forms. For some, it has taken the form of indifference toward Israel, but for others it has taken the form of hostility to Israel’s government”. Yet “indifference” in most cases in not about Israel per-se but about Judaism – with Israel being an extension of general indifference – and “hostility to Israel's government” is, well, hostility to Israel's government, not distancing from Israel (I know some Israelis, left and right, who are very much connected to Israel while being hostile to its government).

So Judis, while writing fairly, does not have a good grip of the facts involved. And he also doesn't answer the question that is probably the most basic one which needs to be asked about all those young rebels who are trying to force their highly critical, hostile, indignant agenda on Hillel: why insist on Hillel? Why do all these groups have such an infatuation with the idea of having their gatherings hosted and sponsored by Hillel?

It is a pity that Judis doesn't quote in his piece the article by rabbi Eric Yoffie in Haaretz. A pity – as Yoffie is exactly the kind of person who is able to balance his criticism of Israeli policies with attachment to Israel. And still, he believes that “A voluntary religious organization that advocates for Israel has no responsibility to provide a platform to those who express views that it finds abhorrent and that contradict its most fundamental principles. Diversity of opinion is valuable, but only up to a point; and in the final analysis, allowing groups that are unremittingly hostile to Israel to speak at a Hillel will end up granting those groups a legitimacy that they do not deserve”.

Of course, Judis himself acknowledges the fact that Hillel is “a private organization” and that it “can adopt whatever rules it wants”. Yet for him this right to adopt “whatever rules” is only properly executed if the rules that are ultimately adopted are the rules proposed by groups such as J Street U and Jewish Voice for Peace. So the question should be asked again: why do the students insist on forcing Hillel to change its rules?

This question can be answered with one of three answers:

1. They want Hillel because Hillel is large and rich and they are small and poor. In other words: they want to take the resources of a better, stronger organization and use it for their own purposes. If that's the case, Hillel is obviously right to block them.
2. They want Hillel because they are annoyed by Hillel and want to change it (or ruin it?) from within. If that's the case, let them try, from within – by observing the rules and trying to change them the way rules are changed in organizations such as Hillel. They can find donors to give money to Hillel and try to gain influence over it; they can convince the current or future leadership that the policy is wrong or detrimental to the organization; or they can quit and do their own thing until Hillel gets back to its senses and begs them to come back on their own terms. But letting them use Hillel's name before the policy is changed would be wrong.
3. They want Hillel because the battle against Hillel is their way of getting a level of attention that they wouldn't get otherwise. Playing the “anti-establishment” game is the oldest trick in the book, and, as Judis' piece proves, it is a trick that never tires. Of course, an establishment should be attentive to changes of public mood and to its constituency's desires – but it should also resist attempts to push it around by using threats of eventual abandonment.  

The conclusion from all this is quite clear to me, and in this case, like Judis, I don't have anything particularly new to say, seeing that I've already said it: if they want a dialogue about the rules, it would be wise to engage with them, but if they ultimately don't accept the rules, there's no other choice but to let the rebels go.