The 2015 Israeli Democracy Index (IDI) was released this week by the Israel Democracy Institute. It is a survey that offers a lot of data — some of it illuminating, some of it problematic. All in all, it shows that 74 percent of Israelis describe their personal situation as “good” or “very good.” This includes Jewish Israelis (77 percent) and Arab Israelis (65 percent).
Why are they so happy with their lives? That might be a mystery. Israelis are highly critical of their government. They feel that society is fraught with tension. Still, a vast majority of them — again, Jews and Arabs, by more than 80 percent — “would not emigrate from Israel” even “if they could obtain citizenship in the United States or another Western country.” Israel, obviously, is not as bad as some people pretend it is. Neither for its Jews, nor for its Arabs.
The IDI survey is useful because, among other things, the same questions are repeated every year. So now we know that, compared with previous years, Israelis perceive a much higher level of tension between right and left this year. Note: We do not know that the tension is higher. We just know that Israelis consider it to be higher — that is probably because this tension is on their minds.
On the other hand, we also learn that the perceived tension between religious and secular Jews has declined this year — again. This much-talked-about tension has, in fact, decreased each year from 2012 until today, from 59.7 percent defining the tension as “severe” in 2012, to 47.5 percent defining it as such today. So, while American Jews seem to become more agitated with Israel’s state of religious affairs, Israelis, at least for now, seem to be moving in the other direction.
In recent weeks, I have written extensively about the complicated nature of Israel’s relations with its Arab citizens, and some of this complexity is well reflected in the IDI’s survey. Only a third of the Arab respondents to the survey (32 percent) report that they feel “a part of the state and its problems.” This is a “considerable drop compared to last year (58.9 percent),” as the authors of the report say — but it is also not a great surprise, considering the current situation in Israel. A fairly large minority among Israel’s Jews — 42 percent — believes that “most Arab citizens of Israel have not reconciled themselves to the state’s existence, and support its destruction.” Thirty-nine percent of Jews think “Arab citizens pose a security risk to Israel.” This is both untrue (as a majority of Jews and Arabs agree) and unhealthy.
Thirty-six percent of Jewish Israelis also do not want to have an Arab family living nearby. That is unhealthy, too — if quite understandable considering the tension between the communities. And it is interesting to note that only 11 percent of Arab Israelis would not want to live next to a Jewish family (but Arab Israelis do not want ultra-Orthodox Jews and homosexuals as neighbors). Surely, Arab Israelis are disturbed by the current situation and are afraid of Jewish violence, as previous polls have demonstrated. But they are not blind to the obvious reality: In Israel today, it is safer for an Arab to live among Jews than the other way around.
Fifty-six percent of Jewish Israelis also say that “it is not possible to identify as a Palestinian and be a loyal citizen of Israel.” This will stir up controversy for no reason: The word “Palestinian” triggers a negative reaction among Jewish Israelis for obvious reasons. That Jews in Israel say today there’s no way to be a loyal Israeli Palestinian doesn’t mean they will not accept that there is when — if — there’s peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
The same is true with many of the other questions included in the poll. The Democracy Index is a creature that I treat with both respect and suspicion. It is a survey, professionally done. But it has an ideological tilt, and its interpretation is often even more tilted. In the press release that was sent to reporters before the survey became available to the public, professor Tamar Hermann, the academic director of IDI’s Guttman Center for Surveys, stated that the poll proves that “Israel appears more democratic than it actually is.” I was puzzled by that statement, and am not sure what this means. That Israelis’ answers were disappointing to IDI because they do not corroborate the negative perception IDI scholars have of Israel’s situation?
Not to worry: There is plenty in the survey that will become fodder for more criticism of Israel — some of it justified, a lot of it not.
Example: Foreign workers should be treated respectfully and humanely. I assume most Israelis understand that, and support that. Israelis also support a policy that would not encourage illegal workers to sneak into the country and then demand to stay. Now the IDI survey shows that Jews do not want to live next to “foreign workers.” Is this racism? Is this a clear demonstration of Israelis’ true cruel nature? Or maybe the obvious recognition of facts: When foreign workers come to live in a neighborhood, the area loses its prestige, the houses lose value, the streets become less safe, the social ecosystem is severely disturbed.
Another example: Again, the IDI insisted on asking the problematic question: “Israel is defined as both a Jewish and a democratic state; which part of the definition is more important to you personally?” This question is problematic, as I have explained in detail in the past, because of two assumptions underlying it: “One — the analysts assume that it is a problem for someone to put more value on ‘Jewish’ than on ‘democratic.’ Two — the analysts assume that there is a contradiction, or a collision, between these two essentials.”
Jewish Israelis were almost equally divided between those highlighting the Jewish component (37 percent) and those highlighting the democratic component (35 percent). The proper answer — the one IDI probably wants to hear — is “both.” Or maybe the IDI wants “democracy” to take precedence over “Jewish” (after all, it is the Democracy Institute)?
Alas, the answer “both” is not offered — it is only volunteered, by a declining share of the Jewish population. Twenty-seven percent this year. It was 29 percent in 2014. Forty-eight percent in 2010.
Does this make Israel less “democratic”? I do not think it does, but I expect many critics of Israel and its society, Israelis and non-Israelis, to argue it does indeed. A similar reaction is also to be expected concerning the fact that 59 percent of Jews in Israel “agree that in order to protect national security, the state should be permitted to monitor what citizens post on the Internet.” I can easily envision the headlines: “Israeli Jews believe in police state” or something of that sort. In fact, more than 70 percent of Israelis resist the notion that “Israelis should be legally prohibited from expressing harsh criticism of the state in public.” Israelis, the way I perceive them, are the least-silenced public on Earth. But yes, some of them would monitor Internet postings for security reasons, as they would support profiling in airports to increase security, as they would agree to restrictions on media reports on highly sensitive security related matters.
They would support all of those things for three reasons:
1. Because they treat the need to keep Israel secure seriously and understand that security has a price.
2. Because they generally trust their security establishment and believe that it is not trying to stop them from expressing their views, but rather trying to stop terrorism and security threats. The Israel Defense Forces — according to the IDI — enjoys a high level of trust (although not among Arab Israelis).
3. Because they have eyes and ears and they clearly see that freedom of expression in Israel is not really a pressing problem. People say whatever they want. In fact, they probably say too much (just ask the appointed spokesperson for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu).
La Plaza de Santo Domingo