Twelve months in a year, 12 articles or events I want to revisit at the end of the Jewish year.
Tishrei:
Last year, right after Rosh Hashanah, I wrote the following paragraph about the strategy of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas:
Abbas is in a defiant mood and believes that rocking the boat, even violently, is his only hope of moving the boat forward. He believes that using force is the only way he can squeeze concessions out of Israel and that using force is the only way he can push the United States back into a more active role in helping the Palestinians get what they want.
The context was similar to what we face today: Abbas’ United Nations speech. And if anyone wants proof that little changes in the Middle East, Abbas’ annual speech of defiance is a good place to start looking. Last year, Abbas was hoping to get some attention by being defiant. It did not help much. The Palestinian problem was cast aside because of other, more urgent problems. Now Abbas is, reportedly, going to try again by declaring “an end to the Oslo process.” Does he think this will do the trick while hundreds of thousands of refugees are flocking to Europe seeking refuge, and not because of Israel or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? I wonder. But there’s always next year’s speech.
Cheshvan:
In early November, the U.S. elected a Republican Senate. So, I wrote this:
As negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program reach their peak this week — with the Nov. 24 deadline getting closer — the political situation in the U.S. is much different from that of a week and a half ago. This raises the obvious question: Does a new, Republican and more combative Senate impact negotiations and a future agreement with Iran?
So did it have any impact? If one wants to be positive, one might say: Had there not been a Republican majority breathing down the Obama administration’s neck, the agreement with Iran would have been even worse than it is today. If one wants to be less positive about the impact of a Republican majority on the agreement with Iran, one might say: Worse? It is hard to imagine a worse agreement, and it is thus reasonable to conclude that the new Republican majority had no impact on the final outcome of the negotiations.
Kislev:
In early December, when Israel was gearing up for its elections, I wrote the following paragraph under the headline “Pity Israel’s Mainstream Voters”:
The failure of the current coalition is what makes the voters’ dilemma more pronounced. In the last round, Israelis could dream of a kumbaya coalition — the reasonable right and the hawkish-enough center-left, the Jewishly sensitive seculars and the moderate religious. Leaving out the disliked Charedis, leftists, Arabs. Building bridges between the parties of the mainstream Zionist majority. Alas, this formula did not work… Israel’s mainstream voters (a mainstream that includes voters from Likud, Habayit Hayehudi, Yesh Atid, Israel Beiteinu, Hatnuah, Labor, Kadima and Cahlon) face a … difficult choice: Since they could not get what they wanted, they’ll have to consider a lesser option. And that would be either a stable coalition that is tilted more to the right, or another coalition that could be unstable and schizophrenic.
Ultimately, we got the worst of both worlds: a coalition that is both tilting to the right and narrow to the point of being unstable. One should never underestimate the ability of the political world to surprise.
Tevet:
When 2015 was still very young, I wrote about European Jews:
Jews of France, considering their next move, are afraid, as recent studies have shown. Conversing with some of their leaders leads to the conclusion that their faith in their government is not very high. They know that the government of France does not want the Jews of France to get hurt — but they aren’t sure that there is sufficient determination within the government to prevent that from recurring. The higher the price all of France has to pay for protecting its Jews, the higher the risk that, at some point, other segments of the French public will feel that the Jews are more a burden than an asset.
Jews in France, and in other European countries, had a tough year. The government of France, thus far, is doing what you’d expect it to do to protect the lives of Jews. But the situation in Europe is getting more complicated by the day, and the recent influx of immigrants from the Middle East is not going to make it less complicated. Surely, all that these miserable Syrians who are coming to Germany and Austria and other places want is a refuge from war. But the presence of Middle Eastern Arab communities in Europe, at least thus far, has been a source of trouble for Jewish communities and individuals.
Shevat:
In early February, in the context of the decision by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to speak in the U.S. Congress about Iran, I asked: What does Netanyahu gain by running against President Barack Obama?
Israelis are highly suspicious of Obama and thus find it hard to truly be angry with Netanyahu’s contrarian approach to relations with him. They agree with Netanyahu’s assessment that Obama is going to make a deal with Iran that is bad for Israel. Most important, those who are inclined to vote for Netanyahu are not going to abandon him because of the speech.
The past year was not good for U.S.-Israel relations. And for the most part, Israelis — even many of the Israelis who do not think very highly of Netanyahu — blame Obama for this. They think he is naïve, they think he is incompetent in world affairs, and many of them, sadly, even think he is hostile to Israel. You see, very few Israeli politicians praise Obama or use him as an example of the kind of leader Israel ought to have, because they recognize the sentiments of most of the Israeli voters. Obama is probably the American president least liked ever by Israelis.
Adar:
Not long after Purim, an appropriate time, I asked who represents the Jewish people — and if Netanyahu was the one:
If “representation” means having an official representative role, then Netanyahu clearly does not have such a role. If “representation” refers to perception, then many non-Jews (possibly a majority of them) and many Jews (surely a fair number of Israeli Jews) do see Netanyahu as the most representative leader of the Jewish world. If “representation” refers to the views of Jews, then Netanyahu can claim representation on some issues and not on others.
The issue of representation will not be resolved this year — or the next — but the past year brought it to the fore in many ways: in France and the interests of the Jews there, for one, but also vis-à-vis Iran and the claim Israel has (or does not have) on representing an overwhelming Jewish interest.
Nisan:
In late March, I wrote a short article about something that will be on everyone’s mind next year — an election year in America: Which president is good for Israel, and if Obama, indeed, has not been a very good one — which is what Israelis tend to think — should we eagerly await Obama’s successor?:
Everyone — the papers, the pundits, the experts, off-the-record officials — more or less agrees: The next two years, while Obama is still in office, and Netanyahu is Israel’s prime minister, are going to be tough. That is, until Obama says goodbye. Enter my fellow traveler, the American, with his penetrating question. Why two years? Did anyone promise Israel, did anyone whisper to Netanyahu that after Obama a more understanding president is a done deal?
I’m one of those who think that Obama’s policies do not benefit Israel. I’m also one of those who tries very hard not to fall into the trap of thinking about this president as an enemy of Israel — he is not.
And I still think Obama is not necessarily the worst option from an Israeli point of view. A couple of days ago, I highlighted some of the troubling emails that emerged from the Clinton State Department. I do not know for certain that Hillary Clinton would adopt policies more to the liking of Israel than Obama’s — nor do I know this for certain about anyone else. Surely, I can make an educated guess based on past statements. But I know from experience that past statements don’t always guarantee the nature of future policies.
Iyar:
At the end of April, when Israel did not yet have a coalition, I wrote an article about Israel’s “minority majority problem.” Israel, I said, lacks a mainstream majority and pays a heavy price for it:
The real problem is the tendency of too many Israelis — and their representatives — to also think and act in their daily lives as a minority. Namely, to think about what is good for the group they belong to rather than about the country. To frequently engage in unnecessary turf battles with other groups. To fear other groups, often to the extent of demonizing them. To lack the confidence in action that is typical of a majority.
Maybe this will change in the next election? It is very possible that, by Rosh Hashanah of next year, there will be a date for a next election — or a new government in place.
Sivan:
I wrote about the protest of the Israeli-Ethiopian community, and about the assumption that the problems this community is having are all because of Israeli “racism”:
While racism might contribute to the problem, it isn’t the problem. The problem stems from a combination of many other things: a measure of neglect, a measure of incompetence, a measure of helplessness, possibly a kernel of fatigue, and a political attention span that befits only problems that can be solved within one election cycle. Israel needs to do things better. It needs to have a better police force, and it needs to come up with a better plan for solving the issues that bother Ethiopian Jews. And it needs to refrain from pretending that these are problems that are easy to solve (“Let’s just all be less racist and everything else will fall into place.”). No — these are not issues that are easy to resolve, even if there’s no racism, even if everyone has the best of intentions.
Allegations of Israeli racism, or an Israeli tendency toward theocratic behavior, or Israeli lack of morals were common this year. They were also common last year and are likely to be common next year. Israel’s real problem is not any of the above. Its problem is that it got out of fashion — or, to put it the other way around, that it became fashionable for people in many quarters to point fingers at Israel and look at it with suspicion. And that is not an easy problem to solve.
Tammuz:
In June, I interviewed Michael Oren on his new book, “Ally: My Journey Across the American-Israeli Divide,” thus beginning (although this was not really the beginning) a summer of dealing with the Iran agreement and U.S.-Israel relations:
Rosner: So, this is about something that you clearly imply in your book, you even write it in some way, but you never say it explicitly. Has President Obama damaged Israel’s security?
Oren: We are less secure today than we were five years ago.
R: Because of President Obama’s policies?
O: We’re less secure than we were five years ago. I mean, it takes two to tango; there are some things that we did, but yes …
Today, the deal seems to be a done deal, and Israel will have to find a way to maintain its security. One of the interesting things about the Iran debate is how not one of the supporters of the agreement cares to agree that, yes, it makes Israel less secure. Had an American leader come forward to say that although the agreement is not very good for Israel, it is good for America — hence, an American government has to make the deal — that would not be as problematic. I would still disagree with him — because I also think the deal is not good for America — but I would appreciate the honesty.
Av:
A decision was made to release Jonathan Pollard. So I wrote this:
Israel gains nothing from Pollard’s release. Nothing. Netanyahu gains nothing from it. In fact, for Israel, the release is a distraction from the battle to stop the Iran deal.
Israel does not gain, because the release is a reminder to Americans — at a crucial time — that Israel, while an ally, is also a country with interests that aren’t always compatible with those of the U.S. When battling over Iran, Pollard is a disruptive symbol.
Here is something on which I hope to have a chance to write next year. Here is something that will give yet another reason for Jews to disagree with one another.
Elul:
I wrote several articles in August, but not many, because of a long visit to Australia as a guest of Australia’s Zionist Federation. So, at the end of this month, and of this year, let me revisit my Rosh Hashanah article of last year. We Jews have an inclination “to have communal concerns,” I wrote a year ago.
Communal concerns were the main intention behind the Pew Research Center study. Whether the community can still hold and grow, when the substance of what “Jew” means becomes unclear. … Communal concerns were also a focus of Israeli life in many instances this year. In October of last year, I wrote about Israel’s “anxiety of exodus” — Israel’s not-always-rational fear of emigration. … Communal concerns over the Israel-Diaspora circle were raised many times during the year on matters large and small.
We end this year with even more communal concerns. We worry about the Jews in Europe, and about the way Israel handles its complicated social realities, and about the relations between Israel and other Jews, and about relations between Jews within the Jewish community — the debate about Iran, as we all know, is making things more complicated for the community.
We hope that next year will be a year of peace and calm. But if it isn’t, then we should hope for a year in which we all keep worrying about all the aforementioned things — as unpleasant as they might be. That is because as long as we worry, it means that we still care and are still involved.
Shanah tovah.
