In 2007, a report from the American intelligence agencies concluded that Iran had halted its military nuclear program. The program, the report said, had been frozen since 2003, when the Iranians became apprehensive following the war in Iraq and because of the significant presence of American forces nearby.
The report reflected the consensus view of 16 intelligence agencies and argued that Iran’s “decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic and military costs.” The good news prompted high-ranking leaders to declare that an alarmist approach to Iran’s nuclear program was no longer necessary.
Sen. Harry Reid, the Democratic majority leader at the time, urged the Bush administration to “appropriately adjust its rhetoric and policy” to a new reality. He called for “a diplomatic surge” to “effectively address the challenges posed by Iran.” Indeed, his call was answered by the next president, Barack Obama. To Obama’s credit, while he was running for president, he committed himself to working toward a negotiated solution. He never seriously looked back at any other solution.
When the American report calmed the Iranian waters by making the assessment that Iran’s nuclear program was under freeze, Israel was not surprised. Its leaders at the time — Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni — had been notified in advance. Their public protest was weak — they did not see much benefit in having a fight over the assessment (one has to wonder if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would have responded differently under those circumstances). Their position remained unchanged. Iran was still seeking to advance its military nuclear capabilities.
But they did have to adjust to a new situation: The Bush administration sent its national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, to explain that “the estimate offers grounds for hope that the problem can be solved diplomatically, without the use of force,” and Israel realized that the Bush administration was going to leave Iran’s problem for the next administration. In 2007, Israel’s leaders still assumed that would probably be under Hillary Clinton.
Israel’s leaders would be thrilled to have a similar problem today — an Obama administration that would leave the handling of Iran to the next (possibly Clinton) administration. Instead, they are dealing with an administration that does not want to keep kicking the Iranian ball down the field. But, much like in 2007, they do have to adjust Israel’s policy to a likely new situation: Iran — and this is a best-case scenario — will be a threshold nuclear state. The Obama administration, somewhat correctly (only somewhat, because it is the result of Obama’s lack of commitment to a rollback strategy), claims that Iran will be such a state with or without an agreement.
“Every day more concessions are made, and every day the deal becomes worse and worse,” Netanyahu said on July 6, a day before negotiations were extended four more days. High-ranking Israeli defense officials no longer believe that the international community has the will to roll back Iran’s program. The ability, yes. But not the will. The few American legislators who show real interest in this topic mostly share a similar view. The objectives of the U.S., as one expert put it, “have shifted” in the past couple of weeks. “Instead of denying Iran a nuclear weapons capability, the U.S. goal now appears to be preventing Iran from building an actual weapon while implicitly ceding the capability.”
The past week was typical for situations with high-stakes political negotiations. As this article is being written, the agreement is still under discussion — Iran trying to give as little as possible, while the U.S. and its allies attempt to gain as much as they need to sell the agreement to a skeptical audience, especially on Capitol Hill.
Last week, a bipartisan group gathered at the Washington Institute presented a benchmark document to the administration. For legislators struggling to understand the complications of a nuclear deal, this document was “the right thing at the right time,” one congressional aide told me this week. For any agreement, Congress needs a benchmark against which to make its assessment. This bipartisan document seems to have become that benchmark, both for Republicans — who might want more, but already know more isn’t likely — and for Democratic legislators — who fear their constituency but do not want to be cheerleaders for a laughable agreement.
The White House is constantly checking whether it has enough backing from Democratic legislators. And the message it was getting this week from top leaders was simple: Stick to the principles laid out in the bipartisan document, and you’re safe. Alas, the document was not an easy one to follow for an administration keen on reaching an agreement.
“This deal will pave Iran’s path to a nuclear arsenal,” Netanyahu said. The administration is going to argue that the deal will prevent Iran from reaching the stage of “arsenal,” while acknowledging — not publicly — that it is not likely to prevent Iran from becoming a threshold state. Graham Allison of Harvard Kennedy School recently wrote about the importance of details and “fine print” in assessing the final outcome. Those expecting Iran to be required to abandon its nuclear ambitions, or be forced to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure, will surely be disappointed. Those willing to accept the reality of a threshold state with no weapons would still have to look at the ways the agreement ensures such an outcome.
Allison, a former adviser to the secretary of defense under Ronald Reagan and an assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans under Bill Clinton, wrote: “If Secretary [John] Kerry and his team bring back an agreement that successfully translates key parameters of the Framework Accord reached by the P5+1 and Iran into legally-binding constraints, including intrusive procedures for inspection, verification, and challenges, my bet is that it will be difficult to responsibly reject that agreement.” An Israeli high-ranking official agrees: Inspection is the key; the ability of the international community to visit Iranian sites and examine their compliance with the agreement is key.
Agreeing on inspection terms is complicated — they have been an obstacle during negotiations and involve many considerations. For the Iranians, it is both the issue of national pride — no country would give international inspectors a green light to visit any site, any time, unannounced — and the issue of Iran’s ability to hide elements of its program from inspectors. For international negotiators, it is the ability to prevent Iran from cheating, and also not to bend the rules that govern agreements with other countries. One cannot ask for certain terms of inspection from one country and then give Iran a better deal.
Inspection is the only way to get to the deal Allison outlines without crossing into the Netanyahu deal territory — to get to a threshold state while staving off a nuclear arsenal. In the U.S. and in Israel, few officials believe inspection can work for very long if Iran is determined to have an actual arsenal. The hopeful among the people of officialdom rely on the assumption that Iran prefers to remain a threshold state over the complications of having an arsenal.
And, of course, there are many more such hopeful officials in the U.S. than there are in Israel. For Israel, obviously, the prospect of leaving the ultimate decision to the Iranians — whether to be a threshold country or a nuclear-armed state — does not have much appeal.