1. Israelis
Three weeks ago, when the war in Gaza was still raging, I briefly explained that dividing Israelis into the customary groups of “hawks” and “doves” doesn't fit this conflict. My suggestion was to divide them instead into “pessimists” and “optimists”.
The pessimists do not much believe in Israel's ability to have a serious impact on regional trends and hence advocate a policy of sitting tightly and not aiming too high – no peace, no war, no changing regimes, no ending the conflict. Waiting for better times is their policy. Netanyahu, defense Minister Yaalon, and other supporters of the cease-fire with Hamas could be counted among the pessimists.
The optimists still believe that Israel can make the difference by the force of its own actions. Leftist optimists believe that Israel can bring about peace if its government wants it with enough zeal. If only Netanyahu stopped building settlements, if only he negotiated in good faith, if only he'd show Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas some generosity, peace would be within reach. Rightist optimists believe that Israel can bring about a more convincing victory over its enemies if its government wants it with enough zeal. If only Netanyahu gave the order to invade Gaza and topple Hamas, if only he refused to negotiate any deal except total surrender by Hamas, if only he were more determined, victory would be within reach.
All this is true for the Israeli leadership, and it is true for the public. Looking at the post-war surveys of Israeli public opinion – there were three such surveys over the weekend – we can now try and asses the way Israelis fall into the two camps.
Clearly, the greatest beneficiary from the war, politically speaking, is the most optimistic leader of the lot, Naftali Bennett of Habayit Hayehudi. Bennett is a right wing optimist. He keeps telling Israelis that the war could have ended differently had the leaders been more determined to achieve victory. He currently has 12 seats in the Knesset but in the latest three polls he got 17, 18, and 19 projected seats. Another right wing optimist, Avigdor Lieberman, is less successful in collecting the fruits of war. The three polls don't give a clear picture of his prospects – in two of them he maintains his current strength or loses little (11, 9) and in one poll he gains as much as Bennett does (17).
Left wing optimists did not do as well in these polls. There aren't many of them to begin with, but assuming that those who are still out there tend to vote for Meretz, Meretz can be somewhat disappointed. It isn't losing mandates compared to its current situation (6); but if a couple of months ago Meretz seemed like a party that could become the surprise of the next elections, the latest polls are not as good for it.
Are the voters of these parties the only optimists? Far from it. We have to assume that optimist voters can be found in many of the parties whose support for the cease-fire suggest that their leaders are pessimists. According to the Maariv poll (Hebrew), 58% of the Jewish Israeli population believes that the cease-fire was a “mistake”. That is, they believe that a better result was possible. In a Panels Politics (Hebrew) poll from last week, 75% of respondents said that Israel should take action to topple Hamas' rule in Gaza. This means they believe that it is in Israel's hands and interest to decide who rules Gaza. The mood of all these many people is sour. But their ideology – whether they understand it or not – is one of optimism.
A curious case of optimist confusion is that of the Labor Party. The Labor Party and its leader, Yitzhak Herzog, were supportive of the military operation and very careful not to criticize it until almost the very end. In recent days, the tone has changed, but the message is still somewhat garbled. The party seemed to be in favor of the cease-fire, and yet it is criticizing Netanyahu for his “failure” to secure something better by referring to past missed diplomatic opportunities. The public doesn't buy it – and the party is losing mandates in the polls. If the war provided an opposition leader with an opening to present an alternative, Herzog surely missed it. I believe that he missed it for the right reasons – wanting to do the right thing at the right time. But his party will not necessarily be as forgiving as I am.
2. Young Jewish Americans
The Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies at Brandeis did a quick study on the reaction of young Jewish American Adults to the Gaza Conflict. The focus is Birthright applicants (participants and non-participants), so we are talking about a group with at least some interest in Israel and Judaism – a level of interest high enough to apply for a free fun trip to Israel. We are also talking about a group of people with which Israel often seems to have a problem: young and liberal. In fact, much more so than the average American: “they are far more liberal than U.S. young adults as a whole: almost two-thirds considered themselves liberal, compared to less than one-third of all U.S. young adults”.
What do they think about Gaza, Israel, and the war? If you want your glass half full, you could focus on the fact that “half of the nonparticipants and 60% of participants believed that Hamas was responsible for the conflict, compared to 21% of all U.S. 18-29 year olds”. Almost half of Birthright participants think that Israel's “response” to the conflict was “about right” – much more than the 31% who believe Israel's response was “about right” among US youngsters.
But you can also look at your glass as half empty: that is, if instead of taking a comparative approach to the numbers – instead of being satisfied with the fact that Birthright does something to make young US Jews more supportive of Israel – you just look at the bare numbers. 25% of Birthright participants think Israel has “gone too far” in its response to the conflict. That is a lot. Among non-participant applicants to Birthright the number goes up to 38% (ten points higher than the average young American – that is, young Jews are much more critical of Israel than young non-Jews, unless they go on Birthright). 20% of participants think that Israel's actions in the war were “mostly” or “completely” unjustified. 9% of Birthright participants are “estranged” from Israel. 19% more are “somewhat estranged”. 23% more are “a little estranged”. A majority of participants do not feel completely connected to Israel.
Should we be satisfied with these results (and by “we” I mean those who want a strong Israel-US Jews connection)? Surely, the advocates of Birthright should be satisfied with it, as it clearly demonstrates the impact of this program on its participants. But I'm not sure about the rest of us. We might look at this survey and think that all we need is more programs and more trips and things will turn out well. But we can also look at the 60% of participants (45% of non-participating applicants) who support Israel “very much” and wonder about the other 40% who do not.
3. Americans
The new study from Pew doesn't specifically deal with the Gaza war but is interesting to read with the war as background. From this survey we learn that “more [Americans] continue to think the United States does too much, rather than too little, to help solve world problems. But the share saying the U.S. does too little to address global problems has nearly doubled – from 17% to 31% – since last November”.
In other words, this is another half-full half-empty situation: Americans, on the one hand, still remember Iraq and are still reluctant to get involved in world affairs. On the other hand, the growing impression that US influence is in decline is beginning to bother Americans. 31% in favor of more engagement is still low from the viewpoint of those who want to see change. But when compared to previous surveys, it is climbing fast.
In Gaza we could see the culmination of many of the patterns that have created this trend –
During the war we saw an American administration that is reluctant about getting involved, following a somewhat embarrassing failure to initiate a serious Israeli-Palestinian peace process; but we also saw an American administration that can't really disengage when the region is at war, an administration that feels a responsibility to do something. John Kerry's rush to the rescue, and subsequent errors in conducting negotiations, can be ridiculed. Yet his instinctive tendency to engage is the same instinctive tendency we see in the Pew survey. This is an American administration that is not as important a player as it used to be. Americans notice this: about half of them say that “the U.S. plays a less important and powerful role as a world leader than it did 10 years ago”.
Some observers tend to define such tensions as a battle between idealism and cold calculation, or as a battle between ego and self-preservation. But it might be just the usual story of the history of American diplomacy – the history of a pendulum movement between wanting to engage and wanting to forget about the troubles of a distant world. Americans have always wanted and still want their country to be a leader. A leader cannot disengage. They are also tired following years of costly engagement. So it takes time for them to regain their energy and get ready for more involvement. Obama might be a transformative President, but his era is not transformative enough to make Americans not care about their country's role as a global leader.