More Gaza rockets, more Gaza fears

A.

More rockets were fired tonight from Gaza at Israel, for the second time within a few days. Israel responded as you'd expect it would in such a situation. Gaza is a problem that was not solved last year, when Israel and Hamas had an extensive round of violence, and will not be solved this year. In fact, there are signs that the Gaza situation is getting more complicated to solve – that Gaza is on its way to being even more chaotic. Such a situation would pose a serious challenge for Israel.

What is the problem in Gaza? Hamas is always a problem, but Hamas isn't the one currently provoking Israel. In fact, it is the groups challenging Hamas that are firing the rockets. “A radical Islamist Salafist group posted a statement on Twitter claiming responsibility for firing the rockets. Calling itself the Omar Brigades the group said the rocket fire on Wednesday was in retaliation for Hamas's killing of an Islamic state supporter in a shootout a day earlier in Gaza”.

So you see: Israel has an interest in weakening Hamas so as not to make it the dominant force in the Palestinian world and the ultimate ruler of Palestinian society. It also has an interest in strengthening Hamas, because when Hamas weakens more radical groups get into the picture.

B.

I wrote an article for Slate back in 2007 – eight years ago, when Hamas took over Gaza – warning about Gaza’s potential for becoming much worse than it was then, much worse than it is now. I wrote this article, before Syria's civil war, before ISIS, before chaos became a Middle East norm.

These are the days of chaos, leading to violence, leading to cruelty and to new heights of brutality. It is the Iraq-ization, the Afghan-ization, the Somali-ization, of the Palestinian Authority: executions Iraqi-style, clan rule Afghanistan-style, and absence of government Somali-style.

The article was far from accurately predicting the future. It failed to predict a relatively stable Hamas rule:

No wonder that what happens in Gaza has the flavor of Iraq: A bad regime – whether it's the Israeli occupation or the incompetent Palestinian Authority – was replaced by no regime. 

Wrong. A bad regime was replaced by a worse regime, the Hamas regime. But the situation today could lead back to the script that worried the world in 2007 – the script of no regime, which is quite common in the 2015 Middle East.

C.

No regime in Syria is a headache. Especially so if one of the radical groups is able to take over the stockpiles of rockets – which still include, Israel assumes, unconventional weapons. But in Syria it seems as if, at least for the foreseeable future, the warring parties are going to be busy fighting one another. It seems as if for the time being they will not have time and energy to turn against Israel (of course, one ever knows for sure).

No regime is a nightmare. In Gaza we know what happens when parties war with one another. And the reminder came last night. A radical group – aiming to annoy Hamas – rocketed Israel. If this group, or other groups, keep using such measures, Israel will have several options to choose from – all bad.

D.

Israel could strike at Hamas – as it did tonight – arguing that Hamas is responsible for actions originated in Gaza.

Israel would be right to make such an argument. But there's no guarantee that striking Hamas would help much. If Hamas has the power to tame the other groups, then Israeli strikes could potentially energize it to do so, or risk greater retaliation. However, if Hamas no longer has the ability to tame these groups, then strikes would weaken it even further, and eventually contribute to having an even more chaotic Gaza.

Israel could also aim to strengthen Hamas by various means. This would be quite ironic, and also, long term, quite dangerous. Hamas is not Israel's friend, and having a stronger Hamas isn't in Israel's long term interest.

Israel could also aim to help a stronger Palestinian Authority take over Gaza – as proponents of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations used to argue it should do. That route does not seem plausible at this time. The Palestinians would say that it is not plausible because there is no desire on their part to do “Israel's work”, as one Palestinian framed it (so it is Israel's fault). Israel would argue that the Palestinian Authority never had the backbone to really take on Hamas (so it's their fault).

Israel could reoccupy Gaza. Just imagine what happens if such a scenario becomes Israel's only option. Imagine the world's response, imagine the bloodshed, imagine the magnitude of the failure of the “disengagement” concept. If Israel is forced to reoccupy Gaza, it will try to install a Palestinian regime to rule the place. And it will likely fail in achieving this goal. Installed regimes don't work in today's Middle East.

And, of course, Israel could stick to defense (Iron dome), containment (occasional strikes), and complaints (to the good-for-nothing international community). It can do that as long as the Israeli public doesn't demand action, and it will not take long for the Israeli public to demand action.

E.

Consider the Gaza situation and think about Prime Minister Netanyahu's contention that the time is not ripe for the establishment of a Palestinian State, that the current atmosphere in the Middle East makes it implausible. Was that such a preposterous analysis?