The ‘Intifadas’ and today’s violence: Four differences

Last week we dealt with the question on everybody's mind: is it the third Intifada or not? Surely, the wave of violence Israel has been dealing with in the last two weeks is something. Giving it a name such as “Intifada” is more a reflection of the need people have to call things by name than an exercise that has real value to policy makers, or to the observing public. This wave of violence has certain characteristics that differentiate it from previous waves of terrorism. Whether that disqualifies it from being an “Intifada” depends on one’s definition of “Intifada.” Let’s look at some – not all – of these differences.

Demonstrations:

The first Intifada involved demonstrations in which thousands of people participated. The second Intifada was much more violent in nature, but its eruption, the first weeks, also involved demonstrations – both in the Palestinian territories and within Israel (of Arab Israelis) – of thousands of people. This time is different. While it is still disturbing to see demonstrations in which people call for violence or clash with policemen, and while the potential of such events to deteriorate and make a bad situation worse is disturbing (for example, if demonstrators get hurt or are killed) – the thousands are not there. Most of these occasions of violent protest involve dozens of people, maybe a few hundred, no more than that. The larger public has not yet decided to join in, or is prevented from joining in. 

Attacks:

The attacks on Israelis are low-tech and sporadic. No use of explosives, little use of guns. The violence is one of knives and rocks. In that the current wave of violence is, thus far, quite different from the one of 2000. Some of it is because of the lessons Israel learned in the bloody years of the second Intifada, lessons that made it much more difficult for Palestinians to use weapons without being discovered and stopped. Some of it is because the current wave is unorganized (see next comment) and is not supported by the groups that have weapons in abundance. Of course, one should not underestimate the ability of attackers to harm Israelis with knives. One should not underestimate the sense of terror that many Israelis feel because of these attacks. But truth must be told: thus far, more attacks have resulted in the death of the attackers than in the death of the attacked.

Organization:

The Palestinian Authority does not want the current wave to continue and escalate. I Repeat: it does not want things to escalate. In fact, the PA is trying to put the situation back under control. It does not want the violence; it does not want to become irrelevant by letting the street take over. Surely, at the initial stages of this wave some PA leaders, Mahmoud Abbas included, played with rhetorical fire. Abbas used language that suggested to some people that he is no longer as opposed to violence against Israel as he used to be. But his actions since he realized that they are losing control over the situation prove that Abbas has an interest similar to that of Israel: to calm things down. For him, avoiding violence has been an ideology. And it is also a means of self-preservation.

Politics:

The first and second Intifadas took place under different political circumstances. The first Intifada occurred when Likud and Labor cooperated in a national unity government. It was much more difficult then for a significant faction of the Israeli public to blame the “other” political camp for the violence. The second Intifada began when the remnants of the bruised left were in power, under the government of Ehud Barak; and it happened right after Camp David, when most Israelis were convinced that the Palestinians had just rejected the most generous offer from Israel they could ever hope for. So again, there was no room for any opposition to put the blame on Israel (in fact, it was a right wing opposition claiming, not without reason, that the conciliatory policy of Israeli governments had ignited Palestinian terrorism). Today the situation is somewhat different. The opposition to Netanyahu’s left faces the dilemma of whether or not to argue that Netanyahu’s policies are the reason why Palestinians are using violence.