In Israel, the Social Contract Has Been Broken

Closely observing the protests engulfing the streets of Israel at this time, one will find that while principally they are held against the Judicial overhaul planned by the Israeli government, their contours are shaped over deep-seated fault lines in the Israeli Jewish society.

Bluntly speaking, these are the rifts between liberals and populists, between the middle class and (mostly) the lower classes, between an educated serving elite and those who enjoy its fruits. There is a large overlap between these three social circles. This is how the groups combine: The most significant fact in the current public opposition to the government is that both Israel’s serving elites—the IDF, the Shin Bet, the Mossad, the heads of the economy, the hi-tech—and the middle class are participating in it. Without these groups almost no protest can succeed, and with them almost no protest can fail (except at the cost of destroying the country, e.g. Syria).

Protestors are out in the streets because they feel that the delicate balance that was part of the social contract in the state has been broken, the same balance that ensured economic prosperity alongside funding the yeshiva world, a liberal public sphere alongside the maintenance of settlements.

Simply put, we always knew that Israel is not Canada, but most citizens were willing to fund large, voluntarily unproductive communities, as long as they were not too much of a burden and as long as they did not interfere in the former’s life. As soon as those communities decided it’s time to dictate to the entire country what the public sphere will look like, a line was crossed. The balance was broken.

In the last decades the maintenance of this balance was the signature achievement of Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu was never a popular leader on the scale of Begin or Sharon, but the deal he offered to Israel was satisfactory from the point of view of most of its citizens: economic prosperity alongside occupation, an increase in the standard of living alongside funding for ultra-orthodox and settler autonomy.

Already in 2005, the sociologist Uri Ram wrote in his book “The Globalization of Israel” that Netanyahu is the personification of the connection between globalization and colonization, between privatization (in the market) and nationalization (in statecraft). On the one hand, Netanyahu is leading Israel toward a successful integration into the global market (an integration that itself was founded, of course, on the achievements of the Oslo process), and on the other hand, he is maintaining the occupation and financing of the non-productive religious sectors.

Now, for the first time, Netanyahu is promoting moves that directly harm Israel’s economy, demand even greater investment in the non-productive sectors, and threaten to import and impose the latter’s norms on the public space

These three together are the jet fuel in the engine of the protest movement.

The concern for the standard of living is combined with the anxiety about the violation of rights. The outrage over the funding of huge groups that do not contribute their share to the economy goes hand in hand with the outrage over the destruction of Israel’s economy. Feelings of resentment that have been suppressed for decades erupt out of panic over a profound change in the nature of the regime.

Feelings of resentment that have been suppressed for decades erupt out of panic over a profound change in the nature of the regime.

One of the fundamental social conditions supporting any modern state is a republican ethos of good citizenship. Without rewarding citizens for their contribution to the whole (not financially, but rather socially and ideologically), an important bond that connects society and state institutions and that enables the prosperity of both, is broken. Populist talking points that scorn the “elites” and disdain public servants as “deep state” undermine the same republican ethos, insult and humiliate those who uphold it, and break the same bond.

The pilots who are no longer willing to volunteer take this stance because they feel that their contribution is being taken for granted, and not only that, but that in practice their needs and values are being trampled upon. Army reservists, who in any case make up a small percentage of the country’s citizens, are not ready to have their abilities exploited on the one hand and their way of life to be dismantled on the other. They are also not ready to serve an autocracy.

This is also where the liberal value system comes in. It should be recognized that, as elsewhere in the world, the Israeli middle class is more liberal than the less economically sustained groups. There is a direct correlation between integration in the global market, education, and humanistic, liberal and progressive values. Unsurprisingly, the government’s moves threaten exactly that integration, that education and those values. Hence the massive backlash.

The protest, therefore, demands the stopping of the legislation that would allow any future government to dismantle the liberal public sphere, deteriorate the economy and impose religion and discrimination on groups and individuals. But it also requires rearticulating the basic contract between the middle class, the serving elites, and the non-productive groups in the country.

The way forward lies with a leadership that is able to formulate a new shared ethos, a new republicanism, where the contribution of all parties is recognized (and of course, the ultra-Orthodox also contribute to Israeli society in different ways), their ways of life and values are protected (to the extent possible), and a new balance is reached between the groups.

Dr. Persico is the Academic Director at Kolot, a Research Fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute, and a Rubinstein Fellow at Reichman University.