Rosner’s Domain | Hamtana: As We Wait

Waiting is a difficult challenge. War – of course – is an even more difficult challenge. And still, waiting for war is not to be taken lightly. It is difficult for the soldiers, who must drill and prepare. It is difficult for the commanders, who must adhere to a routine and keep their soldiers in line. It is difficult for the citizens, who do not know what they are waiting for, and cannot get credible information, as the reasons for the delay are usually not the kind of reasons that can be disclosed to the public. It is difficult for the leadership that is under pressure from all directions to do something and explain itself.

Waiting periods in history have different characteristics: Waiting in 2023 is not the same as waiting in 1967. Still, examining what is similar between the days that passed since the beginning of the current crisis and the most memorable waiting-for-war period is an interesting exercise. 

The three weeks before the Six Day War of 1967 were called in Hebrew “Hamtana” —  waiting. What was Israel waiting for? All kinds of things. Quite a few of them concerned the American administration of President Lyndon Johnson. Here, there are also certain similarities. Much like Joe Biden, Johnson was a tough, rugged, Democratic president, with a lot of political experience. Much like Joe Biden, Johnson was an instinctive supporter of Israel. Much like Biden, he had many other considerations in addition to his support. He was worried about international legitimacy, about relations with other countries, about the implications on the Cold War, about domestic politics, about internal administration infighting. Like Biden, he delayed Israeli action by posing half requests, half demands, vague promises.

It is essential – Johnson wrote in a cable — that Israel does not take any preemptive military action, which would place upon it the responsibility of starting hostilities. The cable was delivered to the Prime Minister Levi Eshkol by the American Ambassador at the time, Walworth Barbour. Of course, Israel was not the aggressor. The Egyptians were the ones who initiated the crisis with an aggressive move of closing the Straits of Tiran, moving troops, kicking out U.N. observers. 

The Israeli government convened; an informal vote was tied: Nine ministers were in favor of a preemptive strike, nine ministers in favor of continuing to wait. What were they waiting for? They were waiting for the Americans. Johnson promised to do something about the closing of the waterways. “I have more confidence in the promises of the Americans than in our ability to break the Egyptian army,” then-Minister Moshe Haim Shapiro said. A statement that in retrospect sounds quite weird. Torn between the two camps — as Michael Oren described in his book, “Six Days of War” — was PM Eshkol. “The prime minister reviewed the disadvantages and advantages of the situation …” He did not trust Johnson’s promise but acknowledged the need for Israel “to ‘show Johnson that we are the good guys.”

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is also torn and pressured. Like Shapiro, his confidence in the military is limited. Like PM Eshkol, he has to work with a sympathetic American president, whose support comes with strings attached. Like another 1967 minister, Zalman Aran, maybe he too thinks that “the war can wait for later.” For those who were not privy to the deliberations, the 1967 waiting time was a difficult time. “The masses of citizens who were not involved in those power games were exposed to corrosive anxiety,” Oren wrote. They built shelters, dug trenches, filled sandbags. The feeling was “of an impending disaster,” perhaps as bad as “another Holocaust.”

Like Eshkol at his day, Netanyahu has a problem with the public. The source of his problem is different, but the result is similar: Rather low trust in the country’s leader at a critical moment, on the eve of war. A survey by the Jewish People’s Policy Institute that examined the level of trust in Netanyahu and in the IDF commanders shows that regardless of what the Prime Minister thinks of the officers, the public has much more trust in them than in him. In fact, only the supporters of two parties still put a lot of trust in him – Likud supporters and Shas supporters. And to be clear, there are far fewer Likud supporters in Israel today than there were two weeks ago.

IDF commanders have at least one thing that Netanyahu does not have – most of the public assumes that they do not have political motivations as they plan for the coming days of the war.

The level of trust in IDF commanders is high. Not as high as the trust in IDF soldiers – in whom almost all Jews in Israel have complete trust. Still, 75% express “fairly high” or “very high” confidence in the high command. This is more than double the trust in Netanyahu (32%). So perhaps it is Netanyahu’s luck that there are no commanders today with the temperament of General Ezer Weizman, who dared to hit the table and scream at Eshkol. And yet, if rumors and reports concerning a friction between him and the military command keep spreading, it is not at all certain that Netanyahu will be able to convince the public that he is in the right and the IDF is the one holding Israel back. True, there was an intelligence and operational failure of the IDF at the outset of the crisis, but its commanders have at least one thing that Netanyahu does not have – most of the public assumes that they do not have political motivations as they plan for the coming days of the war.

Something I wrote in Hebrew

As I presented numbers concerning the growing anxiety of U.S. Jews amid the support Hamas gets in campuses and on social media, I wrote the following paragraph – something that not all Jewish Israelis understand: Jews in Israel have a vital need to feel that their country is strong enough and solid enough to survive in a hostile and murderous region. Jews in America also have such a vital need. Although they do not live here, they shape their future while constantly corresponding with what is happening here. And so, what’s happening here is hard for them too. Not as hard as it is for us. Not as dangerous as it is for us. It doesn’t hurt them like it hurts us. And yet – it does hurt.

A week’s numbers

This is from a JPPI survey of Israelis on the second week of the crisis. The numbers represent the view of Jews in Israel (Arab trust in both the PM and the IDF is much lower). 

A reader’s response:

Mendy Effrati writes: “Israel must fight Hezbollah as well as Hamas.” My response: 1. That’s a good point. 2. Easier said than done.

Shmuel Rosner is senior political editor. For more analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner’s Domain at jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.