June 7, 2016

In recent weeks there has been a lot of talk about the possibility of a breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli peace process. “The Arab peace initiative includes positive elements that can help revive constructive negotiations with the Palestinians,” Prime Minister Netanyahu said a few days ago. The PM and his emissaries – and his newly appointed Minister of Defense Avigdor Lieberman – are trying to create the impression that something is moving, or is about to move, or has the potential to move in a positive direction in the near future. They call it “a window of opportunity,” and they explicitly refer to a “two state solution.” Three days ago, an advisor close to Netanyahu censored the Israeli left-of-center parties for their lack of support at such a crucial moment. “If the left-wing does not recognize the importance of the opportunity and join the coalition, history won't forget and won't forgive,” Eshel warned.

There are two basic ways to treat all these statements: dismiss them as mere talk, or believe that they are sincere. Some people refuse to see that the region is going through a change, and some people refuse to recognize the fact that change creates opportunities. More than a few people doubt if Israel's neighbors seriously intend to seize the moment and come up with a realistic plan for peace. And a significant number of people also doubt whether the government of Israel seriously intends to seize the moment and come up with a realistic plan for peace.

So why the statement? There are different ways to explain this recent wave without much need to believe in the sincerity of Israel's government.

It might be about politics: Netanyahu wants to expand his government and is willing to pay lip service to achieve this goal. He wants the Zionist Camp in his coalition and wants the Jewish Home out. Pretending to be moving toward a diplomatic process is his way of paving the road to get to such political expansion.

It might be about foreign affairs: Netanyahu also knows that a diplomatic siege is coming. The French initiative – pathetic as it might be – put the peace process back on the international agenda. The coming US election and President Obama's possible intent to “do something” after Election Day is over is another looming threat. Thus, the government is looking for ways to ease the coming pressure by talking sweetly about windows and processes.

To conclude: disbelieving Netanyahu is easy because explanations other than a sincere desire for a diplomatic process are available and are convincing.

Then again – Netanyahu might be serious.

Naftali Bennet, the PM's annoyer-in-chief and coalition partner, surely suspects, or is pretending to suspect, that Netanyahu truly means what he says. Recently, Bennet raised the level of criticism he throws at the PM: “You can’t be for Israel in Hebrew and for establishing a Palestinian state in English,” Bennet said. “Only when we are united and determined will the world leave us alone. Until then, we will be (be implored) to divide Jerusalem again.” Of course, Bennet has his own political motivation. If he believes that Netanyahu is trying to oust him and his party from the coalition, it makes sense for him to quickly occupy the role of the critic-in-chief from the right – the role that Lieberman abandoned without much hesitation when the Ministry of Defense was offered to him. 

Does Bennet believe the PM? I don’t know. But he acts as if he does. And on the other pole of the political spectrum people who might believe the Prime Minister act as if they don't. Not long ago, Labor leader Isaac Hertzog was still “laboring” with the Prime Minister to advance a regional peace process. That is, Herzog believed that the PM was sincere. But now he no longer believes it. Coincidentally, this loss of confidence happened when Netanyahu got tired of negotiating with Herzog and called Lieberman into the coalition.

Should you believe Netanyahu the way Bennet does? Should you dismiss his moves as mere show as the opposition does?

The world of dichotomy does not apply to diplomatic and political maneuvering.

Netanyahu ought to be believed: if opportunity calls, if circumstances make it feasible, if the terms of a deal are right, if the other parties seem serious – if all this happens, the PM is likely to jump on the opportunity to make himself a man of historic significance. 

Netanyahu ought not to be believed: if opportunity is only imaginary, if circumstances make it impossible, if the terms of the deal are not right, if he does not trust the sincerity of other parties – under such conditions the PM is unlikely to want to advance a deal.

That is to say: it is foolish to either “believe” or “disbelieve” the sincerity of the Prime Minister and his coalition. Both him and his partners – like most humans – want peace and security for all. They want peace and security under terms as beneficial for Israel as possible. If they see a way to get what they want, they will use it. Thus, the real question one should ask about the government is not whether its intentions are sincere – it is about the terms and conditions that this government would consider worthy of sincerity.

To put it differently: Netanyahu does not yet know himself if he is sincere or not. He will adjust his level of sincerity when more information about the possible deal is revealed. If the deal is beneficial to Israel – beneficial according to Netanyahu's judgment – the PM will be very sincere. If the deal is harmful to Israel – harmful according to Netanyahu's judgment – the PM will pretend to be sincere about the deal but in fact work to sabotage it. An Israel citizen should expect no less.