May 18, 2016

Michael Barnett is University Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at the George Washington University. His research interests include the Middle East, humanitarian action, global governance, global ethics, and the United Nations. Among his many books are Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda; Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order; Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism; Rules for the World: International Organizations in World Politics (with Martha Finnemore). Currently, he is an Associate Editor of International Organization. Professor Barnett is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the recipient of many grants and awards for his research.

This exchange focuses on his most recent book, The Star and the Stripes: A History of the Foreign Policies of the American Jews (Princeton University Press). Parts 1 and 2 can be found here and here.

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Dear Professor Barnett,

In the last round you raised doubts about whether tikun olam can supply America’s universalist Jews with a firm enough basis to withstand the pull of assimilation. In the book you raise the possibility that “even if they are a minority among American Jews, the tribally oriented might dominate American Jewish political life and thus have a decisive influence on the foreign policies of American Jews, because they will control the major American Jewish organizations for several reasons.” 

My question: How clear are the historical divisions between the ‘tribally oriented’ and the ‘non-tribally oriented’ when it comes to Jewish representation and forming Jewish foreign policy? As you see it, have absolutely non-‘tribally minded’ Jews ever had a say, or interest, in Jewish foreign policy, or has some minimal level of tribalism always been needed to be heard in the Jewish community?

Thanks again for the book and for doing this exchange.

Shmuel.

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Dear Shmuel,

The questions are layered, and the responses will be, too. 

How clear are the historical divisions between tribally oriented and non-tribally oriented Jews? Clear enough that I find that these categories help me (and hopefully others) understand an important divide among American Jews. And, by doing so, I am simply suggesting that we should judge these categories according to how useful they are for helping us understand the world. I find the distinction fairly useful, and believe that this is not an invention of mine but rather informed by the history. 

(Big Parenthetical: At the risk of introducing too many distinctions and thus making my answer needlessly complicated, I actually divide the world between more those Jews who lean universal and those who lean particular. When I use the notion of tribalism, it is to refer to those Jews who are at the extreme end of the particular scale.) 

But, like all categories that we use, including Jew vs. non-Jew, the facts often disrupt the theory. So, I find the definitions relatively clear – tribally oriented Jews have these characteristics and non-tribally oriented Jews have these other characteristics – but recognize that in history there is a huge diversity both within and across these categories. Indeed, one of the aspects I found most fascinating in my research was the extent to which different Jewish leaders attempted to propose a different balance between the two. For some, the Jews should be prophetically-minded, avoiding any hint of nationalism and tribalism. For others, too much universalism would undermine any claim the Jews had to being a separate people. So one lesson: there are good reasons to begin by dividing the world into two distinct categories, but we would be fools to think that the world actually lines up so neatly. 

Also, I am suggesting that tribally oriented Jews have always been wanting to remain connected to universalism, and universally-minded Jews have always wanted to remain connected to forms of communal identity. Most American Jews do not want to disappear into the world, or disappear from the world. The consequence is that there is an attempt to navigate, negotiate, manage the tensions between the two. But this is a constant balancing act, and different American Jewish constituencies at different historical periods have a very different understanding of what is an acceptable and unacceptable balance. So, to answer your question: even the most universally-minded American Jews have always wanted to secure their communal identity (though hopefully without resorting to tribalism). 

And have non-tribally oriented, more universally-inclined, Jews been interested in foreign policy? Absolutely. Indeed, one reading of my narrative is that they have, in fact, dominated the foreign policy institutions of American Jews. From the 1850s through the 1967 war, American Jewish institutions that were involved in foreign policy making had a strong universal orientation, especially to the extent that they were concerned about being identified with the extremes of Jewish nationalism. Their foreign policy instincts were liberal internationalist – and they believe that liberal internationalism abroad, just like liberalism at home – was the best way to advance the values and interests of the Jewish people. The big change happened in 1967 – at this point the more tribally oriented Jews begin to capture the major Jewish institutions. As I argue, this is partly because of their growing passion, money, and commitment. Because of this development, and other factors, more universally oriented Jews moved elsewhere. The social justice organizations are not necessarily part of the traditional national Jewish organizations, but rather emerge somewhat outside the system and below the radar. What we have seen over the last decade, I think, is the extent to which the more universally oriented constituency is trying to regain their influence – and the point of fissure is over Israel.