The Distancing from Israel Hypothesis is Disturbingly Re-Affirmed

Just over 50 years ago, noted public intellectual Norman Podhoretz wrote in the New York Times, “Ever since October, 1973, with the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war, it has become clearer and clearer that something new has happened to the Jews of America; they have all been converted to Zionism.”

Podhoretz went on to say, “Once upon a time there were anti-Zionist Jews in America, there were non-Zionist Jews in America, and there were Jews in America indifferent to the whole issue of Jewish statehood. What the Yom Kippur war has revealed is that many who were formerly hostile or indifferent to Israel have by now either become Zionists or have simply faded away.”

In 2024, times have radically changed—and so have American Jews. As early as 2007, social scientists scholars advanced what became known as the Israel distancing hypothesis, arguing that younger Jews in particular were not embracing Israel as did their parents or grandparents. Not all expert observers concurred.

But, these days, the Israel-Hamas war has exposed a number of very distressing truths, and among them is the severe variance in levels of support for Israel by generational cohort: Among both Jews and the larger society, older Americans hold far more favorable views toward the Jewish state. While survey data regularly show that in aggregate Americans support Israel’s right to self-preservation, age differences are pronounced; 82 percent of Americans over 55 believe that a ceasefire should only happen once the Hamas hostages are released and Hamas is out of power compared to a far lower 47 percent of Americans aged 18 to 24.

Coming into sharp focus in light of the tragedy on October 7th is that this pattern of younger Americans turning away from Israel is not just a secular issue; for non-Orthodox Jews, a generational pattern has emerged where younger Jews are more distant from Israel than their elders. The question that should be on the minds of Jewish communal leadership is why has this happened and what can be done to help shore up the relationship between younger cohorts of Jews and Israel.

While I cannot offer comprehensive answers here, the Pew 2020 national survey of almost five-thousand American Jews acutely captures this now very transparent generational divide on attachment to Israel and the data suggest some areas that the Jewish community can focus on that may help strengthen bonds going forward. The Pew data reveal that the differences between those 65 and older and those under 30 are significant with the proportion feeling at least somewhat attached to Israel declining from 67 percent to 42 percent. Similar gaps emerge when it comes to following the news about Israel at least somewhat closely (74 to 46 percent); seeing Israel as an essential part of what being Jewish means to me (53 to 33 percent); and the feeling one shares a lot or some in common with the Jews of Israel (64 to 51 percent).

There is an appreciably large change in support of Israel by generational cohort. In terms of why this is the case, one big factor is having visited Israel, a phenomenon that does in fact vary by age. It is worth noting that nine in 10 Jews who have been to Israel more than once say they feel at least somewhat attached to it. For Jews who have never been to Israel, fewer than half say they feel attached to it. Certainly traveling to Israel leads to greater emotional attachment as a raft of studies of Birthright participant clearly establish; but it is also the case that Jews who feel strongly attached to Israel are more likely to visit. Nonetheless, younger cohorts of Jews do trail older Jews in having experienced Israel repeatedly—even with the positive impact of Birthright Israel, so this could be an area for more investment—be it in the teen years, the college years, or beyond.

It is worth noting that nine in 10 Jews who have been to Israel more than once say they feel at least somewhat attached to it.

In addition to visiting Israel itself, three other factors come into play in explaining levels of attachment to Israel. These include Jewish cultural engagement, Jewish religiosity, and conservative to moderate political identity collectively, as all three statistically exert about the same influence on Israel attachment and, with travel, all four work together to account for most (but not all) of why younger Jews trail their elders in Israel attachment. And on all of these metrics, younger Jews are simply far less connected than their parents and grandparents. To put matters simply: They are less culturally and religiously Jewish, less likely to have been to Israel repeatedly, and more likely to hold liberal or very liberal (i.e., “progressive”) political views—all of which predict lower attachment to Israel. And, as the Pew 2020 data also clearly show, these patterns are further exacerbated by lower rates of Jewish social networks: fewer Jews with Jewish friends, partners and spouses.

But this does not have to be the case. The Jewish community can actively work to promote more cultural traditions, religiosity and Jewish social networks. In the political realm the Jewish community may not be able to address how the left has turned on Israel. But older Jewish cohorts could work with their families and within the community to showcase why the most extreme liberal positions are not in the best interest of Jews today.

It is also the case that acts of cultural engagement can turn the tide with younger Jewish cohorts. Simply marking Shabbat and engaging in Jewish cultural activities has a powerful impact on support for Israel and the data demonstrate that younger American Jews are indeed about half as likely as their grandparents (23 percent to 37 percent) to visit Jewish cultural platforms, read the Jewish news, or engage with cultural markers like foodways. Parents, grandparents and communal institutions can refocus on promoting activities that have meaningful impacts on Jewish solidarity and Israel like Jewish food culture as these activities and traditions clearly play a potent role in shaping the attitudes of younger Jews.

There is no simple answer for how the Jewish community should address the generational decline in Israel attachment and Israel may not have the same degree of steadfast support that has existed in prior generations. However, the data do point to factors that diminish Israel attachment. Even though younger, non-Orthodox Jews are notably moving away from the older cohort, this distancing from Israel is not necessarily a fait accompli. Older cohorts, families and community institutions can work to enhance Jewish traditions, practices and social ties. In doing so, they can strengthen support for Israel. Over 20 years ago, the watchword of Hillel International was, “More Jews doing Jewish with other Jews.” Though abandoned in line with the times, the slogan neatly summarizes the most effective strategy for re-connecting today’s younger Jews with Jewish identity, other Jews and the Jewish State.

Samuel J. Abrams is a professor of politics at Sarah Lawrence College and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.